cia office of current intelligence special report status of soviet and chinese military aid to north vietnam september 3 1965 top secret dinar

Author(s):  
Xiaobing Li

As a Communist state bordering Vietnam, China actively supported Ho Chi Minh’s wars against France in 1950–1954 and then America in 1965–1970. This book uses new Communist sources to offer an unprecedented Chinese military perspective on the Vietnam War. By documenting the level of Chinese military assistance to Vietnam, it reveals the extent to which the Chinese support of Ho’s military and political objective in the wars was a crucial and indispensable factor in North Vietnam’s victory. The study offers an overview and the particulars of Chinese aid to Ho’s army, or PAVN, in terms of training, weaponry, logistics, advisors, and technology during its transformative years of 1950–1956 in depth and detail based on a foundation of multiple documentary sources, memoirs, interviews, and secondary sources both in China and in Vietnam. With Chinese assistance, the PAVN experienced three important transformative changes from a peasant, rebellion force to a regular, national army. In retrospect, international Communist support to North Vietnam proved to be the decisive edge that enabled the PAVN, or NVA, to survive the American Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and helped the NLF, also known as the Viet Cong, to prevail in the war of attrition and eventually defeat South Vietnam. An international perspective may help students and the public in the West to gain a better understanding of America’s long war.


2019 ◽  
pp. 154-177
Author(s):  
Xiaobing Li

Chapter 7 explains Mao’s Cold War theory, in which a clash between China and the United States would inevitably occur sooner or later. The Chinese military should thus have its priorities and preparations established prior to this inevitable conflict. After the Indochina Settlement was signed at Geneva in July 1954, China continued to provide weaponry, equipment, and military training to North Vietnam. This chapter points out that, in June 1965, China began to send its troops to the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1968, China sent twenty-three divisions to Vietnam, including ninety-five regiments, totaling some 320,000 troops. Beginning in 1968, China also sent 110,000 troops to Laos to provide air defense, construct and repair highways, and maintain transportation and communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Nevertheless, the Vietnam War seriously tested the limits of the Communist alliance. Rather than improving Sino-Soviet relations, aid to North Vietnam created a new competition as each superpower attempted to control Southeast Asian Communist movements.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-274
Author(s):  
Xiaorong Han

This article analyses the roles and activities of three groups of Chinese communist revolutionaries in the early phase of the First Indochina War. The author argues that although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not begin to provide substantial aid to North Vietnam until 1950, the involvement of Chinese communists, including members of both the CCP and the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), in the First Indochina War started at the very moment the war broke out in 1946. Although the early participants were not as prominent as the Chinese political and military advisers who arrived after 1949, their activities deserve to be examined, not only because they were the forerunners of later actors, but also because they had already made concrete contributions to the Vietnamese revolution before the founding of the People's Republic of China and the arrival of large-scale Chinese military and economic aid. Moreover, interactions between early Chinese participants and the Vietnamese revolutionaries established a pattern that would characterise Sino–Vietnamese relations in the subsequent decades.


Significance A military cooperation agreement was been signed during the week-long visit. To date, most Chinese military aid to Belarus has been to supply light trucks, medical equipment and computers. Ravkov's visit follows the May 10-12 visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Belarus, following his attendance at the Moscow VE Day commemorations. Xi held discussions with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka during which deals totalling 15.7 billion dollars were signed. However, for China, the greatest significance of Xi's visit was the strengthening of ties with regards to the formulation of China's Silk Road strategy. Impacts In the long term, Russia and China will compete to buy such strategic Belarusian assets as high-tech defence firms. Foreign Minister Uladzamir Makei's attendance at the Riga EU summit in Lukashenka's absence will reinforce Makei's succession credentials. The EEU is likely to coordinate policies towards China, regulating volumes of Chinese imports to the Eurasian trading bloc.


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