scholarly journals Bioethics, Complementarity, and Corporate Criminal Liability

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 997-1021
Author(s):  
Ryan Long

This article provides a brief introduction to some contemporary challenges found in the intersection of bioethics and international criminal law involving genetic privacy, organ trafficking, genetic engineering, and cloning. These challenges push us to re-evaluate the question of whether the international criminal law should hold corporations criminally liable. I argue that a minimalist and Strawsonian conception of corporate responsibility could be useful for deterring the wrongs outlined in first few sections and in answering compelling objections to corporate criminal liability.

2019 ◽  
Vol 181 ◽  
pp. 568-704

Economics, trade and finance — Economic sanctions — Liberia — UN Security Council Resolutions 1343 (2001) and 1408 (2002) — Implementation of arms embargo under Dutch law — Whether sanctions regime violatedInternational criminal law — Difference between perpetrator and accomplice liability — Complicity in war crimes — Requirement that defendant promoted or facilitated the commission of war crimes — Conditional intent — Whether defendant consciously accepted the probability that war crimes would be committed in connection with his material support — Risk of doing business with a government engaged in international criminal activityInternational criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility and weight of witness statements — Factors relevant to assessing witness statements obtained in post-conflict environment — Coercion of witnesses — Whether inconsistencies in witness statements requiring acquittalInternational criminal law — Circumstances excusing unlawful conduct — National emergency — Whether violations of arms embargo and laws and customs of war justified by right to self-defence under international lawJurisdiction — Universal jurisdiction — War crimes — Prosecution of a Dutch national for offences committed abroad — Whether conduct of investigation by Dutch authorities making prosecution inadmissible — Whether amnesty scheme in Liberia barrier to prosecution — No violation of fair trial rightsWar and armed conflict — Existence of armed conflict — Whether armed conflict international or internal — Limited gap between norms applicable to international versus non-international armed conflict — Whether violations of laws and customs of war giving rise to individual criminal liability under Dutch law — The law of the Netherlands


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1167-1192
Author(s):  
Igor Vuletić

Abstract Voluntary withdrawal of criminal attempt is one of the fundamental institutes of the general part of criminal law, originally codified in international criminal law in the Rome Statute. Since the Statute attributed significant legal effects to withdrawal, which excludes the liability for criminal attempt, it is important to establish a clear understanding on its scope and limitations. This article analyses controversial issues related to the legal nature of withdrawal as grounds for exclusion of criminal liability, withdrawal of individual offenders and accomplices, and provides interpretations on potential solutions for these issues. The analysis is based on the subjective conception of withdrawal, under which its essence lays in the rejection of the initial criminal intent, while taking into consideration withdrawal in the context of international crime. Based on the analysis, an original three-level test for the determination of withdrawal in the future practice of the International Criminal Court, (icc) is proposed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 841-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIO CASSESE

The essay argues that the absence of an international treaty definition of aggression in international law should not preclude the prosecution of its perpetrators. Two legal regimes of responsibility, namely the prohibition against aggression as an international wrongful act and the crime of aggression have been entangled. Once one separates the criminal liability of individuals from state responsibility, a definition of the crime of aggression can be seen. According to the author, the contours of such a new definition contain the requisite degree of certainty for judicial approaches instead of merely political approaches. Consideration is also given as to whether conspiracy to wage a war of aggression may also be regarded as a separate crime within international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Shaukat Hussain Bhatti ◽  
Abid Shah

Over the last few years, international criminal law has included an internationally recognized definition of the crime of aggression. One may sight the respective portion from part two (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Laws) Article 8 of the respective document. The purpose of this research represents the historical background of individual criminal responsibility under international law and the concept of individual criminal accountability for the crimes falling under the ambit of international criminal law committed by persons. Whereas the idea of how an individual could be brought to justice, for one of the core crimes of ICC's statutes, i.e., crime of aggression, was recently adopted and envisaged into Rome statutes, after the Kampala conference 2010. The concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression faced many difficulties in at-least adopting its proper definition, which was leftover for future when Rome statue was formulated. To keep pace, this concept needs further evolution. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved


Author(s):  
Laura Ausserladscheider Jonas ◽  
Dire Tladi

War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression could not be perpetrated without those who finance them. This article examines the basis for criminal liability in international criminal law (ICL) for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. Despite the need for clear rules, neither international courts nor scholars agree upon (i) whether liability exists for individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes; and (ii) if so, the circumstances under which such liability exists. This article argues that an individual who finances an entity that perpetrates a core crime should be held criminally liable under customary international criminal law as an aider and abettor. The objective of this article is to clarify the rules that would enable international courts and tribunals to identify the extent to which individual criminal liability attaches to the financing of core crimes, as well as the legal basis for such liability. By clarifying the criminal accountability of individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes, this article also seeks to clarify the mental elements of the mode of liability of aiding and abetting.


Author(s):  
Mohamed Saira

This chapter considers the lost legacy of the concept of criminal organizations in international criminal law. When the notion of declaring the criminality of organizations, in addition to determining the guilt of individuals, was first proposed in anticipation of the trial before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, organizational criminality was viewed as an opportunity both to recognize the role of organizations in nurturing mass criminality and to facilitate the prosecution of masses of individuals. But by the time the Tribunal was in operation, the first of these goals had faded away, and organizational criminality represented nothing more than a tool to accomplish individual criminality. This chapter argues that treating criminal organizations as a means to secure individual criminal liability represents a loss, a missed opportunity, in international criminal law. The condemnation of organizations that can attend organizational liability could have created within international criminal law an opportunity to expose the role of organizations in the perpetration of mass atrocity, to call attention to and analyze the institutionalized nature of mass atrocity crimes, which makes these crimes not only unthinkably destructive, but also inherently and importantly distinct from criminal wrongdoing in which a person’s conduct diverges from the standards of most of society. The missed opportunity of abandoning criminal organizations liability is particularly acute, this chapter contends, in light of the research in the decades since Nuremberg establishing how organizations affect individual behaviour. With greater understanding about the mechanisms for individuals’ desire to conform with peers, to obey authorities, and to rationalize their own actions, we can now see that organizations contribute to individuals’ decisions to commit crimes by providing forums and creating environments in which individuals come to believe that criminal behaviour is necessary or normal or even good, or in which individuals fail to recognize their own part in a criminal system. The organizations thus provide not only the machinery for atrocity, but also the motivation. By abandoning the substantive core of criminal organizations, international criminal law fails to identify the foundational role of organizations in creating mass atrocity crimes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-67
Author(s):  
Dumitrita Florea

In international law doctrine carried on extensive talking and still it is a actual subject, if the individual is liable of responsability and, implied, of sanction for international crimes. Before to reveal some aspects of natural persons responsability for international crimes a couple of clarifications is required. Thus, we recall that the first author which use the term international criminal law was Jeremy Bentham, who distinguished between the criminal law of the community of states and the criminal law of a state. Over time, legal doctrine has extrapolated the concept of legal relationships with an international element, making the distinction between public international law and private international law. If criminal law is a branch of public law, then international criminal law becomes a sub-branch of international law, regulating criminal legal relationships with an international element. In other words, referring to private international law, we specify that it represents the totality of legal norms that resolve conflicts of laws or conflicts of jurisdiction and those regarding the legal status of the foreign national. In this context, the international element appears as a factual circumstance related to a legal relationship due to which this relationship is related to several legal systems (or laws belonging to different countries). With regard to international criminal law, we specify that this is a branch of public international law and designates the set of legal norms stipulated in various conventions and treaties by which states, in their capacity as subjects of law, order the repression of illicit acts that infringe fundamental rights of the international community. In other words, international criminal law consists of rules of general international law that govern the criminal liability of natural persons, individuals, for acts that harm international public order and constitute crimes against humanity.


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