Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (I.C.J.)

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Peel

On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its judgment in the case of Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Whaling Decision). In what is perhaps its most important environmental decision to date, the ICJ ordered Japan to halt its whaling program in the Southern Ocean, finding the program lacked scientific merit and breached requirements of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Gogarty

The recent judgment in the International Court of Justice case Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) determined that Japanese ‘special permit’ whaling in the Southern Ocean was not ‘for the purposes of scientific research’. This is the only exemption permitted under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’s current moratorium on commercial whaling. The Court made its determination by characterising the Japanese research program as a scientific program, but failing to define what scientific research actually was or was not. This paper presents the background to the decision, and challenges the reasoning of the Court and its standard of review test. It concludes that the Court failed to take the opportunity to offer a clear determination to states on their legal–scientific obligations within international law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (51) ◽  
pp. 14523-14527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Mangel

I provide a brief review of the origins of the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling and the failure to successfully regulate whaling that led to the commercial moratorium in 1986. I then describe the Japanese Whale Research Programs Under Special Permit in the Antarctica (JARPA I, JARPA II) and the origins of the caseWhaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)in the International Court of Justice. I explain that the International Court of Justice chose to conduct an objective review of JARPA II, the standard that it used for the review, and the pathway that it took to adjudicate the case without providing a definition of science to be used in international law. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the Judgment for the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, and the International Whaling Commission in particular, for other international treaties, and for the interaction of science and law more generally.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Franziska Liebelt

<p>Third state intervention before international institutions originated in international arbitration around 1875 and has been included in the statute of the International Court since the foundation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and is therefore no new phenomenon. Today, most systems of international dispute settlement provide for the possibility of third state intervention. Nevertheless intervention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been used by states sparsely and seems underdeveloped. The statute of the ICJ provides for two ways of intervention in its arts 62 and 63. There have been few applications under these provisions. Looking at the court’s orders in these few cases, the court seems to have adopted a restrictive approach towards allowing applications to intervene. This paper looks at the institution of intervention in the area of international environmental law disputes. There have been two relevant disputes of this kind before the ICJ: the Nuclear Tests litigation and the recent litigation of Whaling in the Antarctic. Both of these cases dealt with the question of state obligations towards the protection of the environment. The applications to intervene in Nuclear Tests failed for reasons that will be explained in more detail below. New Zealand’s application to intervene in Whaling in the Antarctic was authorized by the ICJ on the 6 February 2013 under art 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. The case is exceptional in that it is only the second time the ICJ allowed intervention under art 63. Both cases demonstrate that there are environmental issues that concern more than only the nations that are parties to the dispute. They indicate that intervention plays a particularly strong role in environmental issues because these issues by their nature often affect more than just two states. This paper analyses how the shared environmental concern of the international community might lead to an extension of intervention before the ICJ. It further more looks at the issues that arose before the court in connection with the intervention in Whaling in the Antarctic and how these issues were dealt with.</p>


2018 ◽  
pp. 539-552
Author(s):  
Malgosia Fitzmaurice

This chapter discusses the totemic object of the whale. It analyses the provisions of the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling and the work of the International Whaling Commission. It gives a detailed analysis of the contemporary status of whaling activities provided for under the Whaling Convention: commercial; scientific; and Indigenous; all eliciting conflicting and emotional reactions for the member states of the International Whaling Commission. The whale can also be seen as an object of consumption, which leads to very strong reactions. It appears that at present there is no acceptable solution to reconcile such divergent attitudes. The chapter also deals with the 2014 case before the International Court of Justice, concerning scientific whaling in the Antarctic (Australia, New Zealand intervening v Japan), which serves as an excellent example of problems and conflict of whaling. Whaling appears to be a Gordian Knot of contemporary international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
Michael Johnson

This paper identifies parts of the International Court of Justice’s judgment in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) that might hold broader relevance beyond the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and explores what that might entail for the Antarctic Treaty System. There are four aspects explored. First, an analysis of the Court’s treatment of Japan’s challenge to jurisdiction that touched upon the relevance or otherwise of Antarctic sovereignty to the issues at hand in the case. Second, the Court’s drawing of important conclusions from the Whaling Convention’s status as an ‘evolving instrument’, in light of it having a treaty body with ongoing decision making responsibility will be discussed. Third, to what extent might the Court’s assessment of the concept of ‘science’ in a legal context find relevance in Antarctic obligations will be analysed. Finally, the success of the claim brought by Australia, and the manner in which the Court addressed the issues before it, and whether they bear any consequences for potential, future environmental cases, will be discussed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-726
Author(s):  
Anastasia Telesetsky ◽  
Seokwoo Lee

