4. Inner Mongolia: Japanese Military Activity And Its Cultural Support, 1932–45

1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-182 ◽  

During the period from July 10, 1947 to December 23, 1948, thirteen policy decisions were adopted by the Far Eastern Commission. These fell primarily into three categories–disarmament, democratization, and the determination of a self-sustaining economy for Japan. In the first category the Commission adopted a policy decision on February 12, 1948, entitled “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment”. Under the terms of this decision a ministry of war was forbidden, and possession by Japanese of arms, ammunition and implements of war and the development, manufacture or importation of these articles was prohibited


1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-396

In the period from January 1 to April 15, 1948, the major policy decision approved by the Far Eastern Commission dealt with the prohibition of military activity in Japan and disposition of Japanese military equipment. On February 12, 1948, the Commission directed that the possession of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by any Japanese should be prohibited, save that which might be authorized for Japanese civil police agencies and licensed hunters. The development, manufacture, importation or exportation of arms, ammunition and implements of war, the manufacture of aircraft of all kinds, and the construction of naval combatant and auxiliary vessels were similarly prohibited. In addition, reestablishment of any of the military ministries and their subsidiary service groups – such as the Naval General Headquarters and the Imperial High Command – was prohibited, together with ex-officers clubs, para-military organizations, or even associations of ex-officers ostensibly founded for legitimate purposes but being disguised forms of military organizations. All senior officers andc career officers in the Army, Navy and gendarmerie were prohibited from employment in the government service or educational institutions unless performing services essential to demobilization and repatriation.


The first TBE patients in China were reported in 1943, and the TBEV was isolated from the brain tissues of 2 patients in 1944 by Japanese military scientists,1 and from patients and ticks (Ixodes persulcatus and Haemaphysalis concinna) in 1952 by Chinese researchers.2 The Far Eastern viral subtype (TBEV-FE) is the endemic subtype that has been isolated from all 3 known natural foci (northeastern China, western China, and southwestern China).14 Recently a new “Himalayan subtype” of the TBEV (TBEV-HIM) was isolated from wild rodent Marmoata himalayana in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau15. The main vector of the TBEV in China is I. persulcatus.3 One recent report suggests that the TBEV-SIB is prevalent in the Uygur region (North West China)13 but epidemiological modelling indicates that the TBEV may occur even widely all over China (Figure 3).4 Likely, the disease is often missed by clinicians due to a lack of the availability of specific diagnostic assays16.


Author(s):  
Andrew Logie

In current day South Korea pseudohistory pertaining to early Korea and northern East Asia has reached epidemic proportions. Its advocates argue the early state of Chosŏn to have been an expansive empire centered on mainland geographical Manchuria. Through rationalizing interpretations of the traditional Hwan’ung- Tan’gun myth, they project back the supposed antiquity and pristine nature of this charter empire to the archaeological Hongshan Culture of the Neolithic straddling Inner Mongolia and Liaoning provinces of China. Despite these blatant spatial and temporal exaggerations, all but specialists of early Korea typically remain hesitant to explicitly label this conceptualization as “pseudohistory.” This is because advocates of ancient empire cast themselves as rationalist scholars and claim to have evidential arguments drawn from multiple textual sources and archaeology. They further wield an emotive polemic defaming the domestic academic establishment as being composed of national traitors bent only on maintaining a “colonial view of history.” The canon of counterevidence relied on by empire advocates is the accumulated product of 20th century revisionist and pseudo historiography, but to willing believers and non-experts, it can easily appear convincing and overwhelming. Combined with a postcolonial nationalist framing and situated against the ongoing historiography dispute with China, their conceptualization of a grand antiquity has gained bipartisan political influence with concrete ramifications for professional scholarship. This paper seeks to introduce and debunk the core, seemingly evidential, canon of arguments put forward by purveyors of Korean pseudohistory and to expose their polemics, situating the phenomenon in a broader diagnostic context of global pseudohistory and archaeology.


1938 ◽  
Vol 7 (13) ◽  
pp. 151-151
Author(s):  
J. R. S.
Keyword(s):  

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