Security Council: Disarmament Commission

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-159

The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (France, Soviet Union, Canada, United Kingdom, United States) met in London, May 13–June 22. Following discussion of possible approaches for the Sub-Committee, the Soviet representative presented a draft resolution11 prohibiting unconditionally weapons of mass destruction and asking the Security Council to effect an international agreement to guarantee enforcement of that prohibition. Permanent members of the Security Council would reduce by one-third conventional military equipment and personnel within a year. The draft recommended the convening by the Security Council of a conference to effect reduction of armaments by all states and to abolish military installations on foreign territories. The Soviet representative attacked parts of the United Nations Majority Plan for Control of Atomic Energy, stating that the United States desired to monopolize nuclear secrets and to secure information on Soviet armaments without prohibiting nuclear weapons.

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-96

The Security Council held two meetings (1140th and 1141st) on August 5 and 7, 1964, to discuss a complaint of the United States government against the government of North Vietnam, which was expressed in a letter dated August 4, 1964, from the permanent representative of the United States addressed to the President of the Security Council. At the outset of the 1140th meeting on August 5, 1964, Mr. Morozov (Soviet Union) explained that he had requested the postponement of the meeting until August 6 to permit his delegation to receive necessary instructions from its government. With regard to this request, Mr. Stevenson (United States) pointed out that the UN Charter explicitly called for immediate reporting to the Council of measures taken by Members in the exercise of their right of self-defense. If the Council wished to adjourn after hearing the statement of the United States delegation, Mr. Stevenson had no objection. Mr. Hajek (Czechoslovakia) also opposed convening the meeting on August 5 on the grounds that Council members did not possess all the facts and views of the parties. To deliberate on the question on the basis of one version would not, he felt, serve the interests of the Council. Moreover, he did not feel that the circumstances constituted an emergency: The United States did not appear to be immediately threatened.


2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Lewandowsky ◽  
Werner G.K. Stritzke ◽  
Klaus Oberauer ◽  
Michael Morales

Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War frequently contained corrections and retractions of earlier information. For example, claims that Iraqi forces executed coalition prisoners of war after they surrendered were retracted the day after the claims were made. Similarly, tentative initial reports about the discovery of weapons of mass destruction were all later disconfirmed. We investigated the effects of these retractions and disconfirmations on people's memory for and beliefs about war-related events in two coalition countries (Australia and the United States) and one country that opposed the war (Germany). Participants were queried about (a) true events, (b) events initially presented as fact but subsequently retracted, and (c) fictional events. Participants in the United States did not show sensitivity to the correction of misinformation, whereas participants in Australia and Germany discounted corrected misinformation. Our results are consistent with previous findings in that the differences between samples reflect greater suspicion about the motives underlying the war among people in Australia and Germany than among people in the United States.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Burda ◽  
Todd Sigg

Recent worldwide terrorist acts and hoaxes have heightened awareness that incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may occur in the United States. With federal funding assistance, local domestic preparedness programs have been initiated to train and equip emergency services and emergency department personnel in the management of large numbers of casualties exposed to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) agents. Hospital pharmacies will be required to provide antidotes, antibiotics, antitoxins, and other pharmaceuticals in large amounts and/or have the capability for prompt procurement. Pharmacists should become knowledgeable in drug therapy of NBC threats with respect to nerve agents, cyanide, pulmonary irritants, radionucleotides, anthrax, botulism, and other possible WMD.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-607 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Sapiro

The United States articulated a new concept of preventive self-defense last fall that is designed to preclude emerging threats from endangering the country. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the preventive approach to national security is intended to respond to new threats posed by “shadowy networks of individuals [who] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The Bush administration wisely concluded that it could not rely solely upon a reactive security posture, due to the difficulty in deterring potential attacks by those determined to challenge the United States and the magnitude of harm that could occur from weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Although the administration has characterized its new approach as “preemptive,” it is more accurate to describe it as “preventive” self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent tiireats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.


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