Caring, objectivity and justice: An integrative view

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stan van Hooft
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethics Of Care ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
Integrative View ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Subjective Form

The argument of this article is framed by a debate between the principle of humanity and the principle of justice. Whereas the principle of humanity requires us to care about others and to want to help them meet their vital needs, and so to be partial towards those others, the principle of justice requires us to consider their needs without the intrusion of our subjective interests or emotions so that we can act with impartiality. I argue that a deep form of caring lies behind both approaches and so unites them. In the course of the argument, I reject Michael Slote’s sentimentalist form of an ethics of care, and expound Thomas Nagel’s moral theory, which seems to lie at the opposite end of a spectrum ranging from moral sentiments to impersonal objectivity. Nevertheless, Nagel’s theory of normative realism provides unexpected support for the thesis that a deep and subjective form of caring lies at the base of even our most objective moral reasons.

Virtue ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Good Life

Virtue ethics has its origin in the ancient world, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It has been revived following an article by G. E. M. Anscombe critical of modern ethics and advocating a return to the virtues. Some have argued that virtue ethics constitutes a third option in moral theory additional to utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarians and Kantians have responded vigorously, plausibly claiming that their views already incorporate many of the theses allegedly peculiar to virtue ethics. Virtue theory, the study of notions, such as character, related to the virtues, has led to the recultivation of barren areas. These include: What is the good life, and what part does virtue play in it? How stringent are the demands of morality? Are moral reasons independent of agents’ particular concerns? Is moral rationality universal? Is morality to be captured in a set of rules, or is the sensitivity of a virtuous person central in ethics? From virtue ethics, and the virtue theory of which it is a part, have emerged answers to these questions at once rooted in ancient views and yet distinctively modern.

Virtue ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Good Life

Virtue ethics has its origin in the ancient world, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It has been revived following an article by G.E.M. Anscombe critical of modern ethics and advocating a return to the virtues. Some have argued that virtue ethics constitutes a third option in moral theory additional to utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarians and Kantians have responded vigorously, plausibly claiming that their views already incorporate many of the theses allegedly peculiar to virtue ethics. Virtue theory, the study of notions, such as character, related to the virtues, has led to the recultivation of barren areas. These include: What is the good life, and what part does virtue play in it? How stringent are the demands of morality? Are moral reasons independent of agents’ particular concerns? Is moral rationality universal? Is morality to be captured in a set of rules, or is the sensitivity of a virtuous person central in ethics? From virtue ethics, and the virtue theory of which it is a part, have emerged answers to these questions at once rooted in ancient views and yet distinctively modern.

FACTICITY AND SOCIOCENTRISM: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING TWO BASIC CONCEPTS OF MORAL THEORY

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (113) ◽  
pp. 301
Author(s):  
Marcel Niquet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
Normative Realism ◽  
Critical Content ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Kantian Deontology ◽  
Core Meaning

Faticidade e sociocentrismo são dois conceitos fundamentais com os quais toda teoria moral se vê confrontada. O artigo enquadra o significado deles na deontologia clássica kantiana e no paradigma pós-kantiano da ética do discurso. A discussão dos problemas implicados nesses conceitos leva o autor a defender um paradigma do Realismo Normativo que faz justiça ao conteúdo crítico desses conceitos e às intuições morais contidas neles.Abstract: ´Facticity´ and ´socio-centrism´ denote major structural features of theories of morality. The paper explicates their core-meaning and tries to demonstrate how these notions are instantiated in classical Kantian deontology and the post-Kantian paradigms of discourse-ethics. A justification is attempted for abandoning these theories in favour of a possible successor paradigm of Normative Realism which does better justice to the critical content of these concepts and the morally loaded intuitions contained therein.

scholarly journals The Ethical Implications of Evolutionary Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-56
Author(s):  
Marc Anthony Parker
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Good People ◽  
The Relationship

This essay is primarily concerned with important arguments involved in the debate about the relationship between evolution and morality. Though the paper holds that it is plausible that certain natural traits would have evolved into human moral sentiments, it argues that evolutionary theory cannot tell us how to be good people or why moral sentiments ought to take priority over immoral sentiments. Evolutionary theory is in this way an incomplete moral theory, analyzing how humans and human morality evolved through natural selection can uncover implications of evolutionary theory, which have a strong impact on a theory of morality

Sympathy, Beauty, and Sentiment: Adam Smith's Aesthetic Morality

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Fudge
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments ◽  
Aesthetic Judgments

One of the more striking aspects of Adam Smith's moral theory is the degree to which it depends on and appeals to aesthetic norms. By considering what Smith says about judgments of propriety – the foundational type of judgment in his system – and by tying what he says in The Theory of Moral Sentiments to certain of his other writings, I argue that Smith ultimately defends an aesthetic morality. Among the challenges that any aesthetic morality faces is that it seems to entail moral relativism. This problem is magnified by Smith's reliance on the judgments of the impartial spectator, which also seems to make his theory more vulnerable to a Euthyphro-type objection. I suggest that Smith can potentially get around these problems, given his presumption of aesthetic naturalism. While there is certainly some variation in our aesthetic judgments, Smith claims that we naturally find certain actions and sentiments odious, while others we find agreeable. The reason, he argues, is that any society that judged otherwise would not survive.

Robots and the Ethics of Care

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Johansson
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethics Of Care ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Health Care Settings ◽  
Care Robots ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
Ethical Care

In this paper, the moral theory ethics of care – EoC – is investigated and connected to care robots. The aim is twofold: first, to provide a plausible and ethically relevant interpretation of the key term care in EoC (which is, it is argued, slightly different from the everyday use of the term) indicating that we should distinguish between “natural care” and “ethical care”. The second aim is to discuss whether EoC may be a suitable theory to implement in care robots. The conclusion is that EoC may be a theory that is suitable for robots in health care settings.

Naturalism and Moral Reasons

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 107-133
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Reasons

Why are traditional ‘objectivist’ theories of morality, such as those put forward by Aristotle, or Kant, or even Bentham, commonly thought not to pass ‘scientific muster’ insofar as they are not ‘naturalist’? My interest in this question is based on my being a moral objectivist, but answering this question is one that moral skeptics should be as interested in as I. The view that the commitments of science preclude us from accepting such theories is the basis of the moral skeptic's position. Yet showing what is wrong with a moral objectivist position is surprisingly difficult. It involves reflecting on what ‘scientific muster’ is supposed to be, and on why a theory is commonly thought to be disreputable unless it passes it. It also involves locating the ‘queer’ element in objectivist moral theory that makes it scientifically disreputable. Yet, as I hope to show in this article, there is no commonly accepted statement of what makes a theory scientifically acceptable or unacceptable, and (perhaps even more surprisingly) no rigorous account of what the queer component of objectivist moral theory is that makes any such theory scientifically unacceptable.

Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning: Ethical Egoism as A Moral Theory

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Kalin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Principle ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Logical Flaw ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Ethical egoism, when summarized into a single ethical principle, is the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest. The criticisms standardly advanced against this view try to show either that it is subject to some fatal logical flaw or else that, even if logically coherent, it can give no account of the basic parts of morality. Both these objections are mistaken, however, and it is the point of this paper to make this clear. Central to my argument is the distinction drawn in Section 1 between two kinds of moral reasoning and hence two kinds of moral reasons. I call these ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’ (the latter could be termed ‘conventional’ or ‘institutional’ without much change of meaning). Both are present in the writings of contemporary moral philosophers but have not been emphasized or seen as crucial.

scholarly journals Can Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Elson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Realism

In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new ‘reduction’ argument against non- reductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his ‘simple moral theory’ version of the argument does not rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

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