The US Oil Pollution Act of 1990

1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. Noyes
Keyword(s):  
2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward H.P. Brans

This article focuses on the April 2004 EC Directive on Environmental Liability (Directive 2004/35/CE). It examines its measure of damages, its framework for assessing damages and its provisions regarding the issue of standing. Comparisons will regularly be made with the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990, its natural resource damage regulations and its provisions on locus standi. Finally, a comparison is made with international civil liability conventions that cover damage to natural resources. The goal of the analysis is to show that the Directive's rules on assessing damages are inspired by the natural resource damage regulations of the US Oil Pollution Act, and secondly, to show that there is a difference between the measure of damages in the international civil liability conventions and the new Directive. *


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-231
Author(s):  
Frank J. Gonynor ◽  
Erika Lindholm

ABSTRACT 2017-392 The term ‘substantial threat’ appears in the statutory text of the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), and has played a key role as an important triggering mechanism for the operation of the Act in many prospective spill events. Yet this important term is not defined at all in the Act itself. This paper examines the meaning of this term, looking at other sources of possible definition, including plain language/dictionary meaning, court cases, the decisions of the US National Pollution Funds Center, and other materials. One way to define ‘substantial threat’ of pollution would be a situation where the risk of a spill is greater than the normal risk posed by a particular vessel in a particular place – but this paper will examine if that possible definition fits with the actual practice and experience of the term. In order to attempt to address that question, we will examine how the US Coast Guard has used this concept in cases in recent years. The statutory concept of ‘threat’ is also used outside of the US, and the second full section of this paper continues with a discussion of how this concept exists in other countries as to their approach to possible spill events, and how that may differ from the US approach. The conclusion from the examination of US and non-US terms is that the current ‘ad hoc’ use of the term, without a rigid meaning, is the best approach.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.


1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. G. Babu ◽  
W. Ketkar

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) advise vessels navigating the waterways, VTS communications provide to the mariner timely, pertinent, and accurate information that would assist in safe manoeuvring of the vessel.Following several oil spills in 1989, Congress passed The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–380). The Act requires the “Secretary to conduct a study…to determine and prioritize the US ports and channels that are in need of new, expanded, or improved vessel traffic service systems.…”As required by the Act, the US Coast Guard analysed historical vessel casualties and their consequences and projected future vessel casualties and consequences for 23 study zones. The study uses a benefit–cost approach, VTS benefits are defined as the avoided vessel casualties and the associated consequences. The avoided consequences are measured in physical units and are assigned monetary values, VTS costs are defined as the initial federal investment for a state-of-the-art VTS system in each study zone and its annual operating and maintenance costs. Both the benefits and costs are expressed in the 1993 Net Present Value of annual stream over the life cycle at 10 percent basic annual rate. The study recommends VTS design by rank-ordering the zones by net benefit.In this paper, we use alternative methodologies for offering better assistance in making VTS design decision-making. First, we perform ABC analysis on the zones; that is, we classify them into three groups: The A group deserves a state-of-the-art, full-fledged VTS presence, the B group could use an intermediate level of VTS services, and the c group deserves an elementary level of VTS services, as and if the budget permits. This analysis assumes that VTS services can be offered at various levels with correspondingly changing costs. Secondly, we perform resource allocation analysis; that is, for a given budget and given criterion (e.g. maximize the total benefit), select the optimal zones in which the VTS services should be offered. This analysis, done for various levels of budget, would form a useful decision aid for the VTS design.


Oceanography ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-123
Author(s):  
Kenneth Halanych ◽  
◽  
David Westerholm

From the outset of the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill, scientists from many different sectors (e.g., government, industry, academia, independent) sprang into action to establish appropriate experimental procedures, collect essential samples, and gather meaningful data. The scale of the spill and the unprecedented use of dispersants challenged scientists familiar with oil spill research, but also drew in many scientists new to hydrocarbon studies. The response to DWH, as with other oil spills, was centered on environmental and human safety concerns as mandated by the US Clean Water Act, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the National Contingency Plan, which defines roles and responsibilities of multiple parties. These roles, however, are usually carried out by government, industry, or government-contracted researchers and until DWH have included limited input from academic investigators. In studying the DWH spill, most researchers also had to navigate the logistics and liability issues that can be associated with an oil spill event, including the formal government response processes that can be unfamiliar to academic researchers. In particular, biological researchers had to rapidly educate themselves on the nuances and complexity of the hydrocarbons and dispersants throughout the water column. Nonetheless, biological studies were hampered by the lack of controls or challenges with employing experimental approaches in the field. DWH spill research also highlighted challenges and opportunities that arose due to the interactions of researchers from the academic, government, and industry sectors. The objective of this document is to provide some perspective and to highlight issues that researchers new to the area should consider when approaching oil spill and dispersant studies.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


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