scholarly journals The Mythic Multiverse Through the Scope of Language: The “Procedural Anatomy” of Verbal Modelling

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Kolesnyk
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Open Systems ◽  
Possible World ◽  
European Languages ◽  
Logical Operations

The Mythic Multiverse Through the Scope of Language: The “Procedural Anatomy” of Verbal ModellingThis article discusses the logical and cognitive premises of verbal world modelling and focuses on the phenomena of irrationally triggered categorization and myth-oriented semiosis as the fundamental mechanisms of construing alternative realities. The paper demonstrates the reconstruction of interpretative mythic axioms via the etymological analysis of the designations of WORLD in different Indo-European languages. The paper proposes a formal model of a possible world created on the basis of mythic concepts, in addition to a multi-vectored algorithm for the configuration of a possible world. The article also proposes a typology of possible worlds which constitute a “multiverse". The paper focuses on the patterns of logical operations and cognitive procedures responsible for secondary designation as “sense-creating" and “world-creating" acts. These patterns correspond to the functioning and interaction of open systems, while the sequence of operational steps follows the logic of assembling a functional construal. Mityczne multiwersum w świetle języka. "Anatomia proceduralna" modelowania werbalnegoAutor omawia logiczne i kognitywne przesłanki werbalnego modelowania świata i koncentruje się na zjawiskach irracjonalnie uruchamianej kategoryzacji, zorientowanej na mit semiozy jako podstawowego mechanizmu konstruowania alternatywnych rzeczywistości. Przedstawia rekonstrukcję interpretacyjnych aksjomatów mitycznych poprzez etymologiczną analizę desygnatów ŚWIATA w różnych językach indoeuropejskich. Proponuje formalny model świata możliwego stworzony na bazie pojęć mitycznych, a także wielowariantowy algorytm konfiguracji świata możliwego. Proponuje również typologię światów możliwych, które tworzą "multiwersum". Autor koncentruje się na wzorcach operacji logicznych i procedur poznawczych odpowiedzialnych za wtórne określanie aktów "sensotwórczych" i "światotwórczych". Te wzorce odpowiadają funkcjonowaniu i interakcji systemów otwartych, a sekwencja kroków operacyjnych jest zgodna z logiką składania konstrukcji funkcjonalnej.

scholarly journals Mínimo e máximo em estruturas nominais – uma análise semântica

2019 ◽  
pp. 250-264
Author(s):  
Rui Marques
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Possible World

This paper is concerned with the semantics of the portuguese phrases with the form o mínimo/máximo N (‘the minimum N’) and o mínimo/máximo de N (‘the minimum/maximum of N’). Some nouns may occur in both of these constructions, while others might occur in only one of them, and still other nouns might occur only if accompanied by a modal operator. The proposal is made that these facts can be straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that the first and the second of these syntactic constructions have, respectively, an extensional and an intensional meaning, together with the fact that some nouns have the same denotation in any possible world, while others denote different sets of entities in different possible worlds.

scholarly journals Nonexistence, Vague Existence, Merely Possible Existence

Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (33) ◽  
pp. 427-443
Author(s):  
Iris Einheuser
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Target Object ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Vague Existence

Abstract This paper explores a new non-deflationary approach to the puzzle of nonexistence and its cousins. On this approach, we can, under a plausible assumption, express true de re propositions about certain objects that don’t exist, exist indeterminately or exist merely possibly. The defense involves two steps: First, to argue that if we can actually designate what individuates a nonexistent target object with respect to possible worlds in which that object does exist, then we can express a de re proposition about “it”. Second, to adapt the concept of outer truth with respect to a possible world – a concept familiar from actualist modal semantics – for use in representing the actual world.

Analysing Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 22-73
Author(s):  
Alastair Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Reductive Theory

This chapter presents and defends the basic tenets of quantum modal realism. The first of these principles, Individualism, states that Everett worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. The converse of this principle, Generality, states that metaphysically possible worlds are Everett worlds. Combining Individualism and Generality yields Alignment, a conjecture about the nature of possible worlds that is closely analogous to Lewisian modal realism. Like Lewisian modal realism, Alignment entails that each possible world is a real concrete individual of the same basic kind as the actual world. These similarities render EQM suitable for grounding a novel theory of the nature of metaphysical modality with some unique properties. Also like Lewisian modal realism, quantum modal realism is a reductive theory: it accounts for modality in fundamentally non-modal terms. But quantum modal realism also has unique epistemological advantages over Lewisian modal realism and other extant realist approaches to modality.

