The Practices of ‘Splitting’ and ‘Common Accord’ Under Scrutiny: the European Parliament‘s Request for an Opinion of the European Court of Justice on the Istanbul Convention

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-486
Author(s):  
Elizaveta Samoilova

Abstract With all eyes on the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, another pandemic has been growing in the shadows: violence against women. The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention creates a legal framework in order to protect women against all forms of violence. Its ratification process, however, has faced considerable challenges, particularly in the Central and Eastern European Member States. This article discusses the basic elements of the Istanbul Convention, reflects on the ratification process in the EU and its Member States, and sets out the main legal issues raised in the European Parliament’s request for an opinion (A-1/19 of 22 November 2019) to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Special focus is put on the choice of the correct EU legal basis and the practices of ‘splitting’ and ‘common accord’. This article argues that the European Parliament’s request for an opinion provides the perfect opportunity for the Court of Justice of the European Union to further clarify the law and the practice of concluding mixed agreements by the EU and its Member States.

Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Hillion

Limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – Changing the fundamentals of the EU constitutional order through the conclusion of accession treaties – The case of Turkey – Caveats, precautions and fallback strategies in the ‘Negotiating Framework for Turkey’ – Enforcing the limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice before ratification and after entry into force.


Author(s):  
Maryna Semenova

Problem setting. The Court of the European Union is a central term, which characterizes the entire court system of the European Union, which, without a doubt, includes three lanes: the Court of Justice, the Zagalny Court and special judges. Such an institute is aimed at accepting new acts of legal form and legal significance, and the very decision, the decision of the institution. The acceptance of such acts is a manifestation of the implementation of the judicial competence of the named institution, however, the link with the system is determined by the following: which may be the reason for the nature of precedent practice; both the established stench for the use of the Court itself by the Court of Justice itself, as well as by the other institutions, which have been approved by Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union; what is the decision of the Court EU norms of law EU. Analysis of the meaningful nutrition is the subject of a complete dosage. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The legal meaning of the decision to the Court of the European Union and the possibility of implementing such decisions before the legislation of Ukraine. Target of research is to examine the status of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union as a precedent. Article’s main body. The research is devoted to the analysis of the legal significance of the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the application of acts of the legislation of the Energy Community in the field of energy by the courts of Ukraine in resolving relevant disputes. It is noted that the Court of Justice of the EU is a judicial institution of another legal order, an international organization – the European Union, whose practice is fundamental to the development of the rule of law in the European Union. However, it is stated that the national courts of the EU member states are tasked with the daily application of EU law in accordance with the principles of supremacy, direct action and responsibility of member states for compliance with EU law. It is established that the legal basis for the functioning of the electricity market is the Constitution of Ukraine, special laws, international treaties of Ukraine, approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and other legislation of Ukraine, according to which the subjects of power and courts In applying the provisions of this Law, the law enforcement practice of the Energy Community and the European Union shall be taken into account, in particular decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (European Court of Justice, General Court), the European Commission and the Energy Community Secretariat. Conclusions and prospects for the development. A systematic analysis of the norms of national and international law allows us to conclude that the provisions of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU are part of the national legislation of Ukraine, its provisions are mandatory and binding throughout Ukraine. Therefore, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is applicable to the courts of Ukraine in resolving disputes concerning the application of energy legislation in the field of energy by other member states in full in the same manner as for the application of European Court of Human Rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-32
Author(s):  
Rumiana Yotova

ON 16 May 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its Opinion 2/15 concerning the competence of the EU to conclude the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore (EUSFTA) (ECLI:EU:C:2017:376). The Opinion was requested by the Commission which argued, with the support of the European Parliament (EP), that the EU had exclusive competence to conclude the EUSFTA. The Council and 25 of the Member States countered that the EUSFTA should be concluded as a mixed agreement – that is, by the EU and each of its members – because some of its provisions fell under the shared competence of the organisation or the competence of the Member States alone.


Author(s):  
Stefan Đurić ◽  
Bojana Lalatović

Solidarity as one of the cornerstone values of the European Union has been once again seated on the red chair and intensively discussed within the European Union and broader. After the economic recession and migrant crisis that marked the last two decades, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has once again harshly tested the fundamental objectives and values of the European Union and the responsiveness and effectiveness of its governance system on many fronts. In April, 2020 several EU Member States were among the worst affected countries worldwide and this situation soon became similar in their closest neighbourhood. It put a huge pressure on the EU to act faster, while at the same time placing this sui generis community to the test that led to revealing its strengths and weaknesses. As it happened in the previous crises, the Union launched policies and various programmes that were meant to lessen the burden of the Member States and aspiring countries caused by the crises. The objectives of the mentioned soft law instruments that the EU adopted during the COVID-19 crisis has been not only to show that EU law is equipped to react to health and economic crises rapidly but to deliver its support in terms of solidarity to its Member States and its closest neighbours facing the unprecedented health and economic crisis. This article will explore the value and implication of the solidarity principle in times of Covid-19 in its various manifestations. A special focus will be on the financial and material aspects of the EU instruments created to combat the negative consequences of the pandemic and their further impact on shaping the solidarity principle within the EU system. While examining the character and types of these mechanisms a special focus will be placed on those available to Western Balkan countries, whereas Montenegro as the “fast runner” in the EU integration process will be taken as a case study for the purpose of more detailed analyses. One of the major conclusions of the paper will be that although the speed of the EU reactions due to highly complex structure of decision making was not always satisfying for all the actors concerned, the EU once again has shown that it is reliable and that it treats the Western Balkan countries as privileged partners all for the sake of ending pandemic and launching the socio-economic recovery of the Western Balkans. Analytical and comparative methods will be dominantly relied upon throughout the paper. This will allow the authors to draw the main conclusions of the paper and assess the degree of solidarity as well as the effectiveness of the existing EU instruments that are available to Montenegro and aimed at diminishing negative consequences of the crisis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
James Gallagher

<p>The European Union (EU) has undergone constant political and economic integration since its inception in 1952. It has developed from a community in the aftermath of World War Two, into a Union of diverse states with its own political and legal system. It is the best example of international integration and co-operation in the world.  A number of treaties represent the primary law of the EU. The treaties represent the EU’s commitment to promote human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. The Treaty of Lisbon¹ was introduced and adopted by the Member States to increase participatory democracy within the EU. Originally called the Reform Treaty, it amended the existing EU and EC treaties, providing the EU with the legal framework to meet the future challenges and to respond to the increasing demands of the citizens’ for a more transparent and open institution.  The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution of the EU, and traditionally had the least amount of power of the EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty attempted to address the so-called democratic deficit through a range of institutional reforms that recognised the importance of European citizen involvement in the EU. Citizen involvement in the EU has also been increased through the implementation of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI represents a further step towards the EU becoming a true participatory democracy.  This purpose of this paper is to critically assess the democratic involvement of European citizens in the operation of the EU, and how the constitutional foundation of the EU provides for this involvement. The paper will seek to answer to what extent European Citizens’ have the ability to affect real and meaningful change upon the EU, a power that currently sits with the governments of Member States.  Democracy is often associated with the power of the citizens to affect change in the institutions that govern them. The theory of constituent power goes one step further and argues that it gives citizens the ability to alter not only the governing institutions, but the also the power that those institutions exercise. This begins with an introduction of the main institutions of the EU, before moving to discuss the theory of constituent power, before assessing what factors would be necessary for constitutent power to be successful in the EU.  ¹ Official Journal of the European Union 2007 No C 306/1 (herein after referred to as the Treaty of Lisbon). Adopted 2008, entered into force 1 December 2009.</p>


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


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