Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Ramsey

In 2007, presidential candidate Barack Obama argued that the U.S. president did not have independent constitutional authority to use military force except in response to an actual or imminent attack on the United States. Since 2008, President Obama has directed the use of U.S. military force in at least seven countries (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia). Critics find inconsistency in these positions, contending that the Obama presidency will be remembered for expansion of the presidency's war powers. But when the administration's record is closely examined, these claims seem overstated. At least with regard to war initiation, the Obama presidency need not be regarded as materially enhancing the president's constitutional powers.This assessment begins by establishing two baselines. First, most war powers scholars agree that under the Constitution's original meaning, Congress’ power to “declare War” required the president to seek congressional approval prior to initiating war. This constitutional command had substantial grey areas, including responses to threats and attacks, relations with non-state actors, and low-level hostilities. Nonetheless, the basic proposition stated by candidate Obama appears well founded both in the Constitution's text itself and in early postratification practice. Second, in the modern (post-Vietnam War) era, most scholars agree that the practice has changed somewhat, with presidents asserting an expanded independent authority over uses of military force. This essay agrees with that description, although it contends that the change in actual practice is less dramatic than commentary sometimes claims.

2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-572

On February 25, 2021, the United States conducted a strike targeting Iranian-backed militia group facilities in Syria. The strike, which came in response to a February 15, 2021 attack on U.S. interests in Iraq, marked the Biden administration's first known exercise of executive war powers. As domestic authority for the strike, President Joseph Biden, Jr. cited his authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and did not rely on the 2001 or 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs). For international legal authority, Biden relied on individual self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, stating that Syria was “unwilling or unable” to prevent further attacks on the United States by these non-state actors within its territory. The strikes garnered mixed reactions from Congress, where efforts are underway to repeal or reform extant AUMFs as well as the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The Biden administration is also undertaking a review of current U.S. military policy on the use of force, and during this process, it has prohibited drone strikes outside of conventional battlefields, absent presidential approval.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

International Law in the U.S. Legal System provides a wide-ranging overview of how international law intersects with the domestic legal system of the United States, and points out various unresolved issues and areas of controversy. Curtis Bradley explains the structure of the U.S. legal system and the various separation of powers and federalism considerations implicated by this structure, especially as these considerations relate to the conduct of foreign affairs. Against this backdrop, he covers all of the principal forms of international law: treaties, executive agreements, decisions and orders of international institutions, customary international law, and jus cogens norms. He also explores a number of issues that are implicated by the intersection of U.S. law and international law, such as treaty withdrawal, foreign sovereign immunity, international human rights litigation, war powers, extradition, and extraterritoriality. This book highlights recent decisions and events relating to the topic, including various actions taken during the Trump administration, while also taking into account relevant historical materials, including materials relating to the U.S. Constitutional Founding. Written by one of the most cited international law scholars in the United States, the book is a resource for lawyers, law students, legal scholars, and judges from around the world.


Author(s):  
Curtis A. Bradley

This chapter describes U.S. law governing the use of military force, and it considers the potential value of comparative study of how different countries regulate the issue. As the chapter notes, there is significant uncertainty and debate in the United States over the distribution of authority concerning the use of force—in particular, over whether and to what extent military actions must be authorized by Congress. Because courts in the modern era have generally declined to review the legality of military actions, disputes over this issue have had to be resolved, as a practical matter, through the political process. For those who believe that it is important to have legislative involvement in decisions to use force, the political process has not proven to be satisfactory: presidents have often used military force without obtaining congressional approval, and Congress generally has done little to resist such presidential unilateralism. The United States is not the only country to struggle with regulating the domestic authority to use military force. This issue of foreign relations law is common to constitutional democracies, and nations vary substantially in how they have addressed it. Comparative study of such approaches should be of inherent interest to scholars and students, including those trying to better understand the U.S. approach. Whether and to what extent such study should also inform the interpretation or revision of U.S. law presents a more complicated set of questions that are affected in part by one’s legal methodology and how the comparative materials are being invoked.


