Dynamics of Normative Change for International Nuclear Export Controls

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-539
Author(s):  
Lami Kim
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Export ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
Normative Systems ◽  
Normative Change

Abstract Like other normative systems, the international nuclear export control norms are incomplete and at times contradictory. Thus, contestations to the international nuclear export control norms inevitably emerge, as they did in the wake of the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the 1991 discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. These two nuclear crises prompted intense debates regarding the adequacy of the existing norms. The outcome of the debates generated overwhelming agreement and action among nuclear suppliers that they required strengthening. Drawing on Wayne Sandholtz’s theory of normative change, which argues that events trigger disputes whose outcomes modify norms, this article illustrates how the nuclear export control norms have evolved in a cyclical fashion. The article aims to contribute to the constructivist literature on normative change and discusses policy implications.

Nuclear Powers' Disarmament Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Interactions between Soft Law and Hard Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALESSANDRA PIETROBON
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Legal Obligation ◽  
Hard Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

AbstractThe Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not be effective until all the 44 states listed in its Annex 2 ratify it. A special link has been established between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the CTBT. The disarmament obligation set by Article VI of the NPT, which has not yet been complied with, remains highly controversial. The relevant subsequent practice of the states parties to the NPT shows that the ratification of the CTBT is to be considered the first of the practical steps towards compliance with Article VI. However, as the practical steps do not set any legally binding norms, there is no legal obligation to ratify the CTBT, not even for the 44 states listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is essential. The paper deals with the position of nuclear powers party to the NPT that have not yet ratified the CTBT (most prominently the US and China) and demonstrates that these states should at least provide detailed motivation for their conduct. Otherwise, other states parties to the NPT could consider them as not complying in good faith with Article VI of the NPT and invoke the inadimplenti non est ademplendum rule to justify breaches of their own obligations under the same treaty.

Child advocacy in the nuclear age

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 802-804
Author(s):  
Lawrence R. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Child Advocacy ◽  
World War ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Second World

In 1943, amidst the nation's mobilization for the Second World War, there appeared an article by Dr. William Schmidt of the Children's Bureau on the susceptibility of young people to the hazards of radioactive materials.1 Reviewing the literature, and invoking generally accepted pediatric principles, Dr. Schmidt concluded that young people possess special vulnerability to the hazards of radiation, and that this warranted their exclusion from employment in the gas mantle and radium dial industries. Now, more than 30 years later, there again exists an urgent need to review the topic of radiation and children. With the spread of nuclear weapons technology to many countries, the spectre of nuclear test fallout (not to mention nuclear warfare!) is once again upon us.

The Pakistani Nuclear Program (1972–1987)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Soviet Invasion

This chapter examines US nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Although Pakistan started its nuclear weapons program prior to the development of a US sanctions policy, and thus underestimated the odds of facing sanctions, it nevertheless went on to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States was unable to halt the Pakistani program for two reasons. First, when it initially threatened and imposed sanctions on Pakistan in the late 1970s, Pakistan was not highly dependent on the United States and therefore had little to lose. Second, once Pakistan became dependent on the United States in the 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased need for aid, the United States undermined the credibility of its nonproliferation policy by waiving sanctions and only credibly threatening to cut off aid in response to a nuclear test.

Sakharov and the Nuclear Test Ban

Worldview ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Herbert York
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
The United States ◽  
Formative Period ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Andrei Sakharov ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban

Since 1958 it has been the stated policy of both the United States and the USSR to achieve a treaty that would ban all nuclear weapons tests. Andrei Sakharov, we now know, played a major, perhaps crucial, role in this matter. And several American scientists, including myself, played a role in establishing and carrying out U.S. policy in this same regard. During the formative period of the late '50s and early '60s we had no idea who Sakharov was or what he was doing. I believe if we had, we would have done a much better job, but the everpresent curtain of Soviet secrecy prevented it.

