The Absence of State Consent to Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice: Judicial and Political Restraints

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Mahasen Aljaghoub

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, (UN) and its Statute is an integral part of the UN's Charter. The court's integral role within the UN has largely been misunderstood especially in the way the court has viewed its advisory jurisdiction. The ICJ always asserts that the delivery of an advisory opinion represents its participation in the UN's work and thus, in the absence of compelling reasons, a request for an opinion ought not to be refused. Some commentators note that the principle that the ICJ must participate in the work of the Organisation might sometimes conflict with its judicial character, which might result in not embracing the philosophy of “judicial restraint” in the court's advisory jurisdiction. They also contend that the absence of consent in advisory cases has led the court to overlook its judicial restraint. This article argues that those commentators have overlooked the main role of the ICJ's advisory function in clarifying the law and providing guidance for future action by the UN organs, and has consequently called for applying the principle of consent as a condition for giving an advisory opinion on questions relating to disputes pending between States. In the present article, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion is analysed to see whether the absence of Israeli consent has undermined the ICJ's judicial character. The author is of the view that the court, as the principal judicial organ of the UN, should, by a cautious judicial policy, provide enlightenment to the UN and participate to achieving its goals while at the same time adhering to its judicial character.

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-340
Author(s):  
Jack M. Goldklang

On December 17, 1982, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution supporting an expansion of the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The resolution (H.R. Con. Res. 86) urges the President to explore the appropriateness of establishing a United Nations committee to seek advisory opinions from the ICJ. The committee would act when asked by a national court seeking advice regarding any international law question under the national court’s jurisdiction.


2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Folk

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a security wall on occupied Palestinian territory, declaring that the wall was in violation of international law. The advisory opinion also indicated that Israel should forthwith cease construction of the wall, dismantle what had been so far constructed, and make reparations to the Palestinians for all damages caused by the project. On July 20, 2004, at the Tenth Emergency Session of the General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/15 was adopted by a vote of 150 in favor, 6 opposed, and 10 abstentions, demanding that Israel comply with the legal obligations as specified by the advisory opinion.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL J. I. M. DE WAART

The impartial and nearly unanimous advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice in the Wall case put the role of politics and diplomacy in the settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in its proper place, within the context of the rule of law. The significance of the opinion goes far beyond the illegality of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The Court wisely and courageously seized the opportunity of its first direct involvement in the conflict to speak in plain legal terms about the tricky political problems that have ruined the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. It ascertained the present responsibility of the United Nations to protect Palestine's statehood. It affirmed the applicability of the prohibition of acquisition of Palestinian territory by Israel and confirmed the illegality of the Israeli settlements in the OPT. Moreover, the existence of the Palestinian people as the rightful claimant to the OPT is no longer open to question. One may only regret that the UN was not able to ask the Court to throw light on the Palestinian question at a much earlier stage.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-154

On 8 December 2003, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution asking the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague to render an ““advisory opinion”” on the legality of Israel's separation wall in the occupied territories after a Security Council draft resolution condemning the wall had been vetoed by the United States on 9 October. The ICJ initiated proceedings on 10 December, receiving written and oral statements over the next two months. Israel's statement focused on challenging the ICJ, while the United States and a number of European states also questioned the appropriateness of the court's rendering an opinion on a political matter. Almost a fourth of the court's sixty-four-page ruling was taken up with addressing these challenges on grounds of law and precedent. The fifteen-member court ruled unanimously that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, but there was one dissenting voice (the American judge, Thomas Buergenthal) as to whether the ICJ should comply with the request to give an advisory opinion. At the end of six months of hearings and deliberations, the court voted on the five questions put to it by the General Assembly pertaining to the legality of the wall. The vote (paragraph 63) was fourteen to one (with Judge Buergenthal dissenting; see Doc. D3) on four of the five questions, as follows: (1) that the ““construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law””; (2) that Israel must dismantle the structure forthwith (as in para. 151 reproduced below); (3) that Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage (as in para. 153 below); and (4) that ““The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.”” Concerning the question of whether all UN member states had an ““obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the wall's construction”” (see para. 159 below), Judge Kooijmans of Holland joined Judge Buergenthal in his dissent, making the vote 13-to-2. The full text of the opinion is available online at www.icj-cij.org.