Counterfactual conditionals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Doring
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Counterfactual Conditional ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals

‘If bats were deaf, they would hunt during the day.’ What you have just read is called a ‘counterfactual’ conditional; it is an ‘If…then…’ statement the components of which are ‘counter to fact’, in this case counter to the fact that bats hear well and sleep during the day. Among the analyses proposed for such statements, two have been especially prominent. According to the first, a counterfactual asserts that there is a sound argument from the antecedent (‘bats are deaf’) to the consequent (‘bats hunt during the day’). The argument uses certain implicit background conditions and laws of nature as additional premises. A variant of this analysis says that a counterfactual is itself a condensed version of such an argument. The analysis is called ‘metalinguistic’ because of its reference to linguistic items such as premises and arguments. The second analysis refers instead to possible worlds. (One may think of possible worlds as ways things might have gone.) This analysis says that the example is true just in case bats hunt during the day in the closest possible world(s) where they are deaf

Modal logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Bull's Eye ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Richard Montague

In reasoning we often use words such as ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘must’ and so on. For example, if we know that an argument is valid, then we know that it is necessarily true that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Modal logic starts with such modal words and the inferences involving them. The exploration of these inferences has led to a variety of formal systems, and their interpretation is now most often built on the concept of a possible world. Standard non-modal logic shows us how to understand logical words such as ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’, which are truth-functional. The modal concepts are not truth-functional: knowing that p is true (and what ‘necessarily’ means) does not automatically enable one to determine whether ‘Necessarily p’ is true. (‘It is necessary that all people have been people’ is true, but ‘It is necessary that no English monarch was born in Montana’ is false, even though the simpler constituents – ‘All people have been people’ and ‘No English monarch was born in Montana’– are both true.) The study of modal logic has helped in the understanding of many other contexts for sentences that are not truth-functional, such as ‘ought’ (‘It ought to be the case that p’) and ‘believes’ (‘Alice believes that p’); and also in the consideration of the interaction between quantifiers and non-truth-functional contexts. In fact, much work in modern semantics has benefited from the extension of modal semantics introduced by Richard Montague in beginning the development of a systematic semantics for natural language. The framework of possible worlds developed for modal logic has been fruitful in the analysis of many concepts. For example, by introducing the concept of relative possibility, Kripke showed how to model a variety of modal systems: a proposition is necessarily true at a possible world w if and only if it is true at every world that is possible relative to w. To achieve a better analysis of statements of ability, Mark Brown adapted the framework by modelling actions with sets of possible outcomes. John has the ability to hit the bull’s-eye reliably if there is some action of John’s such that every possible outcome of that action includes John’s hitting the bull’s-eye. Modal logic and its semantics also raise many puzzles. What makes a modal claim true? How do we tell what is possible and what is necessary? Are there any possible things that do not exist (and what could that mean anyway)? Does the use of modal logic involve a commitment to essentialism? How can an individual exist in many different possible worlds?

Constructing the Impossible

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-163
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Formal Languages ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Degree Of Acceptance ◽  
Broad Role ◽  
Natural Way

Please keep the original abstract. A number of philosophers have flirted with the idea of impossible worlds and some have even become enamored of it. But it has not met with the same degree of acceptance as the more familiar idea of a possible world. Whereas possible worlds have played a broad role in specifying the semantics for natural language and for a wide range of formal languages, impossible worlds have had a much more limited role; and there has not even been general agreement as to how a reasonable theory of impossible worlds is to be developed or applied. This chapter provides a natural way of introducing impossible states into the framework of truthmaker semantics and shows how their introduction permits a number of useful applications.

Fragmentation and Singular Propositions

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori

Two puzzles are described: a problem about necessary a posteriori truths and a problem about propositional attitudes with singular propositions as their contents. Two strategies for solving them are compared. The first is the diagonalization strategy, which distinguishes possible worlds that are compatible with what is actually expressed by a given sentential clause from possible worlds that are compatible with what would be expressed by the clause if that possible world were actual. The second strategy is the fragmentation strategy, which represents the intentional states described by sentential clauses as separate nonintegrated representational states. It is argued that these are complementary, not competing, strategies. Both play a role in the solutions to the problems. In conclusion, it is suggested that these strategies can also help to clarify a number of further problems—about self-locating attitudes, about the nature of computation, and about knowledge of phenomenal experience.

scholarly journals Mathematical Proof on the Existential Necessity of the World

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young Hyeon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Mathematical Proof ◽  
Multiple Impacts ◽  
Possible World ◽  
The World ◽  
World Theory ◽  
Modern Physics ◽  
Solid Foundation ◽  
Entire World ◽  
Null Set

