scholarly journals THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBER STATES IN CONNECTION WITH ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-1016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cedric Ryngaert
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
General Rule ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
European Court ◽  
Droit International ◽  
International Legal Personality

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4

Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean d'Aspremont
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
International Obligations ◽  
International Legal Personality

AbstractIt is classically contended that when an international organization endowed with international legal personality commits an international wrongful act, the organization is to be held exclusively responsible even though the act would have constituted a violation of its member states' obligations if committed by them. This Article intends to depart from such a rigid interpretation of the responsibility of international organization and makes the argument that when member states abuse the international legal personality of an international organization through the exercise of an excessive control over the decision-making process of the organization, they must be held, together with the organization, responsible for violations of international law by the organization provided that such a wrongful act would also constitute a breach of the member states' international obligations if committed by them. It is posited here that, in this situation, member states can no longer hide behind the screen of the international legal personality of the organization. Failing to take the extent of control exercised by member states over the decision-making process of an international organization into account boils down to ignoring that autonomy is one of the constitutive elements of the legal personality of an international organization, which can bolster the contemporary move away from international institutionalism.

Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Responsibility of Member states of an International Organization

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Draft Article ◽  
Legal Limit ◽  
Primary Rule

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.

International Organizations and the Creation of Customary International Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Direct Role ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
International Legal System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
International Legal Personality

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.

ASEAN asWayang Kulit: A Critique of the Constitutional, Extra-constitutional, and Practical Fetters of ASEAN

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Duke BAGULAYA
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Structural Control ◽  
World Politics ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
Wayang Kulit

AbstractInternational organizations have been described metaphorically as the Frankenstein of international law. They are created by states and yet more often than not they assume powers that humble their creators. This paper presents a different metaphor to describe the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. Created in 2007, ASEAN, it is argued, resembles the fetteredwayang kulitin Indonesian theatre. It is an international organization which is controlled by its Member States in various ways. This paper analyzes three forms of ASEAN's fetters: constitutional, extra-constitutional, and practical. Constitutional fetters refer to the structural control embedded in the ASEAN Charter. Extra-constitutional fetters refer to rules of procedure that close the openness of the constitutional text. Finally, practical fetters refer to the ways the Member States limit ASEAN's legal personality in practice. Through these control mechanisms, ASEAN has so far acted on the stage of world politics according to the narrative of its puppet masters.

Responsibility of the WTO for Breach of an International Obligation under the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 197-242
Author(s):  
Noemi Gal-Or
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
International Obligation ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
International Legal Personality

SummaryThis article challenges the argument that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is devoid of executive or governing functions and, hence, immune from the regime set out in the International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (RIO). A brief drafting history of the RIO, clarification of the terminology associated with matters of international responsibility, and two hypothetical examples illustrating the potential for WTO responsibility set the stage for the article’s main argument. The author examines the WTO’s nature by analyzing its constituent law, its sui generis mandate and functions, its international legal personality, and its own use of terminology in presenting itself to the world. Critical analysis of RIO Articles 64 (on lex specialis) and 10 (on the existence of a breach of an international obligation), and their application to the WTO, completes the argument. The author thus refutes both the notions that (1) the WTO is exclusively member driven and, hence, not an executive, governing organization but a sui generis entity and (2) the WTO is therefore unable to breach an international obligation and thus immune from the RIO regime. The article concludes that, while a breach by the WTO of an international obligation may be exceedingly rare, it nonetheless — as any international organization — comes within the ambit of the RIO regime. The WTO should therefore consider adjusting its internal rules accordingly.

The Legal Nature of International Organizations

1980 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
Reinhold Reuterswärd
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Differences Of Opinion ◽  
Scientific Fact ◽  
Contemporary Writers ◽  
International Legal Personality

AbstractAmong contemporary writers on international law it is a widely held view that international organizations are new kind of subjects of international law besides the States, i.e., have an international legal personality distinct from that of their member States. Many writers, indeed, treat this as something almost self-evident and beyond dispute. Actually, however, the international legal personality of international organizations remains a theoretical thesis rather than a scientific fact. Although this thesis seems to be supported by most writers, there are considerable differences of opinion among theorists as regards both the basis of that international personality and its meaning. Furthermore, some important aspects of the matter have been given little attention by most writers. It would seem, therefore, that the problem is far from solved. Some writers differ from the majority and deny that international organizations have international legal personality. They have, I submit, convincingly shown that there are strong reasons to question the validity of the generally accepted doctrine.1 The purpose of the present paper is to set forth some of the facts which support the view of this minority and which deserve more attention than has so far been given to them.

Constitutionalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Law

Constitutionalism emerged as a reaction to functionalism to rebut the international nature of the relation between organizations and member states: member states are organs of the organization when they act in the fulfilment of its purposes; the law created by international organizations is purely internal law; the institutional veil is characterized by an impermeable opacity; the autonomy of the organization is maximal; the conduct of a member state acting in the institutional forum is not relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter describes the historical roots of this conceptualization and posits why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are internal law of each particular organization. Afterwards, it describes the flaws of this theory discussing the problems arising in terms of the principle of lex specialis and concerning the attribution of conduct to an international organization.

The Responsibility of Member States of International Organizations?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 448-467
Author(s):  
Esa Paasivirta
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
General Question ◽  
Modus Operandi ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
Special Case

This article outlines the contours of the special case of the eu in the context of the general question of the responsibility of a member State of an international organization. The special case of eu member States is connected with the modus operandi of the eu in general, and the fact that the implementation of eu acts is largely carried out by national authorities rather than by the eu relying solely on its own organs. This special case is also connected with the phenomenon of so-called ‘mixed agreements’ to which both the eu and its member States are parties. In both situations, the role of the member States is important and appears as part of the normal conduct of the organization. Against the background of these observations, the paper reviews the central concepts of legal personality, competence and responsibility in order to consider and assess the special case of the eu in a broader international law context. The paper also reviews recent legal developments which bear on the assessment of the special case of the eu.

International Organizations’ Obligations under Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Peremptory Norms ◽  
International Legal Personality

The chapter considers in what circumstances international organizations have international legal personality and what results from such personality. It also considers whether international legal personality gives rise to rights and obligations and which ones. Central to this analysis, the chapter studies whether an international organization may have human rights and international humanitarian law obligations and whether these derive from its international legal personality, its constituent agreement, as a result of the functions of the organization, or some combination thereof. The chapter concludes that international organizations have obligations to comply with peremptory norms and accepted general principles of international law (which include elements of human rights and international law) that apply to all subjects under international law. There are also additional obligations which apply in particular contexts, and are aligned with organizations’ purposes and their capacities to act and react in any given situation.

International Responsibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 176-207
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Final Consequence ◽  
Law Commission

The final consequence of the dual legal nature discussed in the book concerns the international responsibility of international organizations. In particular, this chapter describes how the absence of a common conceptualization affected the work of the International Law Commission, the International Law Institute, and the International Law Association. Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the dual attribution of conduct to an international organization and to its member states. It contends that dual attribution is extremely important in practice and it reviews the cases in which it was at issue. After providing a set of principles on how to apply the dual attribution, it distinguishes between three sets of circumstances: dual attribution via institutional links, dual attribution via factual links, and exclusion of dual attribution when the conduct is attributable to only the organization or its member states. Finally, it discusses the effects of dual attribution in terms of joint responsibility.

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