The Clash of Security and Sovereignty in Quasi-Alliance

Author(s):  
Kil Joo Ban

Abstract Which is needed more: sovereignty or security? The autonomy–security trade-off model sees this as a trade-off between a client and a patron. A client surrenders some measure of autonomy to a patron and, in turn, receives security. This paper explores whether the underlying logic is applicable to quasi-alliances between a state and a multinational regime, such as the United Nations Command (UNC). South Korea has maintained a quasi-alliance with the UNC since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The level of trade-off between South Korea and the UNC, however, has been changing over time, particularly while being affected by the power growth of South Korea, a client, and the preference changes of the US, the most important actor of the UNC, a patron. This paper attempts to explain why South Korea is much more enthusiastic in seeking full sovereignty and more autonomy in the 2018–2019 détente era.

Author(s):  
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu

This chapter examines India’s important contributions to U.N. peacekeeping. It discusses peacekeeping operations and their objectives, outlines the United Nations’ peacekeeping principles, and reviews the role India played in historical events such as The Korean War, United Nations Emergency Force, and United Nations Operation in Congo. The chapter argues that as India and Jawaharlal Nehru held no political or economic interest, only a strong vision for peace and a manifestation of One World, they adhered to and encouraged U.N. peacekeeping.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman J. Padelford

The Korean war will no doubt long be regarded as the crucial test of the ability of the United Nations to meet armed aggression with international force. In view of the complexity of the events connected with the war, it may be useful to attempt a tentative appraisal of the United Nations' role up to the point of truce negotiations


Author(s):  
Ulambayar Denzenlkham

This article discusses Mongolia’s 15 years of diplomatic efforts to join the United Nations, the main factors that influenced it, and the changing policies and positions of the Soviet Union, the Kuomintang of China, the United States, and other great powers. Although the Mongolian People’s Republic was able to join the United Nations in 1946, it was influenced by the Soviet Union’s communist position. Since 1946, Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese policy and position have been a major obstacle. The history of the Republic of China, which existed on the mainland between 1912 and 1949, was the history of the struggle for power between the warlords, the history of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists. In the nearly 40 years since the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, neither the warlords nor the Kuomintang have been able to exercise their sovereignty on the mainland, but they are keen to see Outer Mongolia as part of their territory. The Kuomintang was expelled from the mainland in 1949, shortly after 1946. During the Korean War, initiated by Kim Il-sung, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, Mongolia stood firmly behind North Korea, providing both moral and material support. It has not been mentioned anywhere that this resulted in Mongolia’s efforts at the UN being postponed for many years. When Communist China entered the Korean War, the Kuomintang, which fully supported the US-led UN military operation (peacekeeping), not only continuously provoked at the Security Council of the United Nations, but also presented false documents about the MPR - described as “a Chinese territory seized by the Soviet Union” - sending troops to North Korea.The United States, which has recognized the status quo of the Mongolian People’s Republic, has made it clear that it has played an important role in the country’s admission to the United Nations. Thus Mongolia’s attempt finally succeeded and it became the 101st state to join the United Nations. As a consequence, Mongolia’s independence has been approved by a recognize of Western powers and it began to emerge out of its isolation, participate in decision of global issues, and cooperate with the international community. However, not only did this opportunity not be fully exploited, but due to the Cold War, Mongolia became a hotbed of ideological competition between the socialist and capitalist systems at the United Nations, the speakers’ rostrum Nevetheless,Post-Cold War, a whole new era of cooperation between Mongolia and the United Nations began.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-95
Author(s):  
Tae Joon Won

This article examines the discussions and decisions which occurred within the British government concerning Britain's military involvement in the Korean peninsula at a time when Britain was pulling out of its military obligations in Asia – colloquially known as the ‘retreat East of Suez’ – in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. After the end of the Korean War, Britain created the Commonwealth Liaison Mission in Seoul and provided a frigate for use in Korean waters by the American-led United Nations Command and British soldiers for the United Nations Honour Guard. When relations between North and South Korea reached crisis point at the end of the 1960s, London was concerned that Britain could be entangled in an unaffordable military conflict in the Korean peninsula. The Ministry of Defence therefore argued for the abolition of the commitment of the British frigate, but the Foreign Office opposed this initiative so as to mitigate the blow to Anglo-American relations caused by Britain's refusal to commit troops to Vietnam. When Edward Heath's government negotiated a Five Power Defence Agreement with Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand in April 1971, the Ministry of Defence was, despite the objections of the Foreign Office, finally successful in repealing the frigate commitment for reasons of overstretching military resources. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence then called for the abolition of the Commonwealth Liaison Mission altogether when it was then discovered that the British contingent of the United Nations Honour Guard would have to fight under the command of the United Nations Commander in case of a military conflict in the Korean peninsula. But this proposal too was rebuffed by the Foreign Office, concerned that such a move would greatly damage Anglo-Korean relations at a time when Britain was considering establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea.


Author(s):  
Batbayar Tsedendamba

The article explores the aspects of the interaction between the USSR and the USA on the Mongolian question within the UN during first 15 years of the Cold war. The author dwells such problems as Mongolia’s contribution to the war against Japanese militarism; the question of the involvement of Ulaanbaatar to the Korean war in 1950-1953; the arguments between Moscow and Washington concerning the package admittance of new members; the reason of the veto power exercised by the Chiang Kai-shek regime; ideological conflicts between two opposing blocs in the United Nations. The first application for Mongolia’s admission to the UN was submitted to Secretary-General Trygve Lie in a letter dated June 21, 1946, signed by Kh. Choibalsan, Prime-Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the MPR. The solution of this issue, however, dragged on until 1961. During this period, the application for admission of the MPR was renewed four times - in 1948, 1955, 1956 and 1957. The Mongolian statement was considered at least 13 times in various meetings of the UN Security Council.


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