“Your Existence is a Delight to Us.” An Investigation into the Identity of the Neighbour in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love

In this paper, I look into the identity of the neighbour in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, whom I argue has not been identified adequately by previous interpreters. I propose to clarify the identity of the neighbour by contrasting her with the ethical other as presented in four alternative ethical theories. I then set out to reconstruct ethical otherhood in a comparative analysis of Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, Hegelian theory of recognition, and Millian utilitarianism. Ultimately, through a both close and—admittedly—productive reading of Works of Love, I interpret and discuss the fundamental features of Kierkegaard’s neighbour over against these four positions.

THE REVIVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS AS AN ETHICAL VIEW

<span lang="EN-US">Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics</span>

Individualist Utilitarianism and Converging Theories of Rights

The paper develops two core themes of Derek Parfit’s philosophy. The first is his goal of unifying the two main rival impartial moral theories, Kantian deontology and consequentialism, therefore reinforcing their claim to pertain to objective moral truths. The second is his focus on the moral significance of the combined effects of many agents’ behaviour, and on the challenges this poses to ordinary moral thinking. This is a theme that runs throughout his work, that he returns to at the very end of volume iii of On What Matters. Kantianism and consequentialism have been thought to fundamentally diverge on the issue of rights and trade-offs. The chapter first outlines the version of consequentialism taken to be most plausible, calling it ‘individualist utilitarianism’, which differs from so-called ‘classical utilitarianism’ in taking the moral importance of well-being to be grounded on the moral importance of the persons whose well-being it is. This paves the way for a pluralist Kantian and utilitarian account of human rights, grounded on the moral significance both of persons’ well-being and their dignity as rational autonomous agents. The chapter then turns to the topic of the threat to access to the means of subsistence, both for the current poor and future generations, posed by global as well as domestic socio-economic structures and anthropogenic climate change. This harm is the combined effect of the ongoing patterns of behaviour of a vast number of agents. The chapter argues that individualist utilitarianism and Kantianism converge on the conclusion that the duty to avoid harms of this kind should be analysed as a shared duty of basic justice, non-fulfilment of which constitutes a structural human rights violation.

The Revival of Virtue Ethics As an Ethical View

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.

Digital Objects, Digital Subjects and Digital Societies: Deontology in the Age of Digitalization

Digitalization affects the relation between human agents and technological objects. This paper looks at digital behavior change technologies (BCT) from a deontological perspective. It identifies three moral requirements that are relevant for ethical approaches in the tradition of Kantian deontology: epistemic rationalism, motivational rationalism and deliberational rationalism. It argues that traditional Kantian ethics assumes human ‘subjects’ to be autonomous agents, whereas ‘objects’ are mere passive tools. Digitalization, however, challenges this Cartesian subject-object dualism: digital technologies become more and more autonomous and take on agency. Similarly, human subjects can outsource agency and will-power to technologies. In addition, our intersubjective relations are being more and more shaped by digital technologies. The paper therefore re-examines the three categories ‘subject’, ‘object’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ in light of digital BCTs and suggests deontological guidelines for digital objects, digital subjects and a digitally mediated intersubjectivity, based on a re-examination of the requirements of epistemic, motivational and deliberational rationalism.

The Politics of Virtue?

Interlude B reviews The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future by John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, in which they charge “buffered” liberalism and authoritarian interventions with the “atomization” of society. For them, “post-liberalism” replaces “market, state, and technocracy” with the relational fabric of “society, culture, and interpersonal relations.” They also hold that “virtue ethics” is both “more demanding” than utilitarianism and “less moralist” than Kantian deontology. They go on to review politics, economics, culture, and international relations, providing significant insights for a viable post-liberal agenda. Although applauding the general tenor of the book, the Interlude takes exception to a number of accents, such as appeals to (unreflective) “naturalism,” “verticality,” and “neo-medievalism.”

