scholarly journals Short Analysis of Klaus Barbie and Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in Pointing out of the Responsability of Natural Persons for International Crimes

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-67
Author(s):  
Dumitrita Florea

In international law doctrine carried on extensive talking and still it is a actual subject, if the individual is liable of responsability and, implied, of sanction for international crimes. Before to reveal some aspects of natural persons responsability for international crimes a couple of clarifications is required. Thus, we recall that the first author which use the term international criminal law was Jeremy Bentham, who distinguished between the criminal law of the community of states and the criminal law of a state. Over time, legal doctrine has extrapolated the concept of legal relationships with an international element, making the distinction between public international law and private international law. If criminal law is a branch of public law, then international criminal law becomes a sub-branch of international law, regulating criminal legal relationships with an international element. In other words, referring to private international law, we specify that it represents the totality of legal norms that resolve conflicts of laws or conflicts of jurisdiction and those regarding the legal status of the foreign national. In this context, the international element appears as a factual circumstance related to a legal relationship due to which this relationship is related to several legal systems (or laws belonging to different countries). With regard to international criminal law, we specify that this is a branch of public international law and designates the set of legal norms stipulated in various conventions and treaties by which states, in their capacity as subjects of law, order the repression of illicit acts that infringe fundamental rights of the international community. In other words, international criminal law consists of rules of general international law that govern the criminal liability of natural persons, individuals, for acts that harm international public order and constitute crimes against humanity.

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fournet

AbstractDue to the heinous nature of international crimes, admissible defences in the context of international criminal justice understandably constitute an issue surrounded with controversy. Yet, while International Criminal Law precludes the use of a series of defences, it also admits that certain grounds may exclude individual criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment even in the case of the most serious international crimes. The present study thus proposes to analyse the permissibility of these defences and the availability of such grounds for excluding responsibility by drawing a comparison between Public International Law and International Criminal Law and by highlighting the differences and discrepancies between the two systems. Ultimately, this analysis aims at demonstrating that International Criminal Law, one of Public International Law's children, has now surpassed its parent to become a more sophisticated and a fairer legal and judicial system, for both the defendants and the victims.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-182
Author(s):  
Abdelnaser Aljahani

This article attempts to identify the relation of the transnational criminal law to the international criminal law that is one of the branches of public international law that has been formed after the Second World War, if not before. The main purpose of this article is to examine whether transnational criminal law is one of the branches of international criminal law, or is it independent and therefore can be described as an independent and new branch of the public international law. The researcher in this article tends to the second trend because of the differences between the transnational criminal law and international criminal law, based on the legal concept, subject of law, sources of law, criminal liability and jurisdiction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (04) ◽  
pp. 48-52
Author(s):  
Erkin Humbat Musayev Humbat Musayev ◽  

Key words: international law, international criminal law, genocide, war crimes, transnational crime


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 841-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIO CASSESE

The essay argues that the absence of an international treaty definition of aggression in international law should not preclude the prosecution of its perpetrators. Two legal regimes of responsibility, namely the prohibition against aggression as an international wrongful act and the crime of aggression have been entangled. Once one separates the criminal liability of individuals from state responsibility, a definition of the crime of aggression can be seen. According to the author, the contours of such a new definition contain the requisite degree of certainty for judicial approaches instead of merely political approaches. Consideration is also given as to whether conspiracy to wage a war of aggression may also be regarded as a separate crime within international criminal law.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 22-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

The International Law Commision's (ILC's) work on Immunity of State officials from Criminal Jurisdiction, which started ten years ago, has generated over time high expectations. In light of progress in international criminal law, the ILC is expected to strike a reasonable balance between the protection of sovereign equality and the fight against impunity in case of international crimes. It requires the Commission to determine whether or not immunity from criminal jurisdiction applies or should apply when international crimes are at stake. At its 2017 session, the ILC eventually adopted Draft Article 7 on this issue, which proved quite controversial and did not meet states’ approval. The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on the main shortcomings of this provision and to identify possible alternatives that could permit the ILC to overcome the deadlock concerning its adoption.


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Shaukat Hussain Bhatti ◽  
Abid Shah

Over the last few years, international criminal law has included an internationally recognized definition of the crime of aggression. One may sight the respective portion from part two (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Laws) Article 8 of the respective document. The purpose of this research represents the historical background of individual criminal responsibility under international law and the concept of individual criminal accountability for the crimes falling under the ambit of international criminal law committed by persons. Whereas the idea of how an individual could be brought to justice, for one of the core crimes of ICC's statutes, i.e., crime of aggression, was recently adopted and envisaged into Rome statutes, after the Kampala conference 2010. The concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression faced many difficulties in at-least adopting its proper definition, which was leftover for future when Rome statue was formulated. To keep pace, this concept needs further evolution. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved


Author(s):  
Guilfoyle Douglas

This chapter focuses on transnational crimes. Though these were long part of the international criminal law (ICL) canon, it is only late in the discipline’s history that they became conceived as being something distinct. As such, while this chapter envisages the history of ICL, it also focuses more on the origin of the distinction in the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. This distinction, which became quite influential, foregrounded crimes under general international law and crimes of international concern as two separate categories. However, this chapter takes a skeptical view of the distinction, noting the ‘question begging’ character of defining international crimes on the basis of an implicitly accepted notion of what international crimes are. But this is not to say that the attempt at drawing distinctions is fruitless—in fact, it sustains relevant conversations about, for example, the intrinsic character of gravity of various crimes in relation to each other. But, as this chapter shows, it does point to an irreducible element of faith in any act of prioritization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-311
Author(s):  
Eki Yemisi Omorogbe

Abstract This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-253
Author(s):  
RUPERT ELDERKIN

AbstractInternational criminal law (ICL) developed in large part from international humanitarian law during the mid-to-late twentieth century. The International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent institution to investigate and prosecute ICL cases finally was established in 2002. Although widely supported, certain states feared that the ICC would diminish national sovereignty. Yet, in formal legal terms, ICL and the ICC’s Rome Statute are just like other branches of public international law in terms of their relationship with national constitutional arrangements. ICL does not challenge states’ primary executive and judicial powers; it does not introduce any general rights for citizens or particularly onerous obligations for states that are already subject to the rule of law; and its intrusion on national sovereignty is only in evidence when a state’s leaders either are responsible for atrocities or are incapable of protecting their citizens from such atrocities. ICL thus is very different from international human rights law (IHRL), which directly impacts national constitutional arrangements. When ICL does come into play, however, arguably it may perform quasi-constitutional functions, in particular offering the only means under public international law to remove state officials from office when they are believed responsible for the most harmful abuses of power.


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