75 Years of International Law-Making at the United Nations

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Miguel de Serpa Soares
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Unique Contribution ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
International Legal Personality ◽  
Law Making

For the last 75 years, the UN has been placed at the centre of international law-making. The Organization can be considered both as a place where international law is discussed, made and interpreted by its Member States and as a proper actor, with its own international legal personality, voice and practice, engaged in the creation and implementation of international law. This article considers the extraordinary position of the UN in providing a unique contribution to the development, codification and implementation of international law in branches ranging from the law of treaties to the legal principles governing the protection and preservation of the marine environment or the criminal accountability for graves violations of international humanitarian law. On its 75th anniversary, the Organization has demonstrated its flexibility and adaptability to the changing priorities and concerns of the international community and facilitated the commitment of its Member States to multilateralism and the principles enshrined in the Charter signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco. Indeed, the outlook for the next 25 years of international law-making at the UN looks brighter than it may at first appear.

International Organizations’ Obligations under Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Peremptory Norms ◽  
International Legal Personality

The chapter considers in what circumstances international organizations have international legal personality and what results from such personality. It also considers whether international legal personality gives rise to rights and obligations and which ones. Central to this analysis, the chapter studies whether an international organization may have human rights and international humanitarian law obligations and whether these derive from its international legal personality, its constituent agreement, as a result of the functions of the organization, or some combination thereof. The chapter concludes that international organizations have obligations to comply with peremptory norms and accepted general principles of international law (which include elements of human rights and international law) that apply to all subjects under international law. There are also additional obligations which apply in particular contexts, and are aligned with organizations’ purposes and their capacities to act and react in any given situation.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser
Keyword(s):  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
General Introduction ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
International Legal Personality

The general introduction sets the scene for the legal issues addressed in this book by presenting their relevance in most recent conflicts and other situations of violence, including in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, the Central African Republic, and Kenya. It also introduces the legal framework the book sets out to examine, notably international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law. The introductory chapter further presents the book’s methodology, introduces its structure, and explains key terms and concepts. These include, in particular, the terms ‘non-state armed group’, ‘international legal personality’, and ‘degree of organization’, which are especially relevant throughout the book.

scholarly journals Condemning or Condoning the Perpetrators? International Humanitarian Law and Attitudes Toward Wartime Violence

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey P. R. Wallace
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Difficult Situations ◽  
Cross National

What are the implications of international law for attitudes toward wartime violence? Existing research offers contrasting views on the ability of international legal principles to shape individual preferences, especially in difficult situations involving armed conflict. Employing cross-national survey evidence from several conflict and post-conflict countries, this article contributes to this debate by evaluating the relationship between individuals’ knowledge of the laws of war and attitudes toward wartime conduct. Findings show that exposure to international law is associated with a significant reduction in support for wartime abuses, though the results are stronger for prisoner treatment than for targeting civilians. Analysis further reveals that legal principles generate different expectations of conduct than alternative value systems that are rooted in strong moral foundations regarding the impermissibility of wartime abuses. The findings are relevant for understanding the relationship between international law and domestic actors, and how legal principles relate to the resort to violence.

The International Legal Status of Armed Groups: Can One Be Determined Outside the Scope of Armed Conflict?

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Gal
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
International Legal Personality

In 2016 Daragh Murray published his book Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 2016). By way of distinction from many other contributions on this widely discussed topic, Murray tries to provide the reader with a complete overview of the legal framework that enables armed groups to acquire international legal status, and preferably outside the framework of armed conflict. He walks the reader through the path of international legal personality, leading towards the acknowledgement of armed groups as addressees of the law. Murray's attempt is courageous, interesting and innovative, but it has its shortcomings. These include his reliance on international criminal law as a source for defining armed groups, and his insistence on stepping outside international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, his contribution is essential for those who wish to include even more armed groups on the international plane.

Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean d'Aspremont
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
International Obligations ◽  
International Legal Personality

AbstractIt is classically contended that when an international organization endowed with international legal personality commits an international wrongful act, the organization is to be held exclusively responsible even though the act would have constituted a violation of its member states' obligations if committed by them. This Article intends to depart from such a rigid interpretation of the responsibility of international organization and makes the argument that when member states abuse the international legal personality of an international organization through the exercise of an excessive control over the decision-making process of the organization, they must be held, together with the organization, responsible for violations of international law by the organization provided that such a wrongful act would also constitute a breach of the member states' international obligations if committed by them. It is posited here that, in this situation, member states can no longer hide behind the screen of the international legal personality of the organization. Failing to take the extent of control exercised by member states over the decision-making process of an international organization into account boils down to ignoring that autonomy is one of the constitutive elements of the legal personality of an international organization, which can bolster the contemporary move away from international institutionalism.

The Legal Nature of International Organizations

1980 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
Reinhold Reuterswärd
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Differences Of Opinion ◽  
Scientific Fact ◽  
Contemporary Writers ◽  
International Legal Personality

AbstractAmong contemporary writers on international law it is a widely held view that international organizations are new kind of subjects of international law besides the States, i.e., have an international legal personality distinct from that of their member States. Many writers, indeed, treat this as something almost self-evident and beyond dispute. Actually, however, the international legal personality of international organizations remains a theoretical thesis rather than a scientific fact. Although this thesis seems to be supported by most writers, there are considerable differences of opinion among theorists as regards both the basis of that international personality and its meaning. Furthermore, some important aspects of the matter have been given little attention by most writers. It would seem, therefore, that the problem is far from solved. Some writers differ from the majority and deny that international organizations have international legal personality. They have, I submit, convincingly shown that there are strong reasons to question the validity of the generally accepted doctrine.1 The purpose of the present paper is to set forth some of the facts which support the view of this minority and which deserve more attention than has so far been given to them.

International Legal Personality of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Threshold Test ◽  
International Legal Personality

This final chapter of Part II of the book draws together the conclusions of the previous two chapters to develop conclusions about the circumstances in which armed groups can acquire legal personality under human rights law. Examining these conclusions, the chapter argues that there is a need for a threshold test to be met before international human rights law can be applied. It argues that this threshold test should include an ‘organization’ component and an ‘international’ requirement. Drawing upon the conclusions in Chapter 2 on the normative value of human rights law versus international humanitarian law, the chapter ends by considering how an armed group’s control of territory may be relevant to such a threshold test.

International Humanitarian Law and International Legal Personality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin
Keyword(s):  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Threshold Test ◽  
State Consent ◽  
International Legal Personality

This purpose of this chapter is to determine what the framework of international humanitarian law demonstrates about the material and theoretical circumstances that are required in order for armed groups to acquire international legal personality under international humanitarian law. To fulfil this aim, the chapter analyses the threshold of international humanitarian law and explores its relevance to the acquisition of legal personality by armed groups. The chapter ends by analysing the threshold test against the evaluative framework in Chapter 3, drawing conclusions about the role that State consent plays in the acquisition of international legal personality by armed groups under international humanitarian law.

Is IHL a Sham? A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and Doreen Lustig

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 709-719
Author(s):  
Jochen von Bernstorff
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Early 19Th Century ◽  
Small Arms ◽  
Discursive Strategies ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Policy Making Process ◽  
Law Making

Abstract This contribution is inspired by the thought-provoking article ‘Monopolizing War’ by Eyal Benvenisti and Doreen Lustig. My Reply argues that early 19th-century IHL codification projects in the eyes of European governments did not primarily serve domestic anti-revolutionary purposes. It also takes a somewhat sceptical stance as to the recent scholarly trend, which reduces historical explanations for the development of international law to domestic contexts in one or more powerful states involved in the respective law- and policy-making process. Building on the intriguing historical critique of early IHL’s ‘humanizing substance’ developed in ‘Monopolizing War’ and by referring to more recent IHL codification projects (small arms, nuclear weapons, aerial bombing, autonomous weapons), the second part of the contribution sketches four ‘de-humanizing’ discursive strategies, which arguably haunt international humanitarian law-making until today: (i) cynical window dressing; (ii) constructing an ontological wall; (iii) utilitarian reasoning; and (iv) excluding the periphery.

scholarly journals THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBER STATES IN CONNECTION WITH ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-1016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cedric Ryngaert
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
General Rule ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
European Court ◽  
Droit International ◽  
International Legal Personality

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document