Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in un Peace Operations

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald

Since 2003, the un has sought to develop responses to combat sexual exploitation and abuse by un personnel serving on peace operations. Almost 15 years later, the un is still facing challenges in dealing effectively with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers. With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016) on 11 March 2016; the un Secretary-General’s reports of 16 February and 23 June 2016; and General Assembly Resolution A/res/70/286 in 2016; the un appears to have stepped up its efforts to combat sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The first part of this paper seeks to outline the development of the un’s strategy to deal with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The second part identifies the key issues that underlie the un’s strategy. The third part reflects on three components of that strategy: the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, the accountability of un peacekeepers where allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have been substantiated, and reparations for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by un peacekeepers.

Author(s):  
Jasmine-Kim Westendorf

In the past fifteen years, despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Zero Tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers, abuse by interveners remains prevalent in peace operations. SEA is not only perpetrated by peacekeepers, but also aid workers, diplomats, private contractors, and others associated with interventions. This chapter maps the extent and main characteristics of SEA in peace operations, and investigates the ways the international community has attempted to prevent and hold individuals accountable for SEA. It provides an assessment of the weaknesses in the existing WPS framework regarding SEA, particularly in terms of its engagement with masculinities, capital, and other permissive factors that make SEA such a central feature of peacekeeping operations.


1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1660-1671 ◽  

The Palestine National Council met in Algiers, November 12-15, 1988, in its 19th Extraordinary Session, referred to as the session of the intifadah or uprising. The two documents reproduced below were adopted at that session, and have subsequently been circulated as an official document of the U.N. General Assembly, under agenda item 37, the Question of Palestine.A number of U.N. Resolutions are referred to in the Political Communique, and some have appeared in International Legal Materials. Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) appear at 17 I.L.M. 1469 (1978), annexed to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, concluded at Camp David. General Assembly Resolution 40/61 of 1985 appears at 25 I.L.M. 239 (1986). General Assembly Resolution 43/21 of 1988 appears in this issue at 27 I.L.M. (1988). Security Council Resolution 605 (1987) is reproduced in the Secretary-General's report in this issue at 27 I.L.M. (1988).


1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Stuart Klooz

The effort of the delegate from Argentina to press the admission of certain states into the United Nations despite the negative vote of one of the five permanent members of the Security Council was denounced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, Belgium, Pakistan, The Netherlands, and France as being contrary to the provisions of the Charter in the discussion on the adoption of the agenda during the Third Session of the General Assembly. These states held that even discussion of such an item by the Assembly was illegal.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 129-134
Author(s):  
Boris N. Mamlyuk

Larry Johnson’s timely and important essay challenges both utopian and realist accounts of UN law and practice by reviving the debate over the nature and functions of the UN General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly’s power to deploy certain legal tactics not only to influence collective security deliberations in the UN Security Council, but also, more significantly, to provide some legal justification for multilateral military “collective measures” in the event of Security Council gridlock. One vehicle by which the General Assembly may assert its own right to intervene in defense of “international peace and security” is a “Uniting for Peace” (UFP) resolution, authorized by resolution 377(V) (1950). At its core, a “uniting for peace” resolution is an attempt to circumvent a Security Council deadlock by authorizing Member States to take collective action, including the use of force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. General Assembly resolution 377(V) does not require resolutions to take specific legal form—language that echoes the preambular “lack of unanimity of the permanent members [that results in the Security Council failing to] exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” is sufficient to render a given resolution a UFP, provided the General Assembly resolution calls for concrete “collective [forceful] measures.” For this reason, experts disagree on precisely how many times a UFP has indeed been invoked or implemented, although informed analysts suggest UFP has been invoked in slightly more than ten instances since 1950.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-211

Having Examined the first, second and third reports of the Atomic. Energy Commission which have been transmitted to it by the Security Council in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1(1) of 24 January 1946,


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-202

1. On 21 November 1947, by its resolution 117 (II), the General Assembly requested the Interim Committee to:“1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of die General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;“2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;“3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to the General Assembly.”


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