Modelling the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe

2011 ◽  
Vol 217 ◽  
pp. F37-F45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Simon Kirby ◽  
Ali Orazgani
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Government Debt ◽  
Financial Assistance ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Debt Sustainability ◽  
Temporary Rise ◽  
The Impact

This note examines the impact of rising bond yields in certain Euro Area countries on debt sustainability. It concludes that without the financial assistance of the bailout packages, government debt in Greece would clearly have been unsustainable, while Ireland and Portugal would have been extremely vulnerable. We also examine the case of vulnerable countries which have not received bailouts — Italy, Spain and Belgium. We conclude that while they can absorb some temporary rise, as has been seen in recent weeks, a significant further sustained rise — more than 100–200 basis points — would call their solvency into question in the absence of financial assistance.

scholarly journals Volatility of yields of government bonds among GIIPS countries during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area

Equilibrium ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Heryan ◽  
Jan Ziegelbauer
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Yield Spreads ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The aim of the paper is to estimate, how the volatility of yields of the Greek bonds affects yields’ volatilities of bonds in selected European countries during the period of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. We obtained data for 10-year bonds in a weekly frequency from January 2006 till the end of December 2014. To make a comparison of pre-crisis period, we firstly investigate a bond yields’ volatility before 15th September 2008, when U.S. Leman Brothers bankrupted and the global financial crisis had been reflected in full. However, the period of the global financial crisis could also negatively affect the development of government bonds. Therefore, the period after Leman Brothers’ bankruptcy has been excluded and our crisis period starts after 23rd April 2010, when Greece asked the IMF for financial help and the sovereign debt crisis had been reflected in full. Volatility models GARCH (1,1), IGARCH (1,1) and TARCH (1,1) were used as an estimation method. To examine the risk premium of all GIIPS economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), we also compared the whole investigation with the developments of each spread against the yields of German government bonds. Our results clearly proved not only big differences between pre-crisis and crisis period, but also differences in output with the bond yield spreads. It was concluded that  there has been a higher impact of the Greek bond yields, as well as yield spreads volatility in 2010 and 2011, while it is on the lower level in pre-crisis period.

European Economies Stability Faced With Potential Outburst of Sovereign Debt Crisis. An Empirical Study Using Neural Network

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 3255-3260
Author(s):  
Stelian Stancu ◽  
Alexandra Maria Constantin
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
European Level ◽  
Continuous Growth ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
European Economies ◽  
The Impact

Instilment, on a European level, of a state incompatible with the state of stability on a macroeconomic level and in the financial-banking system lead to continuous growth of vulnerability of European economies, situated at the verge of an outburst of sovereign debt crises. In this context, the current papers main objective is to produce a study regarding the vulnerability of European economies faced with potential outburst of sovereign debt crisis, which implies quantitative analysis of the impact of sovereign debt on the sensitivity of the European Unions economies. The paper also entails the following specific objectives: completing an introduction in the current European economic context, conceptualization of the notion of “sovereign debt crisis, presenting the methodology and obtained empirical results, as well as exposition of the conclusions.

scholarly journals The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Member States ◽  
Sovereign Bond ◽  
European Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Collective Action Clauses

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.

Eurobonds: Three Lessons from China’s “Debt Centralization/Decentralization” Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
Previous Series

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.

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