Considering Divine Providence in Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636): The Problem of Evil, Theodicy, and the Divine Eros

Oriens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 318-369
Author(s):  
Sajjad Rizvi
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Mulla Sadra ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Ex Nihilo ◽  
The One ◽  
Good And Evil

Abstract Despite the extensive work on the Safavid thinker Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636) nowadays in metropolitan academia, certain areas of philosophical and theological concern remain understudied, if studied at all – and even then, there is little attempt to consider his work in the light of philosophical analysis. We know of a venerable philosophical tradition of analysing the question of providence as a means for examining questions of creation (ex nihilo or otherwise), the problem of evil, determinism and free will, and the larger question of theodicy (and whether this world that we inhabit is indeed the ‘best of all possible worlds’). I propose to examine these questions through an analysis of a section of the theology in al-Asfār al-arbaʿa (The Four Journeys) of Mullā Ṣadrā (mawqif VIII of safar III) and juxtapose it with passages from his other works, all the while contextualising it within the longer Neoplatonic tradition of providence and evil. The section of the Asfār plays a pivotal role in outlining a wider theory of divine providence: following the analysis of the Avicennian proof for the existence of God as the Necessary Being and her attributes, and before the culmination on the emanative scheme of creation (or the incipience of the cosmos – ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam), Mullā Ṣadrā discusses the question of divine providence where one can clearly discern the influence of previous thinkers on him, namely Avicenna (d. 428/1037, al-Šifāʾ and Risālat al-ʿišq) al-Ġazālī (d. 505/ 1111, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn), and Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240, al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya). The section can be divided into four discussions: defining providence as well as the nature of good and evil, accounting for the ‘presence’ of evil in the cosmos, the ‘best of all possible worlds’, and erotic motion of the cosmos as well as the erotic attraction of humans for one another and back to their Origin. What emerges, however, is an account of providence that is subservient to Mullā Ṣadrā’s wider ontological commitment to the primary reality of being, its modulation and essential motion – the tripartite doctrines of aṣālat al-wuǧūd, taškīk al-wuǧūd and al-ḥaraka al-ǧawharīya – and fits within his overall approach to the procession of the cosmos from the One as a divine theophany and its reversion back to the One through theosis. Thus, an analysis of providence and evil demonstrates that underlying significance of Mullā Ṣadrā’s metaphysical commitments to a modulated monism.

scholarly journals Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus on the Problem of Evil: Insights from their Commentaries on the Book of Job

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-42
Author(s):  
Franklin T. Harkins
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Book Of Job ◽  
Albert The Great ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Abstract This article broadly considers the commentaries on Job of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great as offering a helpful theological alternative to some modern philosophical approaches to the ‘problem of evil’. We seek to show that whereas some modern philosophers understand evil as a problem for the very existence of God, whether and how God can coexist with evil was never a question that evil seriously raised in the minds of Aquinas and Albert. In fact, although the suffering of the just in particular led our medieval Dominicans to wonder about divine providence and our ability to know God in this life, they understood the reality of evil as compelling evidence for the existence of God.

The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
Free Will Defense

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

Religion and Hope

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-174
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Natural Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Chapter 7 defends the rationality of hope for humanity on both theistic and non-theistic grounds. Hope is appropriate when our interest lies in an unknown outcome due to factors completely beyond our control, as is the case if our future is rendered inevitable by theological determination or by the past and the laws of nature. Conceptions of divine providence, whether or not they endorse free will, are challenged by moral wrongdoing and natural evil that appear not to be justified by any good to which they contribute. Responses to the problem of evil, e.g. theodicies, are not decisive, but they allow for rational hope that a providential God exists. There is a related hope that is rational on either theistic or atheistic presuppositions, a counterpart of John Dewey’s “common faith,” a faith in the survival and progress of humanity embedded in a thriving natural environment.

Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil.

