A Near-Optimal Bidding Strategy for Real-Time Display Advertising Auctions

2020 ◽  
pp. 002224372096854
Author(s):  
Srinivas Tunuguntla ◽  
Paul R. Hoban

This article introduces a near-optimal bidding algorithm for use in real-time display advertising auctions. These auctions constitute a dominant distribution channel for internet display advertising and a potential funding model for addressable media. The proposed efficient, implementable learning algorithm is proven to rapidly converge to the optimal strategy while achieving zero regret and constituting a competitive equilibrium. This is the first algorithmic solution to the online knapsack problem to offer such theoretical guarantees without assuming a priori knowledge of object values or costs. Furthermore, it meets advertiser requirements by accommodating any valuation metric while satisfying budget constraints. Across a series of 100 simulated and 10 real-world campaigns, the algorithm delivers 98% of the value achievable with perfect foresight and outperforms the best available alternative by 11%. Finally, we show how the algorithm can be augmented to simultaneously estimate impression values and learn the bidding policy. Across a series of simulations, we show that the total regret delivered under this dual objective is less than that from any competing algorithm required only to learn the bidding policy.

Author(s):  
Aritra Ghosh ◽  
Saayan Mitra ◽  
Somdeb Sarkhel ◽  
Viswanathan Swaminathan

2014 ◽  
Vol 598 ◽  
pp. 656-660
Author(s):  
Fu Gui Dong

Owing to the fact that the power can not be stored directly and the supply must meet the demand in real time, the price of electricity is more volatile than other commodities. In order to hedge the risk, the power plant can sign the power sale contracts with big customers by the promissory price. Using the Bayesian equilibrium theory, this paper establishes the bidding models on two power plants competing for selling the electricity to the big customer. The computing result shows that the power plant’s optimal bidding strategy equals to the mean of the competitor’s ceiling bidding price and its own marginal cost.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 587-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Pei ◽  
Yan Du ◽  
Wei Deng ◽  
Kun Sheng ◽  
Hao Xiao ◽  
...  

Genes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 527
Author(s):  
Eran Elhaik ◽  
Dan Graur

In the last 15 years or so, soft selective sweep mechanisms have been catapulted from a curiosity of little evolutionary importance to a ubiquitous mechanism claimed to explain most adaptive evolution and, in some cases, most evolution. This transformation was aided by a series of articles by Daniel Schrider and Andrew Kern. Within this series, a paper entitled “Soft sweeps are the dominant mode of adaptation in the human genome” (Schrider and Kern, Mol. Biol. Evolut. 2017, 34(8), 1863–1877) attracted a great deal of attention, in particular in conjunction with another paper (Kern and Hahn, Mol. Biol. Evolut. 2018, 35(6), 1366–1371), for purporting to discredit the Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution (Kimura 1968). Here, we address an alleged novelty in Schrider and Kern’s paper, i.e., the claim that their study involved an artificial intelligence technique called supervised machine learning (SML). SML is predicated upon the existence of a training dataset in which the correspondence between the input and output is known empirically to be true. Curiously, Schrider and Kern did not possess a training dataset of genomic segments known a priori to have evolved either neutrally or through soft or hard selective sweeps. Thus, their claim of using SML is thoroughly and utterly misleading. In the absence of legitimate training datasets, Schrider and Kern used: (1) simulations that employ many manipulatable variables and (2) a system of data cherry-picking rivaling the worst excesses in the literature. These two factors, in addition to the lack of negative controls and the irreproducibility of their results due to incomplete methodological detail, lead us to conclude that all evolutionary inferences derived from so-called SML algorithms (e.g., S/HIC) should be taken with a huge shovel of salt.


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