A Politics of Intensity: Some Aspects of Acceleration in Simondon and Deleuze

This article aims to clarify the question of speed and intensity in the thoughts of Simondon and Deleuze, in order to shed light on the recent debates regarding accelerationism and its politics. Instead of starting with speed, we propose to look into the notion of intensity and how it serves as a new ontological ground in Simondon's and Deleuze's philosophy and politics. Simondon mobilises the concept of intensity to criticise hylomorphism and substantialism; Deleuze, taking up Simondon's conceptual framework, repurposes it for his ontology of difference, elevating intensity to the rank of generic concept of being, thus bypassing notions of negativity and individuals as base, in favour of the productive and universal character of difference. In Deleuze, the correlation between intensity and speed is fraught with ambiguities, with each term threatening to subsume the other; this rampant tension becomes explicitly antagonistic when taken up by the diverse strands of contemporary accelerationism, resulting in two extreme cases in the posthuman discourse: either a pure becoming, achieved through destruction, or through abstraction that does away with intensity altogether; or an intensity without movement or speed, that remains a pure jouissance. Both cases appear to stumble over the problem of individuation, if not disindividuation. Hence, we wish to raise the following question: in what way can one think of an accelerationist politics with intensity, or an intensive politics without the fetishisation of speed? We consider this question central to the interrogation of the limits of acceleration and posthuman discourse, thus requiring a new philosophical thought on intensity and speed.

Form IV: From Ruyer's Psychobiology to Deleuze and Guattari's Socius

From the point of view of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Raymond Ruyer's work appears to bear out two distinct tendencies of unequal appeal. On the one hand, Ruyer appears to be an anti-Aristotelian thinker of formation, rejecting any hylomorphic account of the production of reality. However, and notably despite his serious commitment to the work of the sciences of his day, he remains wedded to the ultimately conservative Leibnizian principle of closure. Nowhere is this dichotomy more striking than in his account of human society. The aim of this paper is to show how his positive account of form(ation) finds a significant and convincing extension in Deleuze and Guattari's notion of social surface or socius in Anti-Oedipus.

How Do We Recognise Deleuze and Simondon Are Spinozists?

While typically unapologetic in expressing admiration, notably Gilles Deleuze admits his concern one time, in passing, that Gilbert Simondon's thought might hide a pernicious kind of ‘disguised moralism’, in which the form of the transcendent (‘God’, ‘Man’, ‘Ideas’) lurks, the enemy of the philosophy of immanence. Might there in fact be an ulterior motive in Deleuze's concern? But might this potential critique invite its own reversal? That is, might Deleuze's accusation be in fact a strategy for teasing out what, perhaps, is unrecognisable as such, but structurally essential for how Simondon constructs his onto-epistemological goals? Moreover, might this Simondonian response, unmasked, not only deflect but anticipate a ‘critique’ like Deleuze's? Extending this question further reveals I believe the implications for Simondon's ‘ethics without morality’, bringing him closer to Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza. As a result, Deleuze's ‘critique’ invites the question: ‘What exactly is Spinozan in Simondon's ethics?’ Such a question compels our re-evaluation of humanism, its underlying prerogatives, if now in light of its consequences, the re-evaluation of poststructuralism: first, because it is predicated on the critique of the humanistic subject and, second, because ‘poststructuralism’ has come to designate how Simondon's relatedness is determined to Deleuze.

The Force that Is but Does Not Act: Ruyer, Leibniz and Deleuze

In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari attribute to Leibniz and Raymond Ruyer a vitalism of ‘a force that is but does not act’. This is a judicious characterisation of Leibniz's vitalism, but not Ruyer's. In The Fold, Deleuze presents Ruyer as a disciple of Leibniz, but if Leibniz's monads have no doors or windows, Ruyer's are nothing but doors and windows, nothing but liaisons actively forming themselves. For Ruyer, there is only one force, a consciousness-force, matter-form in sustained, non-localisable self-formation. In Deleuze's reading of Leibniz's concept of the vinculum substantiale, Deleuze comes close to presenting a notion of force like that of Ruyer's, in that the vinculum inextricably interfolds monads and bodies, but ultimately the separation of the forces of monads from those of bodies prevails in a fashion incompatible with Ruyer's conception of force. Deleuze and Guattari make use of Ruyer's understanding of consciousness and the brain as the auto-overflight of an absolute surface in their concluding remarks on philosophy and the arts in What Is Philosophy?, but they depart from Ruyer in their characterisation of the relation of force to those two domains, ultimately because they reject Ruyer's advocacy of a universal, goal-directed finalism.

Ruyer and Simondon on Technological Inventiveness and Form Outlasting its Medium

A summary is provided of Ruyer's important contribution, a reversal from some conclusions held in his secondary doctoral dissertation, about the limits inherent in technological progress, and an attempt is made to show the coherence of this position with Ruyer's metaphysics. Simondon's response is also presented, and subsequently analysed especially as it culminates in a concept of concretisations. As Simondon indicated, and with a displacement in Ruyer's limiting framework on unconditional growth, we end up searching for what represents the category of the ultimate for those two philosophers of the cyberworld.