ICJ Halts Antarctic Whaling – Japan Starts Again

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cymie R. Payne

AbstractThe International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment inWhaling in the Antarctic, a dispute brought by Australia against Japan, found that Japan had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) moratoria on all commercial whaling and the use of factory ships to process whales, and also the prohibition on whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. In the course of analyzing whether special permits issued by Japan qualified for the scientific whaling exemption under Article VIII ICRW, the Court benefited from a more robust scientific fact-finding process than at times in the past. The judgment emphasized the mutual obligations of this multilateral agreement by taking the view that the provisions of the ICRW’s scientific whaling exemptions are neither self-judging nor subject to a ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of a state party claiming the exemption. The case was driven by conflicting attitudes towards commercial whaling, and also towards global common spaces. The ICJ’s decision and Japan’s response indicate the limits of the ICRW in resolving those differences.

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Gogarty

The recent judgment in the International Court of Justice case Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) determined that Japanese ‘special permit’ whaling in the Southern Ocean was not ‘for the purposes of scientific research’. This is the only exemption permitted under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’s current moratorium on commercial whaling. The Court made its determination by characterising the Japanese research program as a scientific program, but failing to define what scientific research actually was or was not. This paper presents the background to the decision, and challenges the reasoning of the Court and its standard of review test. It concludes that the Court failed to take the opportunity to offer a clear determination to states on their legal–scientific obligations within international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-726
Author(s):  
Anastasia Telesetsky ◽  
Seokwoo Lee

Since the global decline in commercial whaling, the International Whaling Commission (iwc) has been at the centre of a long-standing debate between pro-whaling industry States and whale preservation States that threatens the collapse of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (icrw) as a treaty regime. This article describes the ongoing treaty regime disagreement that led to the International Court of Justice (icj) Whaling in the Antarctic case and suggests that the icj’s decision highlights further weaknesses in the existing icrw treaty regime. The fissures in the treaty regime have become even more apparent with the iwc Scientific Committee’s request for more data from the Japanese government on the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (newrep-a) and Japan’s diplomatic threat to unilaterally resume whaling. The article concludes with a suggestion that States amend Article viii in order to strengthen the existing icrw framework.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Stephenson ◽  
Arne Mooers ◽  
Amir Attaran

AbstractThe competency debate over small cetacean regulation at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is legal in nature, yet has been in a political stalemate for years. In this article we argue that the IWC has the competence to regulate small cetaceans and that the commercial whaling of ‘small cetaceans’ is a violation of the moratorium on commercial whaling. We present hybrid legal and scientific arguments and counter-arguments for the treaty interpretation of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and, given recent precedent, advocate that the International Court of Justice be called upon to resolve this matter.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Peel

On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its judgment in the case of Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Whaling Decision). In what is perhaps its most important environmental decision to date, the ICJ ordered Japan to halt its whaling program in the Southern Ocean, finding the program lacked scientific merit and breached requirements of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 529-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAKANE MOÏSE MBENGUE

AbstractThe 2014 judgment of the International Court of Justice, regarding Whaling in the Antarctic, brought into focus scientific fact-finding in disputes before the Court. This article examines the Court's practice with respect to first, the mode of appointment and method of examining experts assisting the Court in fact-finding; and second, the standard of review employed in analysing a scientific fact to arrive at a judicial decision. In doing so, the article also refers to jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization to draw parallels and best practices therefrom. This analysis is aimed at structuring a coherent and predictable approach for scientific fact-finding before the International Court of Justice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (51) ◽  
pp. 14523-14527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Mangel

I provide a brief review of the origins of the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling and the failure to successfully regulate whaling that led to the commercial moratorium in 1986. I then describe the Japanese Whale Research Programs Under Special Permit in the Antarctica (JARPA I, JARPA II) and the origins of the caseWhaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)in the International Court of Justice. I explain that the International Court of Justice chose to conduct an objective review of JARPA II, the standard that it used for the review, and the pathway that it took to adjudicate the case without providing a definition of science to be used in international law. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the Judgment for the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, and the International Whaling Commission in particular, for other international treaties, and for the interaction of science and law more generally.


Author(s):  
Marc Mangel

Abstract I review my interactions with Sidney Holt concerning principles for the conservation of wild living resources, the whaling case between Australia and Japan in the International Court of Justice, and the Beverton–Holt stock–recruitment relationship (BH-SRR). Holt and Lee Talbot published a monograph on principles for conservation in 1977; I lead the publication of an update ∼20 years later. I compare the two versions and discuss Holt’s contributions. Holt was active in the world-wide campaign to cease whaling and in efforts to have the Japanese special permit whaling programme in the Antarctic recognized as violating the moratorium on commercial whaling. I describe my involvement in the case and my interactions with him during oral arguments in the case and when the International Court of Justice rendered its decision that the Japanese programme of special permit whaling contravened the international treaty for the regulation of whaling because it was not for purposes of scientific research. In response to a paper of mine concerning steepness, Holt wrote to me that the BH-SSR is a one-, not two-, parameter function. I explain my current understanding of his reasoning, which involves how we use the SRR in fishery management.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Franziska Liebelt

<p>Third state intervention before international institutions originated in international arbitration around 1875 and has been included in the statute of the International Court since the foundation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and is therefore no new phenomenon. Today, most systems of international dispute settlement provide for the possibility of third state intervention. Nevertheless intervention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been used by states sparsely and seems underdeveloped. The statute of the ICJ provides for two ways of intervention in its arts 62 and 63. There have been few applications under these provisions. Looking at the court’s orders in these few cases, the court seems to have adopted a restrictive approach towards allowing applications to intervene. This paper looks at the institution of intervention in the area of international environmental law disputes. There have been two relevant disputes of this kind before the ICJ: the Nuclear Tests litigation and the recent litigation of Whaling in the Antarctic. Both of these cases dealt with the question of state obligations towards the protection of the environment. The applications to intervene in Nuclear Tests failed for reasons that will be explained in more detail below. New Zealand’s application to intervene in Whaling in the Antarctic was authorized by the ICJ on the 6 February 2013 under art 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. The case is exceptional in that it is only the second time the ICJ allowed intervention under art 63. Both cases demonstrate that there are environmental issues that concern more than only the nations that are parties to the dispute. They indicate that intervention plays a particularly strong role in environmental issues because these issues by their nature often affect more than just two states. This paper analyses how the shared environmental concern of the international community might lead to an extension of intervention before the ICJ. It further more looks at the issues that arose before the court in connection with the intervention in Whaling in the Antarctic and how these issues were dealt with.</p>


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