The Principle of Non-intervention

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAZIAR JAMNEJAD ◽  
MICHAEL WOOD

AbstractThis article examines the existence, nature, and content of the non-intervention principle in contemporary international law, concentrating on the application of the principle to areas other than the use of force. It looks at the historical development of the principle and the sources and evidence of the law, in particular resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the decisions of the International Court of Justice, and the practice of states. The article then considers some specific treaty-based applications of the principle, and explores how far the principle may apply to non-treaty, non-forcible situations. It next considers a number of circumstances that may preclude the wrongfulness of intervention (Security Council authorization, consent, and countermeasures), before drawing some tentative conclusions.

Author(s):  
Nico Schrijver

This chapter focuses on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations. After discussing pre-Charter attempts to restrict states’ freedom to resort to warfare, it examines the emergence of a normative doctrine on a bellum justum. It considers the history of Article 2(4) and the other articles of the Charter that touch on the use of force and outlines exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, including the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure. It examines the interpretation of Article 2(4) in the practice of the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice), together with its inclusion in a number of multilateral treaties. Finally, it assesses the question whether the use of force after 1945 conforms to the object and purpose of Article 2(4), as well as the legal status of the prohibition to use force in contemporary international law.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McKeever

AbstractIn recent years, the International Court of Justice has been presented with opportunities to pronounce on important dimensions of the law on the use of force. An assessment of the court's handling of these issues must consider first the role attributed to the Court within the international legal regime for preventing and mitigating the use of force, and thus what exactly would amount to 'success' for the Court in such cases. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations on the Court's capacity in this area, this article argues that the Court has largely failed to provide clear guidance on pressing legal questions. An unwarranted caution in utilising the judicial tools at its disposal is one important factor in this regard. Finally, this article highlights some potential consequences of the Court's recent work for the development of international law on the use of force.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCELO G. KOHEN ◽  
KATHERINE DEL MAR

AbstractThis article focuses on the reasoning employed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion rendered on 22 July 2010 with respect to the most formidable legal impasse of the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence: the lex specialis that applied at the critical date, and which the Court affirmed continues to apply to Kosovo, as established by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1244 (1999). The Court's analysis of the applicable lex specialis is questionable. Its analysis was coloured by the narrow approach it took to answering the question it was asked to address. It queried an unambiguous factual qualification made by the General Assembly, and it disregarded factual qualifications made by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and indeed all relevant actors. It failed to uphold the legally binding provisions of Security Council Resolution 1244, and it did not qualify as unlawful or invalid an act of a subsidiary body of the Security Council that was undertaken in excess of authority and contrary to the fundamental provisions of that Resolution. The resolute conclusion of the majority of the Court that the unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law seems to read as a declaration of ‘independence from international law’.


1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lailach

On 15 December 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/75K by which it decided:to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render its advisory opinion on the following question: ‘Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?’


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 200-200
Author(s):  
T. M. F.

On February 5, 1991, the terms of five members of the International Court of Justice expired: those of President J. M. Ruda (Argentina) and Judges K. Mbaye (Senegal), Sir Robert Jennings (United Kingdom), G. Guillaume (France) and R. S. Pathak (India). In conformity with Articles 4 and 13 of the Statute of the Court, the General Assembly and the Security Council, on November 15, 1990, elected five persons to nine-year terms of office. Judges Mbaye, Ruda and Pathak did not stand for reelection. Judges Jennings and Guillaume were reelected. The newly elected judges are Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley (Venezuela), Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar) and Christopher Gregory Weeramantry (Sri Lanka).


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojana Lakićević-Đuranović

This paper aims to show the significance of maritime delimitation in the Law of the Sea, as well as the contribution of international jurisprudence to the creation of the rules of maritime delimitation. The decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the awards of arbitration tribunals are especially significant in the part of the Law of the Sea dealing with maritime delimitation. Based on the analysis of the principle of equity and the method of equidistance, the jurisprudence of the courts is shown to have established precedents and to have an irreplaceable role in the development of the international Law of the Sea, particularly in the segment of maritime delimitations.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 867-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Muharremi

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”


Author(s):  
Higgins Dame Rosalyn, DBE, QC ◽  
Webb Philippa ◽  
Akande Dapo ◽  
Sivakumaran Sandesh ◽  
Sloan James

This chapter discusses the regular budget of the UN. The UN’s regular budget includes the expenses of its principal organs—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat—as well as subsidiary bodies. From tens of millions in the early years of the organization, the regular budget has grown to billions of dollars. It is composed of various parts, sections, and programmes. No funds may be transferred between different appropriation sections without the authorization of the General Assembly. The remainder of the chapter covers the authorization of programmes; formulation and examination of estimates; approval and appropriation; implementation and the Contingency Fund; audit; the Working Capital Fund; financing of peacekeeping; international tribunals; voluntary contributions; self-support; apportionment of expenses of the organization; and administrative and budgetary coordination between the UN and specialized agencies.


Author(s):  
Jan Klabbers

This chapter reflects on the uncertainties regarding the question of why international organizations would be bound by international law. It places these uncertainties in the broader framework of a vague and ill-defined ‘turn to accountability’. As the chapter shows, international organizations are often held to account for wrongdoing without it being clear whether they have also violated an international legal obligation resting upon them. The chapter then discusses in some detail the 1980 WHO–Egypt advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding whether the WHO could close their Alexandria office and move it to Jordan. Afterwards, the chapter reviews several recent attempts to overcome the ‘basis of obligation’ problem in the law of international organizations, such as the putative constitutionalization of international law or international organizations, the adoption of accountability models, and the emergence of Global Administrative Law.


Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally to rescue its nationals abroad when their lives or security are threatened. It first considers the definition of the phrase ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ and the legal scope and legal nature of the justification based on the necessity of carrying out such an act. It analyses the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the matter before assessing the current position of international law on the permissibility of rescuing nationals abroad. It also discusses whether the use of force to rescue nationals abroad can be invoked for humanitarian assistance purposes involving non-nationals. The chapter shows that the notion of ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ is ambiguous from a legal perspective and that the legality of using force to rescue nationals abroad has remained unclear since 1945.


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