Interpreting Løgstrup

This concluding chapter returns to the challenges that Løgstrup faces regarding the ethical demand as he characterizes it (§12.1), and the ‘understanding of life’ on which he claims it is based, particularly the idea that life is a gift (§12.2). The chapter also considers what, if anything, is distinctive about Løgstrup’s ethics (§12.3). His position is compared and contrasted to Kantian deontology, utilitarian consequentialism, and virtue theory, while the connections with contemporary care ethics are also explored. Overall, it is argued that this study of Løgstrup suggests the power and coherence of his ethical vision, and the important but underexplored contribution that he can make to contemporary thinking in ethics.

Sexuality, philosophy of

The philosophy of sexuality, like the philosophy of science, art or law, is the study of the concepts and propositions surrounding its central protagonist, in this case ‘sex’. Its practitioners focus on conceptual, metaphysical and normative questions. Conceptual philosophy of sex analyses the notions of sexual desire, sexual activity and sexual pleasure. What makes a feeling a sexual sensation? Manipulation of and feelings in the genitals are not necessary, since other body parts yield sexual pleasure. What makes an act sexual? A touch on the arm might be a friendly pat, an assault, or sex; physical properties alone do not distinguish them. What is the conceptual link between sexual pleasure and sexual activity? Neither the intention to produce sexual pleasure nor the actual experience of pleasure seems necessary for an act to be sexual. Other conceptual questions have to do not with what makes an act sexual, but with what makes it the type of sexual act it is. How should ‘rape’ be defined? What the conceptual differences are, if any, between obtaining sex through physical force and obtaining it by offering money is an interesting and important issue. Metaphysical philosophy of sex discusses ontological and epistemological matters: the place of sexuality in human nature; the relationships among sexuality, emotion and cognition; the meaning of sexuality for the person, the species, the cosmos. What is sex all about, anyway? That sexual desire is a hormone-driven instinct implanted by a god or nature acting in the service of the species, and that it has a profound spiritual dimension, are two – not necessarily incompatible – views. Perhaps the significance of sexuality is little different from that of eating, breathing and defecating; maybe, or in addition, sexuality is partially constitutive of moral personality. Normative philosophy of sex explores the perennial questions of sexual ethics. In what circumstances is it morally permissible to engage in sexual activity or experience sexual pleasure? With whom? For what purpose? With which body parts? For how long? The historically central answers come from Thomist natural law, Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism. Normative philosophy of sex also addresses legal, social and political issues. Should society steer people in the direction of heterosexuality, marriage, family? May the law regulate sexual conduct by prohibiting prostitution or homosexuality? Normative philosophy of sex includes nonethical value questions as well. What is good sex? What is its contribution to the good life? The breadth of the philosophy of sex is shown by the variety of topics it investigates: abortion, contraception, acquaintance rape, pornography, sexual harassment, and objectification, to name a few. The philosophy of sex begins with a picture of a privileged pattern of relationship, in which two adult heterosexuals love each other, are faithful to each other within a formal marriage, and look forward to procreation and family. Philosophy of sex, as the Socratic scrutiny of our sexual practices, beliefs and concepts, challenges this privileged pattern by exploring the virtues, and not only the vices, of adultery, prostitution, homosexuality, group sex, bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochism, incest, paedophilia and casual sex with anonymous strangers. Doing so provides the same illumination about sex that is provided when the philosophies of science, art and law probe the privileged pictures of their own domains.

Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics

Unlike Aristotelian and Platonic virtue ethics, sentimentalist virtue ethics bases morality in feeling rather than in reason/rationality. Historically, we find instances of such virtue ethics in eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century British moral sentimentalism, in Augustine’s agapic ethics, and in both Buddhism and Confucianism. But a reviving sentimentalist virtue ethics needs to deal with philosophical problems that have emerged over the past two centuries and to find a way to plausibly articulate its own conceptions of central present-day philosophical notions. Arguably, sentimentalism can give us accounts of respect, justice, autonomy, and deontology that are both more intuitive in themselves and more adequate to particular cases than what neo-Kantian deontology and neo-Aristotelian virtue tell us about these notions. And sentimentalism can more fully explain the meaning of “right” and “wrong” than anything we find in these other traditions.