Customary International Law and the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-324
Author(s):  
Michael Wood

Abstract This article looks beyond customary international law and asks whether the source of international law listed in Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the ICJ Statute (‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’) might join the dance. Is there a risk that general principles of law may be too easily invoked where no applicable treaty or rule of customary international law can be identified? In emphasizing the distinction between customary international law and general principles of law, the article first recalls relevant recent work of the International Law Commission. It then addresses the term ‘general international law’ and certain problems related to it, and raises questions concerning the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Before drawing some conclusions, reference is also made to the place of general principles of law within the international legal system.

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Đorđeska

Abstract Article 38, para.1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as evidence of general practice accepted as law, understood as State practice and opinio juris. However, by identifying certain norms as an international custom without referring to the traditional evidence of State practice and opinio juris, international courts and tribunals are contributing to the formation of customary international law. This paper presents an analysis of how the International Court of Justice contributes to the formation of customary international law by relying on the draft articles of the International Law Commission (ILC). Th e International Court of Justice, in “deciding in accordance with international law”, also authoritatively declares what the current international law is, while the International Law Commission, although constituted of highly qualified publicists from various States, is drafting only non-binding international instruments. By relying on the ILC draft articles and declaring them to be reflecting customary international law-although the draft articles may not be necessary the expression of the States’ practice and their opinio juris, the ICJ creates and generates the creation of customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ tends to rely mostly on ILC draft articles that refer to the jurisprudence of either the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the ICJ itself. Th e paper presents research of approximately 70 ICJ decisions and individual opinions that cite to the work of the ILC. The author notes the evolution of the relationship between the ICJ and the ILC through three different time periods, and presents the findings on how, when and why the ICJ relies on the ILC draft articles. In addition, the author gives examples in which the ICJ rejected the reliance on the ILC’s work, mainly due to the divergent interpretation on the specific area of international law. The ICJ, by relying on the ILC draft articles that in turn refer to the jurisprudence of the ICJ or PCIJ, is not only generating norms of customary international law, but is also reaffirming the importance of its (and PCIJ’s) jurisprudence for the future of international law. Although ICJ decisions are binding only between the parties to the dispute (Art.59 ICJ Statute), the clarification of whether a norm is customary or not, affects the international community of States. Noting the present reluctance of States to adopt treaties, and- hence their potentially decreasing role in international law-making, this research offers an insight into an alternative venue of international law-making. As the international community, and the ILC itself, is regaining interest in the sources of international law, this paper aims to identify the mechanisms of international law-making, the understanding of which will contribute to international law’s needed predictability and a more uniform and reliable interpretation of international law.


2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 891-919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Wittich

In 2001 the International Law Commission finally adopted on second reading the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and the commentaries thereto, thereby successfully concluding almost half a century of work on the topic by the ILC. Subsequent to the adoption, the General Assembly welcomed the conclusion of the work of the ILC. This article highlights the main changes made during the second reading 1998–2001, among them the issue of international crimes, the concept of injured state and countermeasures. While the 59 articles are the result of compromise, they undoubtedly are a major achievement in one of the most important and most sensitive areas of international law. Ultimately they may be a useful tool to promote the enforcement of community interests in the international legal system.


Author(s):  
Denza Eileen

This chapter describes the Preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations set forth by the International Law Commission, the main legal body which promotes the progressive development of international law and oversees its codification. It briefly describes three theories that form as the basis of the statements written at the Preamble —the ‘exterritoriality’ theory, the ‘representative character’ theory, and the ‘functional necessity’ theory. All of these theories heavily influence matters regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities. Ultimately, the Preamble to the Convention has two important legal functions—to state the view of the participating States on the theoretical basis of diplomatic privileges and immunities, and to make explicit the relationship between the Convention and customary international law.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Marie Dupuy ◽  

International custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”, is considered one of the two main sources of international law as it primarily derives from the conduct of sovereign States, but is also closely connected with the role of the international judge when identifying the applicable customary rule, a function it shares with the bodies in charge of its codification (and progressive development), starting with the International Law Commission. Though mainly considered to be general international law, international custom has a complex relationship with many specific fields of law and specific regions of the world. The editor provides comprehensive research published in the last seven decades, invaluable to everyone interested in the field of customary international law.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter introduces the subject of public international law and provides an overview of its most important elements. It begins with a brief historical overview of international law. It then presents the international legal system consisting of different structures of legal rules and principles; discusses the basis of international legal obligation; offers a brief overview of the relationship between international law and national law; and deals with the issue of enforcement. The chapter concludes with some remarks about the alleged inadequacies of international law and the tension between notions of justice and order that is so prevalent within the international legal system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-200
Author(s):  
Danae Azaria

Abstract This article argues that the International Law Commission (ILC) interprets international law. In recent years, in documents intended to remain non-binding, the Commission has made interpretative pronouncements about a treaty in force, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and customary international law reflected therein. This development is called the ‘codification by interpretation’ paradigm in this article. This article argues that interpretation falls within the ILC’s function, and it analyses the effects of the Commission’s interpretative pronouncements. It explains that the ILC’s interpretative pronouncements are not per se binding or authentic. However, they may trigger an interpretative dialogue with states. The ILC’s interpretative pronouncements may constitute a focal point for coordination among states, a subsidiary means for determining rules of law and a supplementary means of (treaty) interpretation. The aim of the ILC’s ‘codification-by-interpretation’ paradigm in the four topics considered in this article is to introduce clarity and predictability into secondary rules on the law of treaties, thus ensuring the clarity and predictability of primary treaty rules across all fields of international law. The ILC endeavours to convince states to use international law as a medium by which they regulate their affairs.


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