The juche H-bomb? North Korea, nuclear weapons and regime-state survival

2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1068
Author(s):  
Edward Howell
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
International Perspective ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Rogue States ◽  
The North ◽  
North Korean Defectors ◽  
Domestic Level ◽  
North Korean Regime ◽  
State Survival

Abstract Existing scholarship on North Korea's nuclear programme remains overwhelmingly centred around questions of containment or engagement with the North Korean regime-state, amid international calls for denuclearization. Yet, scholarship has rarely interrogated the precise value of nuclear weapons to the regime-state. This article develops a new theoretical framework of nuclear ideology to explore the puzzle of the survival of North Korea. This framework aims to show how the North Korean nuclear programme is deeply entrenched within the state ideology of juche, as one device for continued regime-state survival. Through interviews with elite North Korean defectors and textual analysis of North Korean and international sources, I show that North Korea's nuclear ideology has been constructed according to different frames of meaning, targeting referent actors of international ‘enemy’ powers and domestic audiences. This article concludes that nuclear ideology functions primarily as a tool to arouse domestic legitimacy for the North Korean regime-state, by targeting elite actors within the highly stratified domestic population. From an international perspective, perception of North Korea's survival remains tied largely to the regime-state's physical possession of nuclear weapons. This article has extremely timely theoretical and policy implications given the current ‘dialogue’ between US and North Korean leaders. First, it opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry surrounding questions of the legitimacy of rogue states within international relations. Secondly, this article calls for a more robust understanding of the domestic-level politics of North Korea, in order to understand the regime-state's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis its nuclear programme.

Undermining the Consensus-Building and List-Based Standards in Export Controls: What the US Export Controls Act Means to the Global Export Control Regime

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-599
Author(s):  
Cindy Whang
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
National Security ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Consensus Building ◽  
World War ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
Post World War Ii ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Control Regime

ABSTRACT On 13 August 2018, US President Donald Trump signed a legislation called the ‘Export Controls Act of 2018’ (ECA) that is important for reinvigorating the export control regime in the USA. This paper argues that contents of the ECA will not only impact the USA but also the way that the ECA is structured will potentially have a long-lasting influence on international export control regimes and the role that export controls play in international trade. International export control regimes were established post-World War II as a trade measure to pursue common strategic and national security goals among allied countries. Due to the sensitive nature of national security issues, international export control agreements were structured as non-binding agreements that heavily relied on the consensus of participating countries in formulating export control lists that the participating countries could then adopt in their domestic regulations. The cohesiveness of the global export control regimes has been based on the cornerstones of the consensus-building and list-based standards. The USA established its export control regimes to complement these international export control regimes and has been a strong proponent of requesting countries to adopt the international export control lists into domestic regulations. With the passage of the ECA, the infusion of economic policy considerations such as maintaining the USA’s technological leadership through adding a category of emerging and foundational technology has changed the long-standing export control narrative. Through the changes made to the US ECA, the scope of national security subject to export control regimes has expanded from being focused on military-oriented goods and technology into one that now includes commercial technology. While the changes made through the ECA serve to protect the USA’s technological interests, the statute could also undermine important elements of the global export control regime that the international community has established in the past seventy years post-World War II.

scholarly journals La réglementation américaine en matière de contrôle des armes chimiques et biologiques

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-785
Author(s):  
Albert Legault
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
Technical Data ◽  
Group A ◽  
The U.S

After identifying the role of the Australia Group which is a multilateral body designed to control export of sensitive chemicals, as well as « equipment » and « technical data » designed to fabricate chemical or bacteriological weapons, this study briefly overviews U.S. policy in terms of export controls, and then attempts to review the current U.S. regulations on chemical and bacteriological weapons. With regard to chemical weapons, the analysis goes back to the Iran-Irak war and traces the evolution of the various controls imposed on chemicals. With the March 13, 1991 decision, export controls exist on 50 chemicals and the warning list has now been reduced to zero. With regards to biological weapons, a whole new list of controls is now being discussed within the Australia Group. A list of 29 countries has been drawn up and the U.S. hope that the Australia Group will adopt similar controls when it meets in December 1991. The article also contains five annexes : the classification of groups countries for export control reasons ; a list of countries under foreign policy controls ; the classification of microorganisms according to their class and degree of pathogenicity; a list of the fifty precursors under control; and the chronological evolution of the U.S. controls imposed on chemicals.

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