Since the global decline in commercial whaling, the International Whaling Commission (iwc) has been at the centre of a long-standing debate between pro-whaling industry States and whale preservation States that threatens the collapse of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (icrw) as a treaty regime. This article describes the ongoing treaty regime disagreement that led to the International Court of Justice (icj) Whaling in the Antarctic case and suggests that the icj’s decision highlights further weaknesses in the existing icrw treaty regime. The fissures in the treaty regime have become even more apparent with the iwc Scientific Committee’s request for more data from the Japanese government on the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (newrep-a) and Japan’s diplomatic threat to unilaterally resume whaling. The article concludes with a suggestion that States amend Article viii in order to strengthen the existing icrw framework.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cymie R. Payne

AbstractThe International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment inWhaling in the Antarctic, a dispute brought by Australia against Japan, found that Japan had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) moratoria on all commercial whaling and the use of factory ships to process whales, and also the prohibition on whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. In the course of analyzing whether special permits issued by Japan qualified for the scientific whaling exemption under Article VIII ICRW, the Court benefited from a more robust scientific fact-finding process than at times in the past. The judgment emphasized the mutual obligations of this multilateral agreement by taking the view that the provisions of the ICRW’s scientific whaling exemptions are neither self-judging nor subject to a ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of a state party claiming the exemption. The case was driven by conflicting attitudes towards commercial whaling, and also towards global common spaces. The ICJ’s decision and Japan’s response indicate the limits of the ICRW in resolving those differences.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Franziska Liebelt

<p>Third state intervention before international institutions originated in international arbitration around 1875 and has been included in the statute of the International Court since the foundation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and is therefore no new phenomenon. Today, most systems of international dispute settlement provide for the possibility of third state intervention. Nevertheless intervention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been used by states sparsely and seems underdeveloped. The statute of the ICJ provides for two ways of intervention in its arts 62 and 63. There have been few applications under these provisions. Looking at the court’s orders in these few cases, the court seems to have adopted a restrictive approach towards allowing applications to intervene. This paper looks at the institution of intervention in the area of international environmental law disputes. There have been two relevant disputes of this kind before the ICJ: the Nuclear Tests litigation and the recent litigation of Whaling in the Antarctic. Both of these cases dealt with the question of state obligations towards the protection of the environment. The applications to intervene in Nuclear Tests failed for reasons that will be explained in more detail below. New Zealand’s application to intervene in Whaling in the Antarctic was authorized by the ICJ on the 6 February 2013 under art 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. The case is exceptional in that it is only the second time the ICJ allowed intervention under art 63. Both cases demonstrate that there are environmental issues that concern more than only the nations that are parties to the dispute. They indicate that intervention plays a particularly strong role in environmental issues because these issues by their nature often affect more than just two states. This paper analyses how the shared environmental concern of the international community might lead to an extension of intervention before the ICJ. It further more looks at the issues that arose before the court in connection with the intervention in Whaling in the Antarctic and how these issues were dealt with.</p>


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 339-344
Author(s):  
Cathryn Costello ◽  
Michelle Foster

This essay examines the interpretation of the core international treaty dedicated to the elimination of racial discrimination, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and in particular how the prohibition on race discrimination applies to the treatment of migrants. This essay is timely, as CERD has travelled from the margins of human rights law to the center of the hottest interstate lawfare. At the time of writing, the first ever interstate dispute before any UN treaty body is before the CERD Committee, and CERD has been invoked in several interstate cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Unfortunately, this crucible of adjudication has not marked an increase in principled interpretation. This essay critiques the recent admissibility ruling of the ICJ in Qatar v. U.A.E. for its marginalization of the prohibition of race discrimination, in particular the failure meaningfully to consider how nationality discrimination may constitute prohibited race discrimination.


2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIENHO YEE

The ICJ interpreted Article 36(1) of its Statute – more specifically, the phrase ‘all cases which the parties refer to it’ – as permitting it to adopt the doctrine of forum prorogatum as a jurisdictional principle and to adapt this doctrine to the circumstances of international judicial process, as an informal way of founding its jurisdiction over the merits of a dispute. The resort to this doctrine has given rise to some concerns and has not received the general acceptance of states. The Certain Criminal Proceedings in France case marks the successful return of the doctrine to the ICJ and shows that the doctrine is a valuable tool for nationalists seeking to protect national interests and for internationalists seeking to promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes.


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