A Healthy Dose of Wartime Normative Realism

Faticidade e sociocentrismo são dois conceitos fundamentais com os quais toda teoria moral se vê confrontada. O artigo enquadra o significado deles na deontologia clássica kantiana e no paradigma pós-kantiano da ética do discurso. A discussão dos problemas implicados nesses conceitos leva o autor a defender um paradigma do Realismo Normativo que faz justiça ao conteúdo crítico desses conceitos e às intuições morais contidas neles.Abstract: ´Facticity´ and ´socio-centrism´ denote major structural features of theories of morality. The paper explicates their core-meaning and tries to demonstrate how these notions are instantiated in classical Kantian deontology and the post-Kantian paradigms of discourse-ethics. A justification is attempted for abandoning these theories in favour of a possible successor paradigm of Normative Realism which does better justice to the critical content of these concepts and the morally loaded intuitions contained therein.

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Caring, objectivity and justice: An integrative view

Nursing Ethics ◽

10.1177/0969733010388927 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 18 (2) ◽

pp. 149-160 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Stan van Hooft

Keyword(s):

Moral Theory ◽

Ethics Of Care ◽

Moral Reasons ◽

Moral Sentiments ◽

Normative Realism ◽

Integrative View ◽

Principle Of Justice ◽

Subjective Form

The argument of this article is framed by a debate between the principle of humanity and the principle of justice. Whereas the principle of humanity requires us to care about others and to want to help them meet their vital needs, and so to be partial towards those others, the principle of justice requires us to consider their needs without the intrusion of our subjective interests or emotions so that we can act with impartiality. I argue that a deep form of caring lies behind both approaches and so unites them. In the course of the argument, I reject Michael Slote’s sentimentalist form of an ethics of care, and expound Thomas Nagel’s moral theory, which seems to lie at the opposite end of a spectrum ranging from moral sentiments to impersonal objectivity. Nevertheless, Nagel’s theory of normative realism provides unexpected support for the thesis that a deep and subjective form of caring lies at the base of even our most objective moral reasons.

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Normative Disagreements and Choice of Legal Concepts .

Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS ◽

10.35427/2073-4522-2020-15-3-belyaev ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 15 (3) ◽

pp. 116-123

Author(s):

MAXIM A. BELYAEV

Keyword(s):

Legal Text ◽

Normative Realism ◽

Legal Concepts ◽

Normative Judgments

The paper provides a commentary on the theses of the German jurist Lorenz Kähler on the formation of legal concepts. The author eliminates truth-characterization of normative judgments because there are no justification for these judgments. However, if we consider normative judgments as one of the factors in the choice of legal concepts in the formation of a legal text, then the subjects who find themselves in a situation of disagreement on any of the concepts should refer to the normative facts (values, reasons, and obligations). Therefore, by allowing this type of disagreement, we implicitly accept normative realism as true. The author did not indicate what a normative anti-realist should refer to in controversial situations. Since Lorenz Kähler himself is anti-realistic about normative facts, his position is either contradictory or not good elaborated for understanding.

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The Normative Pluriverse

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy ◽

10.26556/jesp.v18i2.652 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 18 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Matti Eklund

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽

Mathematical Objects ◽

Normative Realism ◽

Important Form ◽

The Way

According to a certain pluralist view in philosophy of mathematics, there are as many mathematical objects as there can coherently be. Recently, Justin Clarke-Doane has explored what consequences the analogous view on normative properties would have. What if there is a normative pluriverse? Here I address this same question. The challenge is best seen as a challenge to an important form of normative realism. I criticize the way Clarke-Doane presents the challenge. An improved challenge is presented, and the role of pluralism in this challenge is assessed.

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Normative realism, or Bernard Williams and ethics at the limit

Australasian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00048408912350151 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 67 (3) ◽

pp. 306-318 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Joseph Mendola

Keyword(s):

Bernard Williams ◽

Normative Realism

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A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.2018.1432392 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 48 (3-4) ◽

pp. 569-591 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

David Copp

Keyword(s):

Derek Parfit ◽

Truth Conditions ◽

Normative Realism ◽

Moral Claims ◽

Orthodox View

AbstractRecently, some philosophers have attempted to escape familiar challenges to orthodox nonnaturalist normative realism by abandoning the robust metaphysical commitments of the orthodox view. One such view is the ‘Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism’ or ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism’ proposed by Derek Parfit and a few others. The trouble is that, as it stands, Non-Realist Cognitivism seems unable to provide a substantive non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. The paper considers various strategies one might use to address the challenge. There is a rich field of views that are cognitivist and non-realist. But the paper is skeptical of the prospects of Non-Realist Cognitivism.

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