Chinese Perceptions of Parhae

2012 ◽  
pp. 167-179
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-346
Author(s):  
Sam Wong ◽  
Brian Wong

Abstract Analysis of the writings of Kuang Qizhao and other Chinese self-strengtheners suggests that their emphasis on promoting education before democracy and continuing to endorse classical Confucianism were not signs of a retrograde kind of conservatism, but an entirely rational decision based on the actual experiences of late Qing observers of 19th Century American democracy. Observing the U.S. Congress’s passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese officials observed the real dangers of demagogue led populism without an educated, moral citizenry and the apparent importance of Christianity to creating the moral foundation for an effective modern society. For Kuang, Confucianism was equivalent to Christianity to establish that moral basis, and not a conservative desire to preserve the old social order. Kuang would pass on his thoughts to some of China’s most important reformers and officials on his return home, suggesting he and the officials he associated with had a more realistic and sophisticated understanding of American society and democracy than is currently assumed.


Author(s):  
Yi Guo

Ever since the concept of press freedom was first introduced into China during the late-Qing dynasty, Chinese perceptions of the function of a free press have frequently changed. This research has shown that the social and cultural context shaped the unique interpretations of press freedom in China and impacted the extent to which it was realized in modern Chinese history. There were numerous problems that permeated the history of press freedom in China, problems that continue to influence the experience of press freedom in China today. This chapter concludes by exploring the theoretical and contemporary implications of the conceptual history of press freedom in China.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 787-805
Author(s):  
Zheng Chen ◽  
Hang Yin

Abstract While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kurt Herold

Virtual worlds and 'the Internet' in general are highly popular in the People's Republic of China. This article will argue, though, that in contrast to non-Chinese perceptions of virtual worlds and the Internet, Chinese users tend to see virtual worlds as wholly separate from their offline existence and identity.Based on the authors research experience with the Chinese Internet, and his years of teaching Chinese students in the 3D online world Second Life, the paper will demonstrate that Chinese usage frames virtual worlds (and the Internet in general) as spaces, in which it is permissible to rebel against authority, where users receive validation and approval from their peers, and where they can escape their often stressful and boring lives. The low costs involved, and the high entertainment value of virtual worlds, combined with a perception of virtual worlds as 'gaming', 'consequence-less' and 'not serious' spaces, contributes to the high attractiveness of virtual worlds to young Chinese, which has led to a moral panic in society about the dangers of Internet or gaming 'addiction'.The article will conclude that this framing of virtual worlds is so strong in China, in particular among young Chinese, that any attempt to utilize virtual worlds for other purposes, e.g. marketing, education, etc. will have to carefully re-frame and re-situate virtual worlds for Chinese Internet users.


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