scholarly journals Legal Nature of Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice

Author(s):  
Petro Halimurka ◽  
Ihor Zeman

The article explores the legal nature of advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. It has been established that advisory jurisdiction consists of at least two main elements – ratione personae and ratione materiae. The original power to request advisory opinions is given to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Court’s case-law demonstrates that political aspects of question or political motives don’t give any grounds to refuse the request for an advisory opinion. The advisory opinions de jure are not legally binding. However, in practice, due to its quality and the status of the International Court of Justice, the advisory opinions are authoritative. In order for the advisory opinion to be authoritative, it is important that the Court’s position is not divided. Advisory proceedings in its form are similar to the proceedings in disputes, indicating the judicial nature of the advisory opinions. It has been found that in practice, the bodies that requested an advisory opinions of the ICJ, as a rule, follow them. An analysis of the interpretation and application by the Court of the international treaties in the advisory opinions demonstrates that the Court acts as the main judicial organ of the United Nations. There has been established the indirect influence of the ICJ on the formation of an international custom through the use of resolutions of the UN agencies as proof of opinio juris. In the advisory opinion Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations International Court of Justice has created a new rule of international customary law regarding the status of a legal entity in international organizations and, consequently, personal legal personality. It is also worth mentioning the advisory opinion Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by which the Court has given an impetus to the development of international customary law in the area of reservations to multilateral treaties, in particular with humanitarian purposes. In the advisory opinion of the Western Sahara, the Court not only substantiated the universality of the principle of self-determination, but also clarified what features, in it’s opinion, should have the will of the people. In the advisory opinion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the Court substantiated that the rules of international humanitarian law became part of international customary law. Advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has contributed to the understanding of a number of norms as customary. In particular, the Court confirmed the customary nature of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. In addition, the Court noted that the obligation to respect the right of other peoples to self-determination was a commitment erga omnes. Key words: court; law; justice; dispute; advisory opinion; case-law; custom.

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshifumi Tanaka

After nearly 10 years of proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court, on 16 March 2001, rendered the decision concerning maritime delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain. One may identify two interesting features in this judgment. First, the ICJ, in the Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), peacefully resolved a difficult dispute regarding territorial sovereignty as well as maritime delimitation.1 In this connection, a question which arises is the interrelation between territorial disputes and maritime delimitation.2 As will be seen later, the status of low-tide elevations, in particular, generated a serious disputes between the Parties. Secondly, the equidistance method was, for the first time in the case law of the ICJ, explicitly applied to a delimitation between States with adjacent coasts under customary law. Considering that the Court has been reluctant to apply the equidistance method to delimitations in situations of adjacency, this may be said to be a new development.


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-340
Author(s):  
Jack M. Goldklang

On December 17, 1982, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution supporting an expansion of the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The resolution (H.R. Con. Res. 86) urges the President to explore the appropriateness of establishing a United Nations committee to seek advisory opinions from the ICJ. The committee would act when asked by a national court seeking advice regarding any international law question under the national court’s jurisdiction.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Mahasen Aljaghoub

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, (UN) and its Statute is an integral part of the UN's Charter. The court's integral role within the UN has largely been misunderstood especially in the way the court has viewed its advisory jurisdiction. The ICJ always asserts that the delivery of an advisory opinion represents its participation in the UN's work and thus, in the absence of compelling reasons, a request for an opinion ought not to be refused. Some commentators note that the principle that the ICJ must participate in the work of the Organisation might sometimes conflict with its judicial character, which might result in not embracing the philosophy of “judicial restraint” in the court's advisory jurisdiction. They also contend that the absence of consent in advisory cases has led the court to overlook its judicial restraint. This article argues that those commentators have overlooked the main role of the ICJ's advisory function in clarifying the law and providing guidance for future action by the UN organs, and has consequently called for applying the principle of consent as a condition for giving an advisory opinion on questions relating to disputes pending between States. In the present article, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion is analysed to see whether the absence of Israeli consent has undermined the ICJ's judicial character. The author is of the view that the court, as the principal judicial organ of the UN, should, by a cautious judicial policy, provide enlightenment to the UN and participate to achieving its goals while at the same time adhering to its judicial character.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 867-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Muharremi

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-551
Author(s):  
Roger S. Clark

The case-law of the International Court of Justice (Court) is replete with arguments about whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the particular dispute (or request for advisory opinion) with which the Court is faced. These arguments are framed at one level as matters of interpretation of the relevant instruments. But they typically play out as well a multiplicity of variations on the overlapping themes of sovereignty (the extent to which states have been prepared to concede decision-making to third-party settlement mechanisms) and justiciability (the extent to which they will accept that an issue may be governed by ‘law’ and thus be susceptible to resolution by judicial actors).


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 116-117
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis

Larry Johnson’s answer to his own question is a qualified “no.” Surely he is correct when he says that the General Assembly does not need the Uniting for Peace resolution in order to consider a matter that is on the UN Security Council’s agenda. The International Court of Justice made that clear in its Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall. It is only when the Security Council is actively pursuing the matter that UN Charter Article 12(1) requires the General Assembly to defer to the Council.Johnson is also correct when he says that Uniting for Peace does not serve to enhance the authority that the UN Charter itself supplies to the Assembly to adopt non-binding resolutions intended to keep or restore peace. The ICJ also made that clear in its Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall. Without relying on the Uniting for Peace resolution, the ICJ in paragraphs 27 and 28 of its Opinion approved the practice of the General Assembly to deal with matters concerning maintenance of international peace and security. The Court turned to the Uniting for Peace resolution only in the ensuing paragraphs of its Opinion, dealing with procedural matters related to the Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 799-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov Jacobs

‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’ It is to answer this question that the General Assembly of the United Nations (‘UNGA’) requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). The request, adopted in October 20081 and initially sponsored by Serbia, was triggered by the declaration of independence of Kosovo issued on the 17 February 2008.2 Some two years later, on the 22 July 2010, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion.3 By a 10–4 vote, the ICJ found that the declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric De Brabandere

Abstract The recent IFAD Advisory Opinion of the ICJ has resuscitated the long-standing question of the access of individuals to the Court in advisory proceedings when the Court is acting as a ‘review’ body for judgements rendered by administrative tribunals of international organizations. Under such circumstance, the ICJ is confronted with the existence of an actual underlying dispute between two parties, although only one of the parties to the original dispute may appear before the Court, thus creating an obvious inequality before the Court. This article examines the review procedure before the ICJ, and the position of the individuals before the ICJ in such proceedings. In particular, this article discusses the different inequalities resulting from such procedures, and how the ICJ has remedied these in order not to use its discretion to not reply to the request for an advisory opinion.


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