Robb-Silbermann Commission, Report to the President of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005, Unclassified, White House.

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-159

The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (France, Soviet Union, Canada, United Kingdom, United States) met in London, May 13–June 22. Following discussion of possible approaches for the Sub-Committee, the Soviet representative presented a draft resolution11 prohibiting unconditionally weapons of mass destruction and asking the Security Council to effect an international agreement to guarantee enforcement of that prohibition. Permanent members of the Security Council would reduce by one-third conventional military equipment and personnel within a year. The draft recommended the convening by the Security Council of a conference to effect reduction of armaments by all states and to abolish military installations on foreign territories. The Soviet representative attacked parts of the United Nations Majority Plan for Control of Atomic Energy, stating that the United States desired to monopolize nuclear secrets and to secure information on Soviet armaments without prohibiting nuclear weapons.


2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Lewandowsky ◽  
Werner G.K. Stritzke ◽  
Klaus Oberauer ◽  
Michael Morales

Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War frequently contained corrections and retractions of earlier information. For example, claims that Iraqi forces executed coalition prisoners of war after they surrendered were retracted the day after the claims were made. Similarly, tentative initial reports about the discovery of weapons of mass destruction were all later disconfirmed. We investigated the effects of these retractions and disconfirmations on people's memory for and beliefs about war-related events in two coalition countries (Australia and the United States) and one country that opposed the war (Germany). Participants were queried about (a) true events, (b) events initially presented as fact but subsequently retracted, and (c) fictional events. Participants in the United States did not show sensitivity to the correction of misinformation, whereas participants in Australia and Germany discounted corrected misinformation. Our results are consistent with previous findings in that the differences between samples reflect greater suspicion about the motives underlying the war among people in Australia and Germany than among people in the United States.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Burda ◽  
Todd Sigg

Recent worldwide terrorist acts and hoaxes have heightened awareness that incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may occur in the United States. With federal funding assistance, local domestic preparedness programs have been initiated to train and equip emergency services and emergency department personnel in the management of large numbers of casualties exposed to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) agents. Hospital pharmacies will be required to provide antidotes, antibiotics, antitoxins, and other pharmaceuticals in large amounts and/or have the capability for prompt procurement. Pharmacists should become knowledgeable in drug therapy of NBC threats with respect to nerve agents, cyanide, pulmonary irritants, radionucleotides, anthrax, botulism, and other possible WMD.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Clemens

AbstractNegotiations to control and perhaps eliminate North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appeared to achieve positive results in the 1990s. But these positive trends reversed direction in 2001–2004 under President George W. Bush. Why? This essay weighs six possible explanations. 1. progress in the 1990s as a mirage; 2. cultural differences; 3. distrust of international agreements; 4. perceptions regarding the utility of WMD; 5. internal divisions within each government and society; and 6. ulterior motives.The evidence suggests that the sixth explanation carries the most weight. Top leaders in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as well as in the United States had priorities other than arms control. Each side used arms control negotiations as an instrument to promote its political and economic agenda in other realms. Pyongyang demanded large and certain rewards to give up its main bargaining chips. North Korea's negotiating behavior suggested some willingness to freeze or eliminate WMD programs if the price were right. But Kim Jong Il's regime clearly saw its nuclear and missile capabilities as major assets not to be traded away except for very substantial security and economic rewards. For its part, the Bush White House probably worried that any accord with Pyongyang would impede Washington's larger political, military, and economic ambitions, including deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). There was also a subjective element: President Bush probably loathed Kim Jong Il and did not relish the prospect of making any compromises with evil incarnate. For enlightened self-interest to prevail, the parties could benefit from greater empathy and a quest for mutual rather than one-sided gain.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-607 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Sapiro

The United States articulated a new concept of preventive self-defense last fall that is designed to preclude emerging threats from endangering the country. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the preventive approach to national security is intended to respond to new threats posed by “shadowy networks of individuals [who] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The Bush administration wisely concluded that it could not rely solely upon a reactive security posture, due to the difficulty in deterring potential attacks by those determined to challenge the United States and the magnitude of harm that could occur from weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Although the administration has characterized its new approach as “preemptive,” it is more accurate to describe it as “preventive” self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent tiireats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.


2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Burda ◽  
Todd Sigg

Recent worldwide terrorist attacks and hoaxes have heightened awareness that more incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may occur in the United States. With federal funding assistance, local domestic preparedness programs have been initiated to train and equip emergency services and emergency department personnel in the management of large numbers of casualties exposed to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) agents. Hospital pharmacies will be required to provide antidotes, antibiotics, antitoxins, and other pharmaceuticals in large amounts and/or have the capability for prompt procurement. Pharmacists should become knowledgeable in drug therapy of NBC threats with respect to nerve agents, cyanide, pulmonary irritants, radio-nucleotides, anthrax, botulism, and other possible WMD.


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