scholarly journals Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition. Volume One: Sense Perception

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhana Toivanen
Keyword(s):  
Sense Perception ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

scholarly journals Sense Perception and the Flourishing of the Human Person in von Hildebrand and the Aristotelian Traditions

2018 ◽  
pp. 95-118
Author(s):  
Mark K. Spencer
Keyword(s):  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Material World ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

Phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand argues that many properties of the material world only exist in relation to persons, that sense perception is not merely a bodily act, but a properly spiritual, personal act, and that our highest act is not purely intellectual but involves bodily sense perception. By his own assertion, his philosophy must be understood in the context of the Catholic philosophical tradition; here, I consider his account of the material world and of sense perception in comparison to two strands of the Aristotelian tradition in Catholic philosophy, represented by Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas. I show how von Hildebrand’s views on the material world and sense perception can be better understood, their phenomenological bases defended, and their deficiencies corrected, by drawing on the notion of energeiai from Palamas’ thought, and of participation and obediential potency from Aquinas’ thought

Are We Mad? Intensity and the Problems of Modern Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-215
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Bell
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
The Relationship

In this essay Deleuze's concept of intensity is placed into the context of the problem of accounting for the relationship between sense perception and our conceptual categories. By developing the manner in which Kant responds to Hume's critique of metaphysics, this essay shows how Deleuze develops a Humean line of thought whereby the heterogeneous as heterogeneous is embraced rather than, as is done in Kant, being largely held in relationship to an already prior unity.

Walter Benjamin's media theory and the tradition of the media diaphana

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Antonio Somaini
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Experience ◽  
Media Theory ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Spatially Extended ◽  
The Media ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

"The article presents an in-depth analysis of Benjamin’s use of the German term Medium, in order to show how his entire media theory may be interpreted as centered on the interaction between the historically changing realm of the technical and material Apparate, and what he calls in the artwork essay the »Medium of perception«: the spatially extended environment, the atmosphere, the milieu, the Umwelt in which sensory experience occurs. This notion of »Medium of perception« is then located within the long, post-Aristotelian tradition of the media diaphana, whose traces can be found in the 1920s and 1930s in the writings of authors such as Béla Balázs, Fritz Heider, and László Moholy-Nagy. </br></br>Der Artikel präsentiert eine eingehende Analyse von Benjamins Gebrauch des deutschen Begriffs »Medium«, um zu zeigen, dass seine gesamte Medientheorie fokussiert ist auf die Interaktion zwischen dem historisch veränderlichen Bereich der technischen und materiellen Apparate einerseits und dem, was er in dem Kunstwerkaufsatz das »Medium der Wahrnehmung« nennt: die räumlich ausgedehnte Umgebung, die Atmosphäre, das Milieu, die Umwelt, in der sinnliche Wahrnehmung erfolgt. Dieser Begriff des »Mediums der Wahrnehmung« wird dann innerhalb der langen, nacharistotelischen Tradition der media diaphana verortet, deren Spuren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren in den Schriften von Autoren wie Béla Balázs, Fritz Heider und László Moholy-Nagy zu finden sind."

Must Functionalists Be Aristotelians?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons ◽  
Alexander Pruss
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Computing System ◽  
Proper Function ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Normative Language ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

Functionalism in the theory of mind requires an account of function that has a normative component—mere conditional connection (whether indicative or sub-junctive) is not enough. For instance, a component of a computing system isn’t an adder just in case its output is always or would always be the sum of the inputs, since any computing system in a world with as much indeterminism as ours can err or malfunction. Two general reductions of normative language have been proposed that one might wish to apply to the problem of defining proper function: the evolutionary reduction (Wright, Millikan) and the agential reduction (Plantinga). We argue that whatever the merits of the reductions in other contexts, a functionalist theory of mind that defines proper function in either of these ways must fail. The argument proceeds by first showing the agential reduction is viciously circular in the context of a functionalist theory of agency. Second, if functionalism about mind is true and proper function is reducible evolutionarily, then it is possible to have a situation in which the presence or absence of mental properties depends in an implausibly spooky, acausal way on remote facts. It is plausible that the only currently avail-able way for the functionalist to meet these challenges is to accept irreducible end-directed causal powers of minds and/or their functional parts, in accordance with a broadly Aristotelian tradition.

Space, Color, Sense Perception and the Epistemology of Logic

The Monist ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dallas Willard ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Sense Perception ◽  
Color Sense ◽  
Epistemology Of Logic

scholarly journals The Bundle Theory Approach to Relational Quantum Mechanics

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Oldofredi
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Bundle Theory ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Relational Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Essential Idea ◽  
Mereological Fusion ◽  
Metaphysical Interpretation ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

AbstractThe present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.

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