Author(s):  
Petro Halimurka ◽  
Ihor Zeman

The article explores the legal nature of advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. It has been established that advisory jurisdiction consists of at least two main elements – ratione personae and ratione materiae. The original power to request advisory opinions is given to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Court’s case-law demonstrates that political aspects of question or political motives don’t give any grounds to refuse the request for an advisory opinion. The advisory opinions de jure are not legally binding. However, in practice, due to its quality and the status of the International Court of Justice, the advisory opinions are authoritative. In order for the advisory opinion to be authoritative, it is important that the Court’s position is not divided. Advisory proceedings in its form are similar to the proceedings in disputes, indicating the judicial nature of the advisory opinions. It has been found that in practice, the bodies that requested an advisory opinions of the ICJ, as a rule, follow them. An analysis of the interpretation and application by the Court of the international treaties in the advisory opinions demonstrates that the Court acts as the main judicial organ of the United Nations. There has been established the indirect influence of the ICJ on the formation of an international custom through the use of resolutions of the UN agencies as proof of opinio juris. In the advisory opinion Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations International Court of Justice has created a new rule of international customary law regarding the status of a legal entity in international organizations and, consequently, personal legal personality. It is also worth mentioning the advisory opinion Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by which the Court has given an impetus to the development of international customary law in the area of reservations to multilateral treaties, in particular with humanitarian purposes. In the advisory opinion of the Western Sahara, the Court not only substantiated the universality of the principle of self-determination, but also clarified what features, in it’s opinion, should have the will of the people. In the advisory opinion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the Court substantiated that the rules of international humanitarian law became part of international customary law. Advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has contributed to the understanding of a number of norms as customary. In particular, the Court confirmed the customary nature of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. In addition, the Court noted that the obligation to respect the right of other peoples to self-determination was a commitment erga omnes. Key words: court; law; justice; dispute; advisory opinion; case-law; custom.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-218
Author(s):  
Ksenia Polonskaya

Abstract This article examines the notion of consent as an element of judicial propriety as defined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of its advisory function. The article situates the issue of judicial propriety within a broader conversation on the Court’s normative outlooks in international law, and examines the most recent advisory opinion on the Chagos Archipelago to understand how the Court itself views its role in international law. The article concludes that the Court’s advisory opinions do not provide much clarity as to the circumstances in which a lack of consent will become a compelling enough reason to justify a refusal to give an advisory opinion. The Court appears to ritually recite consent as a relevant element in its assessment of judicial propriety, however, it continues to limit such relevance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


Author(s):  
Huu Phuoc Him ◽  
Thi Kim Kook Nguyen

This article analyses, clarifi es the theoretical and practical issues of the advisory capacity of the International Court of Justice. Thereby, highlighting the role of the International Court of Justice in the development compliance and enforcement of international law from 1945 to now. Keywords: Jurisdiction, advisory opinion, International Court of Justice, international law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 450-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Crook

During 2004 the International Court of Justice decided three important matters. In March the Court found that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with respect to a number of Mexican nationals sentenced to death in U.S. state court proceedings. In a much-noted advisory opinion, the Court concluded in July that Israel's construction of a security wall or fence in occupied Palestinian territory violated international law. And in December it found that it did not have jurisdiction over Serbia and Montenegro's claims against eight NATO countries regarding NATO's 1999 bombing campaign aimed at halting the conflict in Kosovo. In other developments, the Court heard and had under deliberation Germany's preliminary objections to Liechtenstein's suit regarding certain property of Crown Prince Adam. Finally, Judge Gilbert Guillaume, a member of the Court since 1987 and its former president, announced that he would resign in February 2005.


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