God’s Devils: Pragmatic Theodicy in Christian Responses to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s Conquest of Jerusalem in 1187

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-164
Author(s):  
Keagan Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Twelfth Century ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face

Abstract This paper considers Christian responses to the problem of evil following Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s conquest of Jerusalem. Among Catholics, Audita Tremendi offered the orthodox response that God was punishing Christian sin. However, the logical conclusion of this view is that the Muslims were agents of God despite being “evil” for having captured Jerusalem from Christians. Twelfth-century theologians believed that God could use demons in the service of good. In response to 1187, while many Christians portrayed the Muslims as evil, some expressed that they were divine agents. Meanwhile, others murmured that Muslim gods (including, to some, Muḥammad) were superior to Christian ones; that the Christian god was apathetic, violent, or wicked; that the crusade of 1189–92 was against God’s will; and that crusaders were murderers. Thought-terminating clichés centring on the divine mysteries permitted the continuance of Christianity in the face of this profound theodical controversy.

On Identifying the Problem of Evil and the Possibility of Its Theist Solution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Cognitive Level ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Existential Problem ◽  
Foundational Problem

The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.

Essays in Analytic Theology

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Original Sin ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Divine Hiddenness ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Part Deal ◽  
The Human Condition

This book is the second of two volumes collecting together the most substantial work in analytic theology that I have done between 2003 and 2018. The first volume contains essays focused, broadly speaking, on the nature of God; this second volume contains essays focused more on doctrines about humanity, the human condition, and how human beings relate to God. The essays in the first part deal with the doctrines of the incarnation, original sin, and atonement; the essays in the second part discuss the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness, and a theological problem that arises in connection with the idea God not only tolerates but validates a response of angry protest in the face of these problems.

scholarly journals A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR OF BIG BLUE MARBLE SCHOOL FOR MORAL URGENCY, SOUL MAKING AND HUMAN ADVANCEMENTS

Think ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (37) ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Tim Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Teacher Behavior ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Pain And Suffering

A traditional defense of God in the face of pain and suffering is that humans learn from encounters with suffering – learn something wonderfully valuable that could not be learned in any other way. God is a teacher, and we humans are the students. This article examines the Problem of Evil through this paradigm. It argues that any God-as-teacher defense of evil fails on its face because God does not meet even the most lax standard for teacher behavior and action.

Theological determinism and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEAL JUDISCH
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
God's Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Per Se

AbstractI argue that the free-will defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz, that (1) God intentionally necessitates all human actions, and (2) no human has it within her power to influence causally God's will – is entailed by any version of theological determinism. Contrary to widespread opinion, therefore, the viability of the free-will defence does not depend upon the viability of libertarianism per se but on the falsity of theological determinism.

Is There a “Halakhic” Response to the Problem of Evil?

1999 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moshe Sokol
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Jewish Law ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face

On the face of it, the very title of this paper may appear puzzling. Responses to the problem of evil are by their nature theological or philosophical, whereas halakha, or Jewish law, is about behavior. In what sense, then, can there be a halakhic response to the problem of evil?

Can I Believe?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Stackhouse
Keyword(s):  
Popular Religion ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Human History ◽  
Christian Religion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Christian Commitment ◽  
Do So

Maybe Christianity is actually true. Maybe it is what believers say it is. But at least two problems make the thoughtful person hesitate. First, there are so many other options. How could one possibly make one’s way through them to anything like a rational and confident conclusion? Second, why do so many people choose to be Christian in the face of so many reasons not to be Christian? Yes, many people grow up in Christian homes and in societies, but many more do not. Yet Christianity has become the most popular religion in the world. Why? This book begins by taking on the initial challenge as it outlines a process: how to think about religion in a responsible way, rather than settling for such soft vagaries as “faith” and “feeling.” It then clears away a number of misunderstandings from the basic story of the Christian religion, misunderstandings that combine to domesticate this startling narrative and thus to repel reasonable people who might otherwise be intrigued. The second half of the book looks at Christian commitment positively and negatively. Why do two billion people find this religion to be persuasive, thus making it the most popular “explanation of everything” in human history? At the same time, how does Christianity respond to the fact that so many people find it utterly implausible, especially because of its narrow insistence on “just one way to God,” and because of the problem of evil that seems to undercut everything it asserts? Grounded in scholarship but never ponderous, Can I Believe? takes on the hard questions as it welcomes the intelligent inquirer to give Christianity at least one good look.

Evil: theodicy or resistance?

2004 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius C. Felderhof
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constructive Approach ◽  
Satisfactory Solution ◽  
Active Resistance ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face

The thinker who approaches the problem of evil theoretically will conceive of the issue differently from one who approaches it practically. He will also differ on what would constitute a satisfactory ‘solution’. One looks for a logical coherence in theism, the other for consolation and the elimination of evil. The theoretical approach, it is argued, actually subverts the thinker morally and religiously. In the face of intractable evil, a theological suggestion that evil is a dark mystery is also rejected in favour of a more practical and constructive approach. It requires an active resistance to evil and then finds consolation in the consequent unity with the Holy Will that opposes all evil.The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, no. 11

Non-human animals and process theodicy

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY CHARTIER
Keyword(s):  
General Problem ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Process Thought ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Divine Goodness

I argue that that the suffering of non-human animals poses some potentially knotty difficulties for process theodicy. To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism or make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims. I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I explain how process thought can respond with reasonable effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives.

The Argument from Evil: Reply to Professor Richman

1980 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Langston
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Nelson Pike

The problem of evil has traditionally been formulated as a claim about the incompatibility of the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’. Hume, for example, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part x, claims that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are incompatible. In his esssy ‘Hume on Evil’, Nelson Pike argues that it has not been shown that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are incompatible because it has not been shown that God could not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering he could prevent.1 Moreover, according to Pike, the theist who is convinced that God must have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering he can prevent will claim that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are not incompatible. He will claim this even though he cannot specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits suffering he can prevent. The theist will thus maintain that God exists even given the occurrence of suffering in the world.2 Robert Richman, in his essay ‘The Argument from Evil’, argues that Pike is too generous to the theist. According to Richman, only if the theist can specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits suffering he can prevent will the theist be rationally justified in maintaining that God exists in the face of suffering in the world. Richman supports his position by reformulating the argument from evil in terms of what he calls ‘the logic of our moral judgmentsr’.3 Richman thinks that his formulation of the argument from evil is successful against the theist who cannot specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits evil he can prevent. In this paper, I shall argue that Richman's argument is not successful against the typical theist, i.e. the person who accepts the existence of God on the basis of faith or a priori arguments.4

The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil

1975 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Stanley kane
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
Human Goodness ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Divine Goodness

Traditional theism maintains the view that the world is created by a God who is at once omnipotent and perfectly good. One of the most persistent challenges to this view is that known as the problem of evil. The challenge consists in the allegation that the manifest imperfections of the world are incompatible with its having been created by a God who is both perfectly good and has the power to carry out his will. In the face of this challenge some theists have sought to defend theism by drawing a sharp distinction between human goodness and divine goodness and claiming that the goodness of God is different from human goodness not merely in degree but in kind, and that God's goodness cannot be understood by men. As a consequence of this, they contend, the created world can be judged to be imperfect only if it is measured against the inferior standards of human goodness, which because they are inferior are inappropriate for judging the works of the almighty and infinitely perfect God. The sharp distinction between God's goodness and man's thus allows the theist to maintain that God is perfectly good even while recognising that there is (according to human standards of goodness and evil) a great deal of evil in the world. Hence, if the distinction can be successfully defended, it provides a neat way of getting out of the problem of evil.

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