1944 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 569
Author(s):  
Helmut Kuhn ◽  
Robert P. Russel
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Free Will and the Problem of Evil

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Mason Myers
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Traditional Theist

Hume after arguing for the compatibility of liberty and necessity, a view now known as soft determinism or compatibilism, noted that it is not ‘possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of the actions of sin and moral turpitude’. It seems that Hume is correct if the explanation must show specifically why an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity must permit certain actions that to human reason seem to be unnecessary evils. On the other hand if such specifity is not required, the soft determinist who also happens to be a theist can argue that it is possible that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds even though the reason for any specific apparent evil cannot be known. If seemingly evil choices are free in the soft determinist's sense but determined by an omnipotent and omniscient deity, then either that deity is not omnibenevolent or that deity has determined the world to have the maximum possible goodness through including seemingly evil choices in the scheme of things. Consequently if, as the traditional theist believes, the creator is omnibenevolent as well as omnipotent and omniscient, the occurrence of seemingly evil choices are necessary for maximizing the goodness of the whole.

Why is there so much evil?

2014 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-243
Author(s):  
William Hasker
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Natural Order ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Good And Evil

The problem of evil is one that perplexes both believers and non-believers. The best approach to the problem is to see evil and suffering as the outcome of general policies God has adopted in creating and governing the world—policies which on the whole are good and beneficial, but which in specific cases lead to suffering for humans and other sentient creatures. Chief among these policies are the policy of allowing human beings to exercise free will in choosing between good and evil, and the policy of creating and sustaining a world of nature that operates according to its inherent laws, with divine interventions into the natural order comparatively infrequent. This approach benefits persons suffering from various evils by releasing them from an often fruitless search for “God’s reasons” for the evil in question, and enabling them to focus on the grace and strength given by Christ to live courageously in spite of their suffering.

scholarly journals El mal sufrido como vía de acceso a la trascendencia: una revisión del problema del mal en Paul Ricoeur. Suffered Evil as a Path to Transcendence: a Review of the Problem of Evil in Paul Ricoeur

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Martínez Martínez
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

A lo largo de la historia de la filosofía, el problema del mal ha sido enfocado o desde un punto de vista moralizante o desde un punto de vista metafísico, que difícilmente puede dar respuesta a la pregunta por el origen del mal radical en el hombre. Partiendo de la distinción entre mal sufrido y mal cometido o mal moral —que establece Paul Ricoeur—, se tratará de mostrar que el mal sufrido realmente no es un mal. Por su parte, la experiencia genuina del mal sufrido que se concreta en la pregunta al aire del justo sufriente nos permitirá, por un lado, deslindar las concepciones de sufrimiento y mal mediante el uso del concepto dolor, y por otro lado, una revisión antropológica del problema del mal, que cuadra perfectamente con la línea de propuesta de Paul Ricoeur, cuya teoría acerca de la experiencia del mal será comentada y ampliada desde un antropología trascendental, no desde una metafísica, ni desde la perspectiva simbólica de Ricoeur.Throughout the history of philosophy the problem of evil has been examined either from a moral or a metaphysical point of view, neither of which can answer the question of the radical origin of evil in human life. By distinguishing between suffered evil and committed or moral evil —a distinction that Paul Ricoeur established— we will try to show that suffered evil is not really an evil. On the one hand, the genuine experience of suffered evil, which takes form in the questions of the just man who suffers, will allow us to make a distinction between suffering and evil through the concept of pain. On the other hand, it will also help us to conduct an anthropologic review of the problem of evil. This approach fits perfectly with Paul Ricoeur’s line of thought, since his theory about the experience of evil will be studied and delved into through a transcendental anthropology, not from a metaphysical approach, and not from Ricoeur’s symbolic perspective.

Why Not Believe?

2020 ◽  
pp. 157-174
Author(s):  
John G. Stackhouse
Keyword(s):  
Jesus Christ ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The One

This chapter sets out responses to the two most popular obstacles to Christian belief: (1) the Christian insistence on the unique and supreme importance of Jesus Christ vis-à-vis any other religious or philosophical figure, and (2) the problem of evil. While other religions and philosophies are acknowledged as contributing, sometimes greatly, to the benefit of humankind, Christianity identifies a problem that needs a solving, a debt that needs paying, a hole that needs filling—and then asserts that Jesus Christ is the one who makes things right. Once he has done so, of course, there is no need for someone else to do likewise. But if he has done so, then he deserves supreme gratitude and worship. As for the problem of evil, this chapter sympathizes with skeptics and mourners, and offers the main answer Christianity has to offer to every problem: not clever philosophy or dogmatic theology, but the person of Jesus.

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