Conceptions and (Mis)conceptions of Science in International Treaties; the ICJ Whaling Case in Context

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Gogarty

The recent judgment in the International Court of Justice case Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) determined that Japanese ‘special permit’ whaling in the Southern Ocean was not ‘for the purposes of scientific research’. This is the only exemption permitted under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’s current moratorium on commercial whaling. The Court made its determination by characterising the Japanese research program as a scientific program, but failing to define what scientific research actually was or was not. This paper presents the background to the decision, and challenges the reasoning of the Court and its standard of review test. It concludes that the Court failed to take the opportunity to offer a clear determination to states on their legal–scientific obligations within international law.

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (51) ◽  
pp. 14523-14527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Mangel

I provide a brief review of the origins of the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling and the failure to successfully regulate whaling that led to the commercial moratorium in 1986. I then describe the Japanese Whale Research Programs Under Special Permit in the Antarctica (JARPA I, JARPA II) and the origins of the caseWhaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)in the International Court of Justice. I explain that the International Court of Justice chose to conduct an objective review of JARPA II, the standard that it used for the review, and the pathway that it took to adjudicate the case without providing a definition of science to be used in international law. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the Judgment for the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, and the International Whaling Commission in particular, for other international treaties, and for the interaction of science and law more generally.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Peel

On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its judgment in the case of Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Whaling Decision). In what is perhaps its most important environmental decision to date, the ICJ ordered Japan to halt its whaling program in the Southern Ocean, finding the program lacked scientific merit and breached requirements of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-726
Author(s):  
Anastasia Telesetsky ◽  
Seokwoo Lee

Since the global decline in commercial whaling, the International Whaling Commission (iwc) has been at the centre of a long-standing debate between pro-whaling industry States and whale preservation States that threatens the collapse of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (icrw) as a treaty regime. This article describes the ongoing treaty regime disagreement that led to the International Court of Justice (icj) Whaling in the Antarctic case and suggests that the icj’s decision highlights further weaknesses in the existing icrw treaty regime. The fissures in the treaty regime have become even more apparent with the iwc Scientific Committee’s request for more data from the Japanese government on the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (newrep-a) and Japan’s diplomatic threat to unilaterally resume whaling. The article concludes with a suggestion that States amend Article viii in order to strengthen the existing icrw framework.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cymie R. Payne

AbstractThe International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment inWhaling in the Antarctic, a dispute brought by Australia against Japan, found that Japan had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) moratoria on all commercial whaling and the use of factory ships to process whales, and also the prohibition on whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. In the course of analyzing whether special permits issued by Japan qualified for the scientific whaling exemption under Article VIII ICRW, the Court benefited from a more robust scientific fact-finding process than at times in the past. The judgment emphasized the mutual obligations of this multilateral agreement by taking the view that the provisions of the ICRW’s scientific whaling exemptions are neither self-judging nor subject to a ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of a state party claiming the exemption. The case was driven by conflicting attitudes towards commercial whaling, and also towards global common spaces. The ICJ’s decision and Japan’s response indicate the limits of the ICRW in resolving those differences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Franziska Liebelt

<p>Third state intervention before international institutions originated in international arbitration around 1875 and has been included in the statute of the International Court since the foundation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and is therefore no new phenomenon. Today, most systems of international dispute settlement provide for the possibility of third state intervention. Nevertheless intervention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been used by states sparsely and seems underdeveloped. The statute of the ICJ provides for two ways of intervention in its arts 62 and 63. There have been few applications under these provisions. Looking at the court’s orders in these few cases, the court seems to have adopted a restrictive approach towards allowing applications to intervene. This paper looks at the institution of intervention in the area of international environmental law disputes. There have been two relevant disputes of this kind before the ICJ: the Nuclear Tests litigation and the recent litigation of Whaling in the Antarctic. Both of these cases dealt with the question of state obligations towards the protection of the environment. The applications to intervene in Nuclear Tests failed for reasons that will be explained in more detail below. New Zealand’s application to intervene in Whaling in the Antarctic was authorized by the ICJ on the 6 February 2013 under art 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. The case is exceptional in that it is only the second time the ICJ allowed intervention under art 63. Both cases demonstrate that there are environmental issues that concern more than only the nations that are parties to the dispute. They indicate that intervention plays a particularly strong role in environmental issues because these issues by their nature often affect more than just two states. This paper analyses how the shared environmental concern of the international community might lead to an extension of intervention before the ICJ. It further more looks at the issues that arose before the court in connection with the intervention in Whaling in the Antarctic and how these issues were dealt with.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


Author(s):  
Ingo Venzke

This chapter investigates the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during the battle for international law circa the years of 1955–1975. It first draws attention to newly independent states that saw the Court in its role of reinforcing international law’s colonial imprints. The chapter then focuses on the Court’s captivating highpoint during the battle for international law: its 1962 and 1966 Judgments in South West Africa, and the jarring 1966 decision which, in the eyes of many states, presented the ICJ as a ‘white man’s court’ in a white man’s world. The chapter then shows the effects of the 1966 decision in judicial elections and the quest to change the composition of the bench. Finally, the chapter argues that the present inquiry serves as a vivid reminder that international law and its institutions are the product of a veritable struggle, then as now.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 867-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Muharremi

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-407
Author(s):  
Udoka Ndidiamaka Owie

Abstract International law has a long history of dealing with racial discrimination, including its involvement in the perpetration of racial discrimination. However, in establishing a body of norms to tackle the problems of racial discrimination, several multilateral instruments have been adopted under the auspices of the United Nations addressing this malaise to various extents with the most extensive being the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of 21 December 1965. While lauded for its singular and dedicated focus on racial discrimination, the Convention is challenged, at least interpretatively, as to the grounds for racial discrimination within its remit. Events occurring between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates on 5 June 2017 have afforded the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an opportunity—the third since the coming into effect of the Convention—to interpret this landmark treaty.


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