A Human Rights Approach to Extremely Vulnerable People: Challenges and Feasibility in Assessing Smuggled Migrants

Every nurse is accountable for their decisions and actions. It is a professional responsibility, and statutory duty, to uphold the human rights of people for whom they care. This part of their role is often referred to in terms of ‘advocacy’ and ‘safeguarding’. On occasion, nurses will likely be faced with the need to express their concerns about aspects of care/treatment or suspected neglect/abuse of vulnerable people in a range of care settings. These might be in relation to perceived organizational shortcomings or failures, or specific to the circumstances of one person. In taking action, it is important that nurses adhere to local policies and follow appropriate channels of communication. This chapter focuses on two contemporary social and healthcare concerns where there is the potential for criminal justice involvement|—‘hate crime’ and ‘elder abuse’.

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Is there a human right to be assisted in dying? [Temos um direito humano a ser assistido na morte?]

Princípios Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) ◽

10.21680/1983-2109.2016v23n41id9834 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 23 (41) ◽

pp. 75-104

Author(s):

Milene Tonetto

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Slippery Slope ◽

Individual Autonomy ◽

Assisted Dying ◽

Right To Life ◽

Human Right ◽

Terminal Disease ◽

Vulnerable People ◽

Imminent Death ◽

The Right

This paper will focus on the issue of whether it is plausible to think about a human right to be assisted in dying. The right to be assisted in dying cannot be considered just a right of non-interference. It is better understood as a claim right because it demands assistance and positive actions. I will argue that the principles of individual autonomy and Kant’s notion of dignity taken independently cannot be considered plausible justification for the human right to be assisted in dying. Griffin’s personhood account points out that principles of liberty, minimum provision and autonomy must be taken together to justify human rights. Based on his theory, I will argue that a person with a terminal disease who was aware of her imminent death or who suffered from an intractable, incurable, irreversible disease may waive the right to life and choose death. Therefore, the right to life would not restrict the human right to be assisted in dying and a state that allowed the practice of assisted dying would not be disrespecting the human right to life. This article will defend that the personhood account is able to protect vulnerable people from making decisions under pressure and avoid the slippery slope objection.

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Poor Lives Matter: COVID-19 and the Plight of Vulnerable Groups with Specific Reference to Poverty and Inequality in South Africa

Journal of African Law ◽

10.1017/s0021855321000292 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-22

Author(s):

John C Mubangizi

Keyword(s):

South Africa ◽

Human Rights ◽

South African ◽

Vulnerable Groups ◽

Specific Reference ◽

Constitutional Rights ◽

Poverty And Inequality ◽

Vulnerable People ◽

Human Rights Based Approach ◽

The Impact

Abstract This article explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on vulnerable people in South Africa in the specific context of poverty and inequality. It does so by first looking at the conceptual context and then highlighting the extent of the impact both from a constitutional and human rights context and from a legislative context. It uses the poor and vulnerable as a proxy to explore the impact of the pandemic (and the measures put in place to contain it) on the specific constitutional rights of vulnerable people, before suggesting a human rights-based approach to managing the pandemic. It concludes that, despite the South African government having undertaken some of the actions recommended, there remains room for improvement and scope for further research, as the pandemic is expected to continue for some time.

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Human Dignity and Human Rights

Contours of Dignity ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198844365.003.0006 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 129-156

Author(s):

Suzy Killmister

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Human Dignity ◽

Socially Constructed ◽

Human Rights Practice ◽

Vulnerable People ◽

Human Kind

This chapter argues that human dignity should be understood as one more instantiation of status dignity. Accordingly, to have human dignity is to be a member of the human kind, where the human kind is a socially constructed category. This conception of human dignity is then integrated into an account of human rights, and it is shown that despite being socially constructed, human dignity can serve as the foundation of human rights. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the role of human rights practice in preventing the dehumanization of vulnerable people.

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Direitos Humanos e Retórica Pós-Moderna / Human Rights and Postmodern Rhetoric

Revista Brasileira de Direito ◽

10.18256/2238-0604.2017.v13i3.1674 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 13 (3) ◽

pp. 318

Author(s):

Narbal De Marsillac

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Human Dignity ◽

Communicative Rationality ◽

Social Force ◽

Vulnerable People ◽

The Future ◽

Democratic Engagement

Resumo: Com visões diametralmente opostas, Santos e Melkevik defendem, cada um a sua maneira, a dignidade humana e sua promoção global. A aporia dos dois posicionamentos teóricos apenas apura o senso crítico e denuncia os contornos do problema da fundamentação dos direitos humanos em um mundo pós-moderno, globalizado e cada vez mais plural. Se para o primeiro, a legitimidade desses direitos reside na radical dialogicidade e adaptabilidade aos auditórios aos quais são dirigidos, para o segundo, na qualidade de discordante razoável, é a tolerância, a solidariedade e o engajamento discursivo-democrático de uma racionalidade comunicativa que pode e deve mudar a sorte dos vulneráveis através de uma lógica de mosqueteiro que se impõe planetariamente não enquanto dada, mas enquanto força social e se traduz no dever de ser por todos e por cada um a força dos fracos. A proposta aqui é acompanhar em paralelo essas duas reflexões e se deixar influenciar pelo que as duas têm de melhor.Palavras-Chave: Direitos Humanos; Pós-Modernidade; Retórica; Modernidade JurídicaAbstract: With diametrically opposed views, Santos and Melkevik defend, in their own way, the human dignity and its global promotion. The aporia of the two theoretical positions only clears the critical sense and denounces the contours of the problem of the foundation of human rights in a postmodern world, globalized and increasingly plural. If in Santos’s perspective, the legitimacy of these rights lies in the radical dialogue and adaptability to the audiences to whom they are directed, in the Melkevik’s perspective, as a reasonable discordant, is the tolerance, solidarity and the discursive-democratic engagement of a communicative rationality that might and must change the future of the vulnerable people with a musketeer logic that imposes itself globally not as given, but as a social force and is translated into the duty of being for all and for each one the strength of the weak. The proposal here is to accompany these two reflections in parallel and let to be influenced by what the two have the best.Keywords: Human Rights; Postmodernity; Rhetoric; Legal Modernity

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COVID-19 pandemic and derogation to human rights

Journal of Law and the Biosciences ◽

10.1093/jlb/lsaa015 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Audrey Lebret

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

International Human Rights Law ◽

Human Rights Law ◽

International Human Rights ◽

Global Pandemic ◽

Vulnerable People ◽

Public Emergency ◽

International Human

Abstract Under international human rights law, States can limit the exercise of most human rights if it is necessary to protect the rights of others or collective interests. The exceptional circumstances brought by the COVID-19 global pandemic lead to more extensive, on both their scope and their duration, restrictions of human rights than in usual times. This article introduces the States’ specific right to derogate to human rights in circumstances of public emergency and the conditions of a legitimate derogation in the context of COVID-19. It argues that States must ensure that the general measures they adopt to face the crisis do not disproportionally harm vulnerable people.

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