Affray and Legislative Intent: Cautionary Tales

2003 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-348
Author(s):  
Alan Reed

In comparison with other doctrinal areas of criminal law relatively little has been written on public order infractions, specifically the offence of affray. A revival of interest in this topic has been prompted by the House of Lords' decision in I v DPP and the Court of Appeal decision in Plavecz. This article examines the outcome in these cases and, more widely, seeks to deconstruct the substantive elements of the affray offence. It is suggested that it does not merit the pre-eminence currently accorded by prosecuting authorities, and that more encomia solutions to breaches of public order may be found through consideration of a gamut of alternative charges.

Legal Studies ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-76
Author(s):  
Hazel Carty

Stare decisis provides the framework of certainty in the codeless English legal system. Even since 1966, when the House of Lords announced its power to depart from earlier authority, it has shown great reluctance to do so and has underlined this need for certainty. Given the small number of cases that filter through to the House of Lords, it is, however, the Court of Appeal that plays the vital role in the supervision of the lower courts and in the maintenance of support for the strict theory of binding precedent. Situated at the focal point of our legal system it is responsible, according to Lord Scarman, for its ‘stability, its consistency and its predictability’. Orthodox theory demands that the Court of Appeal, at least in its Civil Division, be bound by its own decisions and look to the House of Lords or Parliament to deal with unsatisfactory law. Yet recently, the Master of the Rolls held that an earlier Court of Appeal decision should, in part, be ignored. It would appear, therefore, that Lord Denning's ‘one man crusade’ (to quote Lord Diplock in Davis v Johnson) against the strict application of stare decisis in the Court of Appeal continues. This article will consider Lord Denning's various pronouncements throughout his career on precedent as it affects the Court of Appeal and will attempt to assess the theoretical justifications of his unorthodox views.


Legal Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-113
Author(s):  
Catherine O'Sullivan

The issue of decriminalising euthanasia and/or assisted suicide has been the subject of a number of high-profile cases, the most recent of which was the Court of Appeal decision in R (Nicklinson & Lamb) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961. This paper will focus on the offence of assisted suicide and Martin's argument that the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, issued by the DPP following the House of Lords' final judgment in R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45 failed to provide foreseeability where a prospective assister was not someone with an emotional connection to the requester. The success of this claim offers a fresh opportunity to examine a somewhat neglected aspect of the Policy that emanated from the Purdy case, namely its potential challenge to the oft-stated claim that motive is irrelevant to mens rea. It is my contention that the Policy has (effectively) amended s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 by making compassion/motive a definitional element of the offence, and that this is problematic because it contravenes a limitation imposed by the maxim that supports the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.


1950 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 432-445
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson

It may be convenient in conclusion to attempt to restate the ambit of the first two exceptions in the light of cases decided since Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.:—(1) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow, whether the second decision was reached in ignorance of the first, or the first decision was discussed and distinguished in the second. (The rider to the formulation of the exceptions in the Young Case is the product of the subsequent decisions in Battersby v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Ltd. and Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C.)It appears that when the court has once decided that there is a conflict between two or more previous decisions and purported to resolve it that resolution is final in the sense that a subsequent court cannot then prefer the rejected decision. It is doubtful whether it is open to a subsequent court to decide there was no conflict at all, but it is suggested that no such power should be conceded, although Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. permits it where the second exception is concerned.When the court has once decided that there is no conflict between two or more previous decisions, it is not open to a subsequent court to hold that there is in fact a conflict and thereby confer upon itself jurisdiction to make a selection: Hogan v. Bentinck Collieries. Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. is to the contrary, but should be overruled on this point. The Court of Appeal has, of course, power to choose between these two conflicting authorities when the point again comes before it.(2) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which was reached in ignorance of a previous decision of the House of Lords that covers the point, or which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a subsequent decision of the House of Lords, or which is expressly disapproved in considered dicta by a majority in the House of Lords: Leathley v. John Fowler and Co., Ltd. [1946] K.B. 579.Where the House of Lords decision comes first, and the decision is discussed and distinguished in the later Court of Appeal decision, the Court of Appeal in the case sub iudice is bound by the Court of Appeal decision according to Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd. and Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, Ltd., but according to Fitzsimmons v. Ford Motor Co., Ltd., is under a duty to follow the House of Lords decision if, in its opinion, there is a conflict. There is stronger authority in support of the Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, Ltd. decision, that of a ‘full’ court, but the ruling in the Fitzsimmons Case should be preferred, as it is unreasonable to treat the first and second exceptions differently. The Court of Appeal has, of course, power to choose between the two lines of authorities when the question next arises.If the Fitzsimmons Case is preferred, it has been held in Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. that a subsequent court can decide that there was no conflict at all, and revive the discarded Court of Appeal decision, but it is suggested that this view should not be followed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Bankole Sodipo

Abstract Infringement of broadcasts is often treated as a crime. The Nigerian Constitution guarantees that no-one can be prosecuted for any act that is not prescribed in a written law. Section 20 of Nigeria's Copyright Act only criminalizes dealing with infringing copies. A “copy” is defined in terms of material form. An infringing broadcast therefore connotes a recorded broadcast or a copy of a broadcast. This article argues that, statutorily, not every act that gives rise to civil liability for broadcast copyright infringement constitutes a crime. The article reviews the first broadcast copyright prosecution Court of Appeal decision in Eno v Nigerian Copyright Commission. Eno was unlawfully prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned. The article seeks to stem the wave of prosecutions on the type of charges used in Eno. In the absence of law reform, the prosecutions based on the line of charges in Eno constitute a fracturing of constitutional rights.


Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-322
Author(s):  
Mitchell C. Davies

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.


2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 440-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Kugler

In criminal law theory, it is common to distinguish between the defence of necessity as a justification and the defence of necessity as an excuse. However, it is sometimes said that English law does not clearly distinguish between justification and excuse. In Re A (Children) the Court of Appeal permitted the separation of conjoined twins although the separation would lead to the immediate death of one of the twins. In his judgment, Brooke LJ invoked the defence of necessity and appears to be ready to base his decision on necessity as an excuse. It is, however, submitted in this article that Brooke LJ's decision should be interpreted as having been based on necessity as a justification. Consequently, it cannot be said any longer that English law does not distinguish between justification and excuse.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (21) ◽  
pp. 1258-1259
Author(s):  
Richard Griffith

Richard Griffith, Senior Lecturer in Health Law at Swansea University, discusses the implications of a Court of Appeal decision that considers the scope of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 39, in relation to care workers


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