Bridge over Troubled Water – A Semantic Approach to Purposes and Goals in International Criminal Justice

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 929-957
Author(s):  
Alexander Heinze

International tribunals are both legal and political institutions and their list of goals is manifold. Hard cases carry an inflated reference to ‘purposes’ and ‘goals’ of these institutions – despite the herculean task of achieving these goals, the inherent tension between them and the lack of a ranking order. This article borrows from studies of both the politics of organisational decision-making and language philosophy to determine the meaning of ‘purpose’ and ‘goal’. Against the common understanding that uses both terms interchangeably, a distinction between ‘purpose’ and ‘goal’ goes beyond a mere semantic description and can actually offer a classification that might be used as a coarse screen to separate ‘core goals’ from other goals, provide a weak ranking order and relativise the alleged obligation to achieve these goals.

Author(s):  
Jacqueline S. Hodgson

Analyzing the evolving nature of core features of adversarial and inquisitorial processes in an applied and dynamic way, this chapter examines the two traditions through a variety of lenses and contexts. Beginning with the organizing principles of both traditions, it examines how jurisdictions have adapted their procedures with the common ambition of avoiding a contested trial. Adopting an external standpoint, it then analyzes the adversarial tradition’s association with individual rights, fairness, and transparency, and its resulting appeal to systems seeking to move away from a more state-dominated process. It then examines the ways that different procedural values play out within the context of international criminal justice, concluding with an analysis of contemporary pan-European influences on criminal procedure and the challenges in developing common criminal justice values and standards of fair trial through the ECtHR and the EU that often run counter to domestic trends.


2020 ◽  
pp. 164-186
Author(s):  
Marcela Herdova ◽  
Stephen Kearns

This chapter explores the relationship between self-control and decision-making. In particular, it examines various problems with the idea that agents can (and do) exercise self-control over their decisions. Two facts about decisions give rise to these problems. First, decisions do not result from intentions to make those very decisions. Second, decisions are often made when agents are uncertain what to do, and thus when agents lack best judgments. On the common understanding of self-control as an ability to act in line with an intention or best judgment (in the face of counter-motivation), decisions are not, and perhaps cannot, be the subject of self-control. In light of this, the authors propose that this common conception of self-control needs revision. As well as commitment-based self-control, they argue that there is also non-commitment-based self-control—the type of self-control over an action that need not involve any prior evaluative or executive commitment.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Ewald

AbstractSentencing of atrocity crimes is a highly disputed topic among experts, as well as the wider public, particularly in post-conflict countries dealing with international core crimes. Yet, empirical sentencing research, while quite developed in regard to national jurisdictions, is still in its infancy for international criminal justice. Furthermore, much criticism of sentencing practices, e.g. of the ICTY, is based on anecdotal evidence rather than empirical investigation. This article reflects on some of the 'stereotypes' and 'myths' of international sentencing, draws on historical examples and approaches to understand international sentencing decision-making, and provides empirical findings in regard to possible patterns in ICTY sentences and the underlying decision-making process. Topics for substantial and long-term international sentencing research are then presented.


Author(s):  
Jack Knight ◽  
James Johnson

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically explores the subject and makes a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics—and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? This book explores how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. It concludes that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made—even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. This book argues that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, the book suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.


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