The 2001–2002 Military Standoff

2018 ◽  
pp. 83-120
Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Military Force ◽  
The Third ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Critical Junctures ◽  
Autonomous Behavior ◽  
Military Campaign ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the 2001–2002 military standoff that kept India and Pakistan on the verge of war for ten months. Brokered bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party. India threatened to use military force but pulled back at critical junctures as the United States acted as a guarantor of Pakistan’s promises of curbing cross-border terrorism and raised India’s costs of defying third-party demands to de-escalate. Pakistan promised retaliation against India and harmed the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan by withdrawing forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but this “autonomous” behavior was trumped by its propensity to oblige the United States by accepting some responsibility for anti-India terrorism and acting tangibly against militants. The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation introduced by India’s and Pakistan’s misperceptions of the third party’s leverage over the opponent.

The Mumbai Crisis

2018 ◽  
pp. 121-154
Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
The United States ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Military Action ◽  
The Third ◽  
Crisis Behavior ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the 2008 Mumbai crisis and shows that brokered bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party. In a situation that could have boiled over given the spectacular nature of the terrorist attacks that triggered the crisis, India, Pakistan, and the United States exhibited an even greater sense of familiarity with the opportunities and limitations associated with the trilateral bargaining framework. Despite threatening military action at times, India relied almost exclusively on the United States to pursue its crisis objectives. Without boxing it in completely, the United States pressured Pakistan and forced it to take actions against terrorists believed to be linked to the attacks, and used this to pacify India. The centrality of the third-party strand of crisis management helps explain the prudence both sides exhibited in avoiding brinkmanship.

Sold—to the Highest Bidder in Japan: Operational Challenges and Culture

2015 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Gerry Yemen ◽  
Kristin J. Behfar ◽  
Allison Elias
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese Firm ◽  
Cultural Norms ◽  
Exit Strategy ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Financial Benefits ◽  
Operational Issues ◽  
The U.S

Most talented executives can recognize when an acquisition has strategic or financial benefits, and in this case, the decision to be acquired was an appropriate exit strategy for a successful start-up. Peter Street’s start-up had been growing quickly and was building a reputation for reliability in a booming industry when a Japanese firm offered to pay a premium for the U.S. firm. Having done business in Japan (and extensively with the acquiring company) before the sale of his company, Street entered the acquisition with enthusiasm. As part of the deal, Street’s former company would continue to operate in the United States as a division of its parent company and Street would remain as CEO. A few months into the transition, however, Street discovered a huge difference between working with and working for the Japanese firm. Cultural norms for confronting seemingly small problems quickly became bigger operational issues, and Street experienced a growing dichotomy between corporate (in Japan) and his division (in the United States). This case focuses on the challenges of implementing a cross-border acquisition.

Remarks by Stephen Pomper

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 123-127
Author(s):  
Stephen Pomper
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Humanitarian Emergency ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Face ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
The U.S

We are having this conversation now because of the April 7 strikes on the Shayrat Airfield in Syria, but the question of how one justifies forcible measures in the context of a humanitarian emergency, and in the face of a deadlocked Security Council, is one that deserves urgent attention beyond the context of any single event. Progress toward answering this question has, however, been mired in a long-standing debate between those who believe that there is no credible international law justification for humanitarian intervention—and that the U.S. government should instead justify interventions like those taken at Kosovo and Shayrat as morally “legitimate”—and those who believe a legal justification can and should be put forward. I am very much in the latter camp and will use my time now to explain how I arrived at this position as a policy and as a legal matter by looking at three questions: the first question is whether legal justification is the direction that the United States should go in as a matter of policy. The second question is whether legal justification is credibly available as a matter of international law. The third question (which assumes the answer to the first and second is yes) is how to go about articulating and disseminating such a justification. Let me take these in order.

scholarly journals Domestic Lending and the Pandemic: How Does Banks' Exposure to Covid-19 Abroad Affect Their Lending in the United States?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (056) ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Judit Temesvary ◽  
◽  
Andrew Wei ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
The United States ◽  
Registry Data ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
The U.S

We study how U.S. banks' exposure to the economic fallout due to governments' response to Covid-19 in foreign countries has affected their credit provision to borrowers in the United States. We combine a rarely accessed dataset on U.S. banks' cross-border exposure to borrowers in foreign countries with the most detailed regulatory ("credit registry") data that is available on their U.S.-based lending. We compare the change in the U.S. lending of banks that are more vs. less exposed to the pandemic abroad, during and after the onset of Covid-19 in 2020. We document strong spillover effects: U.S. banks with higher foreign exposures in badly "Covid-19-hit" regions cut their lending in the United States substantially more. This effect is particularly strong for longer-maturity loans and term loans and is robust to controlling for firms’ pandemic exposure.

35 United States of America

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cohn Joshua
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
New York State ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Security Interest ◽  
Bankruptcy Code ◽  
The Right ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the most common aspects of the right of set-off in the United States, focusing on the State of New York. It also considers the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and its implications for the right of set-off. The chapter first considers contractual and statutory set-off outside bankruptcy proceedings and whether set-off can be considered a security interest before discussing set-off against insolvent parties. It explains how the right of set-off is affected by the automatic stay provision in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the prohibition of creditor preferences, and fraudulent transfers. It also analyses choice of law issues arising in cross-border set-off, taking into account the relevant provisions of the New York State law and Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, it reviews the applicable rules for non-U.S. parties participating in a debtor's plenary Bankruptcy Code proceeding in the absence of a Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding.

4 South Africa: Can U.S. Policies Influence Change?

Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-14
Author(s):  
Robert Conway
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
Major Part ◽  
State Department ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Honest Broker ◽  
The U.S

U.S. policies can play a major part in influencing change in South Africa, but before this can occur there is much faulty thinking to correct. Traditional academic commentary on the matter prescribes for the U.S. the role of honest broker; indeed, the State Department often categorizes its own role in such terms. This is a myth that must be exploded immediately. The United States has too much at stake in the area; it can't pretend to be neutral or play the role of a third party mediator. It is a major partner.

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