Author(s):  
Kyle Burke

In the late 1970s, a new set of Americans took up the dream of a global anticommunist revolution. Many were high-ranking CIA and military officers who had been forced from their jobs by the Ford and Carter administrations in the wake of the Vietnam War. As Congress passed new laws constraining the United States’ clandestine services, these ex-soldiers and spies argued that the state’s deteriorating covert war-making abilities signaled a broader decline in U.S. power. To remedy that, retired covert warriors such as U.S. Army General John Singlaub, a thirty-year veteran of special operations, entered the world of conservative activism, which promised both steady pay and power in retirement. Working in the shadow of the state, they sought to revitalize a form of combat to which they had dedicated their lives. Some even started private military firms to fill in for the U.S. government. Meanwhile, hundreds of American men, mostly disgruntled Vietnam veterans, sought new lives as mercenaries, first in Southeast Asia and then in Rhodesia and Angola. In the late 1970s, these two camps of revanchist Americans—retired covert warriors and aspiring mercenaries—established patterns of paramilitarism that would transform the anticommunist international in the Reagan era.


Author(s):  
Robert J. Thompson

American history is replete with instances of counterinsurgency. An unsurprising reality considering the United States has always participated in empire building, thus the need to pacify resistance to expansion. For much of its existence, the U.S. has relied on its Army to pacify insurgents. While the U.S. Army used traditional military formations and use of technology to battle peer enemies, the same strategy did not succeed against opponents who relied on speed and surprise. Indeed, in several instances, insurgents sought to fight the U.S. Army on terms that rendered superior manpower and technology irrelevant. By introducing counterinsurgency as a strategy, the U.S. Army attempted to identify and neutralize insurgents and the infrastructure that supported them. Discussions of counterinsurgency include complex terms, thus readers are provided with simplified, yet accurate definitions and explanations. Moreover, understanding the relevant terms provided continuity between conflicts. While certain counterinsurgency measures worked during the American Civil War, the Indian Wars, and in the Philippines, the concept failed during the Vietnam War. The complexities of counterinsurgency require readers to familiarize themselves with its history, relevant scholarship, and terminology—in particular, counterinsurgency, pacification, and infrastructure.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Jalel Ben Haj Rehaiem

The 21st century geopolitical developments in East Asia have placed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in aprime position to play a major role in the complexities of Asia-Pacific politics. China is a rising power, but whetherit is going to be a status quo power or a challenging one remains to be seen. With the world’s largest population, theworld second economy and a modernizing military force, China theoretically has room to have a say in the revisionof the security order in East Asia, which has been dominated so far by an already controversial Cold War alliancebetween the United States and Japan and a new American pivot to Asia since former President Obama announced hisnew Asia strategy in Canberra in November 2011.As China’s prowess grows, so do percolating challenges to U.S. prominence in the region. The gap between whatChina intends to do with accumulating power and how it is perceived in Asia and the West alike has created whatthis article calls China’s trust dilemma with the United States.The distrust between Beijing and Washington has ostensibly plagued their relationship and may continue to dominatetheir interaction for the unforeseeable future; an interaction between an already established world hegemon and arising regional player that is allegedly aspiring to challenge and even replace its rival, at least in Asia for the timebeing.As this article seeks to study the implications of the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a world powerand the trust dilemma China’s rising might is incurring, this work,in its attempt to fathom Beijing’s strategic intents,adopts the security dilemma framework whichrefers to a situation wherein two states may be drawn into conflict,possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of them actually seeks confrontation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-284
Author(s):  
Seth Offenbach

The U.S. conservative movement in the mid-20th Century argued that the United States needed to continuously get tougher in the fight against communism worldwide. It remained supportive of U.S. efforts throughout the Vietnam War. However, in the period immediately preceding Americanization of the war in 1965, conservatives were uncertain about the outcome of any fighting in Vietnam. Specifically, they claimed that optimism for the Republic of Vietnam was lost with the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Without Diem, conservatives claimed, the Vietnam War was likely lost before it began. This article discusses how Diem went from a barely talked-about anti-Communist ally prior to his death to becoming posthumously the last great hope for Southeast Asia. Conservatives argued that without Diem, the only way the United States would be able to stop Communist expansion in Indochina would be to engage in a massive aerial bombing campaign and find a regional partner to deploy troops. Had he survived, this might not have been necessary. Learning why and how conservatives supported Diem after his death helps us better understand how conservatives reacted to the Vietnam War once Americanization began in 1965.


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


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