The Use of Military Force Abroad by the United States since 1798: An Annotated Bibliography of Unclassified Lists of Incidents Prepared by the U.S. Government

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Ramsey

In 2007, presidential candidate Barack Obama argued that the U.S. president did not have independent constitutional authority to use military force except in response to an actual or imminent attack on the United States. Since 2008, President Obama has directed the use of U.S. military force in at least seven countries (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia). Critics find inconsistency in these positions, contending that the Obama presidency will be remembered for expansion of the presidency's war powers. But when the administration's record is closely examined, these claims seem overstated. At least with regard to war initiation, the Obama presidency need not be regarded as materially enhancing the president's constitutional powers.This assessment begins by establishing two baselines. First, most war powers scholars agree that under the Constitution's original meaning, Congress’ power to “declare War” required the president to seek congressional approval prior to initiating war. This constitutional command had substantial grey areas, including responses to threats and attacks, relations with non-state actors, and low-level hostilities. Nonetheless, the basic proposition stated by candidate Obama appears well founded both in the Constitution's text itself and in early postratification practice. Second, in the modern (post-Vietnam War) era, most scholars agree that the practice has changed somewhat, with presidents asserting an expanded independent authority over uses of military force. This essay agrees with that description, although it contends that the change in actual practice is less dramatic than commentary sometimes claims.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.


Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf

This chapter examines the 2001–2002 military standoff that kept India and Pakistan on the verge of war for ten months. Brokered bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party. India threatened to use military force but pulled back at critical junctures as the United States acted as a guarantor of Pakistan’s promises of curbing cross-border terrorism and raised India’s costs of defying third-party demands to de-escalate. Pakistan promised retaliation against India and harmed the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan by withdrawing forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but this “autonomous” behavior was trumped by its propensity to oblige the United States by accepting some responsibility for anti-India terrorism and acting tangibly against militants. The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation introduced by India’s and Pakistan’s misperceptions of the third party’s leverage over the opponent.


Worldview ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (9) ◽  
pp. 13-18
Author(s):  
Walter C. Clemens

Russia's Aesop, Ivan Krylov, said: “You can be sure the puppy is strong, because it barks at the elephant.”; The Russian bear is much more powerful than a puppy, but it stands on feet of clay. The United States is not an elephant, but it is by far the world's strongest economic and military force, striking both respect and fear in Soviet leaders, from Lenin through Brezhnev.The U.S. economy is more than twice the size of the Soviet and much more dynamic. Our strategic arsenal also overshadows Moscow's. According to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the United States today has nearly 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads aboard our land-and sea-based missiles and bombers, compared to 5,000 for the Soviets. These power realities help explain Kremlin complexes about Moscow's persistent Avis posture in world affairs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-849

In the face of rising tensions between Iran and the United States, some members of Congress have urged the Trump administration to clarify whether it believes it has congressional authorization to use force against Iran. In June of 2019, the U.S. State Department issued a letter stating that it had not “to date” interpreted either the 2001 or the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF and 2002 AUMF, respectively) “as authorizing military force against Iran, except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or partner forces engaged in counterterrorism operations or operations to establish a stable, democratic Iraq.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-323

On January 3, 2020, the U.S. military conducted a drone strike near Baghdad International Airport that killed Qasem Soleimani, the leader within the Iranian military of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Trump administration initially appeared to justify the strike as an effort to deter imminent attacks on U.S. embassies and personnel, but later insisted that Iran's actions in the months leading up to the strike triggered the U.S. right to self-defense. Domestically, the Trump administration claimed the authority to carry out the strike based on both the president's inherent constitutional powers and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq passed by Congress in 2002. In the aftermath of the strike, Iraq voted to expel U.S. troops from its territory, and Iran conducted a missile strike on American bases in Iraq. Iran also announced that it would cease to observe limits on its production of nuclear fuel—a core tenet of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from which the United States withdrew in 2018.


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