The "best of all possible worlds" theory (hereinafter the "possible world theory") was presented by Leibniz many centuries ago, and provided an opportunity for metaphysics to understand the ontological meaning of the world in an in-depth way. Furthermore, the theory has multiple impacts on the multiverse theory of modern physics. However, considering the ontological questions of the world solely on linguistics logic leads to basing the possible world theory or the multiverse theory on relatively uncertain inferential reasons. In this study, symbolic logic was used to consider the possible world theory on a more solid foundation. The entire world was made into oneness, and tracking the existential process at the beginning of the world, realized the existential necessity of the world, even though the initial causal point of the world was assumed to be completely void (null set). The existential system in this study, was generalized without specific elements, apart from existence and non-existence. It was discovered that existential possibility and existential necessity are logically equivalent.

scholarly journals KAIP APIBRĖŽIAMOSIOS DESKRIPCIJOS VARTOJAMOS SINGULIARINIAMS TEIGINIAMS IŠREIKŠTI?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Evgeny Borisov
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Subject Term ◽  
The Subject

Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas: kokios sąlygos turi būti patenkintos, kad, ištarę sakinį su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija kaip sakinio subjektu, mes išreikštume singuliarinį teiginį (Kaplano prasme). Autorius teigia, kad Wettsteino įsitikinimas, jog teiginio singuliariškumas nustatomas ištarimo metu nurodant apibrėžiamosios deskripcijos referentą, yra nenuoseklus. Straipsnyje siūlomas kitas singuliariškumo kriterijus: teiginys yra singuliarinis, jeigu jame dalyvaujanti apibrėžiamoji deskripcija įvertinama vieninteliame galimame pasaulyje, o jeigu apibrėžiamoji deskripcija turi būti įvertinta daugiau nei vieno galimo pasaulio atžvilgiu, tai teiginys yra bendrasis (general). Šis kriterijus veiksmingas aiškinant kontroversiškus atvejus – kai išreiškiame teisingą singuliarinį teiginį, kurio subjekto dėmuo nedera su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija, pavartota ištartame sakinyje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: apibrėžiamoji deskripcija, nuoroda, singuliarinis ir bendrasis teiginys, galimų pasaulių semantika. How Do We Use Definite Descriptions to Express Singular Propositions?Evgeny Borisov AbstractThe paper is devoted to the question: under what conditions do we express a singular proposition (in the Kaplanian sense) when uttering a sentence containing a definite description as the subject term. It is argued that Wettstein’s claim that singularity of a proposition is determined by the demonstration of the referent of definite description accompanying the utterance contains an inconsistency. An alternative criterion of singularity is proposed: we express a singular proposition if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a single possible world, and we express a general one if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a range of possible worlds. This criterion is effective in explaining controversial cases in which we manage to express a true singular proposition with a subject constituent that does not fit the definite description used in the utterance.Keywords: definite description, reference, singular and general propositions, possible world semantics

scholarly journals Crossworld Predication in Natural Language

2021 ◽  
pp. 260-272
Author(s):  
Евгений Васильевич Борисов
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Partial Functions ◽  
Possible World Semantics

Некоторые предложения естественного языка, такие как «Джон мог быть выше, чем Мэри, как она есть», не допускают адекватного анализа в терминах стандартной семантики возможных миров, поскольку содержат кросс-мировую предикацию, которая в стандартной семантике не отображается. Для логического анализа такого рода предложений автором была разработана (и представлена в других публикациях) логика для кросс-мировой предикации (СРL). В статье приведен ряд примеров, демонстрирующих широкую распространенность феномена кросс-мировой предикации в естественном языке и описаны главные особенности семантики СРL (кросс-мировая интерпретация предикатов и использование частичных функций от переменных к возможным мирам в истинностной оценке формул), а также охарактеризована специфика синтаксиса СРL и онтологии, лежащей в ее основе. Some sentences of natural language cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of standard possible world semantics because they involve cross-world predication that cannot be reflected by means of standard semantics. An instance is ‘John might be taller than Mary is’. In some other papers the author proposed a logic for cross-word predication (CPL) that can be used to logically analyze sentences of this sort. In this paper, some examples are adduced that show that cross-world predication is highly widespread in natural language. The main features of the semantics of CPL are described, namely cross-world interpretation of predicates, and using partial functions from variables to possible worlds in the evaluation of formulas. Finally, the specificity of the syntax of CPL, and the ontology behind the semantics of CPL is characterized.

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