A Typology of the Frivolous: Varying Meanings of Frivolity in Section 1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation

1998 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENRY F. FRADELLA

In the last few years, the popular press, judges, state attorneys general, and legal scholars have raised concerns about the frivolus nature of lawsuits filed in federal court by inmates in state and local custodies under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. An ethnographic content analysis of a random sample of 200 cases filed in 1994 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona demonstrates that the label “frivolous” is used in different ways by various stakeholders in the civil justice system. A typology of differing conceptualizations of frivolous cases is explored, and the sociolegal and public policy implications of the findings are discussed.

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-168
Author(s):  
Guillermo A. Montero

In Patel v. Midland Memorial Hospital & Medical Center, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant hospital did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights by suspending his clinical privileges without a pre-suspension hearing, where there were reasonable grounds for assuming that patient safety was at risk. Dr. P.V. Patel, a board-certified cardiologist, brought an action against Midland Memorial Hospital and several of its doctors, alleging that the suspension of his clinical privileges violated his right to a pre-suspension hearing; was the result of racial discrimination; and resulted in anticompetitive behavior in violation of antitrust laws. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted Midland's motion for summary judgment. The parties filed cross appeals, Dr. Patel on the ground that there were genuine issues of fact for all of his claims, and Midland on the ground that, with the exception of the civil rights claim, it was immune from all of Dr. Patel's claims under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-202
Author(s):  
Allan Gomes

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled, in United States u. Texus Tech University, 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), that the Eleventh Amendment bars a private citizen from bringing a qui tam action in federal court against a state, absent federal intervention.Intervenor Carol Foulds was a dermatology resident at the Texas Tech Health Services Center. While a resident, Foulds examined patients, made diagnoses, and prescribed treatments for patients. Foulds alleged that she and other residents performed these medical services without the supervision of staff physicians. Foulds further alleged that, after residents performed these services without physician oversight, staff physicians signed charts and Medicare and Medicaid billing forms certifying that they personally performed or supervised the administration of these services. Foulds estimates approximately 500,000 false claims occurred in a span of ten years.In 1995, Foulds filed a qui tam action with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. As regulated by the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (West 1998), the complaint remained under seal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (5) ◽  
pp. 596-626
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Spinney ◽  
Marcia Cohen ◽  
William Feyerherm ◽  
Rachel Stephenson ◽  
Martha Yeide ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1054-1055

On August 23, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Mitchell v. U.S., denying a certificate of appealability to the petitioner who sought a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence of death. The petitioner, Lezmond Mitchell, argued that his conviction and sentence must be vacated in light of an August 12, 2020, report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that concluded that Mr. Mitchell's trial and sentence were a violation of his rights under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Mr. Mitchell, the only Native American on federal death row, argued that the IACHR report created rights binding on the U.S. “‘(1) because they are derived directly from the OAS Charter, a treaty within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) because they are derived, through the OAS Charter, from the American Declaration, a statement of human rights norms the United States has not only adopted, but helped to draft.’” The Ninth Circuit concluded that Mr. Mitchell's motion to vacate “did not make ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right’” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and denied his motion. In its reasoning, the Court explained that “reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the IACHR's decision is not binding in federal court.” It agreed with the District Court's conclusion that IACHR rulings are not binding on the U.S. because the OAS Charter is “not self-executing” and there is no U.S. statute which implements it. Moreover, the District Court correctly determined that because the American Declaration is not a treaty, it creates no binding legal obligations, nor does the “IACHR's governing statute, the Statute of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights . . . give the IACHR power to make binding rulings with respect to nations, like the United States, that have not ratified the American Convention.” The Ninth Circuit thus joins the other federal courts of appeals that have addressed this issue by concluding that neither the American Declaration, nor the IACHR's recommendations related thereto, is a source of binding obligations for the United States under international law. Cf. Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 2016); Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 991, 997–98 (5th Cir. 2014); Flores-Nova v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 652 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2011); Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 n. 11 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Hicks, 375 F.3d 1237, 1241 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2004); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2001); Roach v. Aiken, 781 F.2d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 1986).


2012 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 23-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Holmes ◽  
Salmon A. Shomade ◽  
Roger E. Hartley

We examine the time required for lower federal court nominees to complete the confirmation process. Using proportional hazards models, we analyze delay at the Judiciary Committee stage and the full Senate vote stage from 1977 to 2010, finding that delay has been used by members of the committee and the full Senate to signal opposition to nominees. Delay at the committee stage has influenced delay on the Senate floor for circuit and district court nominees, at least in the years since Robert Bork’s failed nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court. Our findings indicate that senators pick up on committee delay as a cue in the confirmation process. Examining the distinct stages of the confirmation process provides important new insights into legislative signaling behavior and confirmation politics.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Rosenblat ◽  
Kate Wikelius ◽  
danah boyd ◽  
Seeta Peña Gangadharan ◽  
Corrine Yu

Discrimination and racial disparities persist at every stage of the U.S. criminal justice system,from policing to trials to sentencing. The United States incarcerates a higher percentage of its population than any of its peer countries, with 2.2 million people behind bars. The criminal justice system disproportionately harms communities of color: while they make up 30 percent of the U.S. population, they represent 60 percent of the incarcerated population. There has been some discussion of how “big data” can be used to remedy inequalities in the criminal justice system; civil rights advocates recognize potential benefits but remained fundamentally concerned that data-oriented approaches are being designed and applied in ways that also disproportionately harms those who are already marginalized by criminal justice processes.Like any other powerful tool of governance, data mining can empower or disempower groups. The values that go into an algorithm, and the metrics it optimizes for, are baked into its design. Data could be used to identify discrimination in current practices, or to predict where certain combinations of data points are likely to lead to an erroneous conviction. When algorithms are designed to improve how law enforcement regimes are deployed, the question that data analytics raises is, which efficiencies are we optimizing for? Who are the stakeholders, and where do they stand to gain or lose? How do these applications intersect with core civil rights concerns? Where can we use big data techniques to improve the structural conditions criminal justice system that lead to disparate impacts on marginalized communities? How do we measure that impact, and the factors that lead to it?


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