Strategic interaction in local governments’ industrial land supply: Evidence from China

Urban Studies ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (6) ◽  
pp. 1328-1346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhonghua Huang ◽  
Xuejun Du
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 104009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Zhou ◽  
Li Tian ◽  
Yuan Gao ◽  
Yingkai Ling ◽  
Chenjing Fan ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang He ◽  
Wendong Wu ◽  
Taozhi Zhuang ◽  
Yuan Yi

In China, while large-scale industrial land redevelopment has played a significant role in promoting economic growth, it has also triggered a series of unsustainable problems. To date, few studies have explored the expectations of stakeholders in industrial redevelopment projects in China. Gaining an in-depth understanding of the diverse expectations among core stakeholders is an essential step towards realizing social sustainability. This study aims to analyze these diverse expectations in industrial land redevelopment projects. For this purpose, 19 factors were identified and compared across the following core stakeholders: local governments, consulting experts, the general public, and original land users of state-led redevelopment and land user-led redevelopment projects, using questionnaires and interviews conducted in Shanghai, China. The findings show there to be tremendous differences between the expectations of different stakeholder groups in terms of economic, social and environmental aspects. Major differences were also found between the expectations of original land users across different project types. Moreover, the negative externalities, the balance between industrial and residential space, the diverse needs of original land users in different project types, and the barriers to stakeholders’ participation, in industrial land redevelopment in China were discussed. The findings of the current paper are conducive to optimizing stakeholder participation in industrial land redevelopment so as to enhance social sustainability.


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 324-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huub Ploegmakers ◽  
Erwin van der Krabben ◽  
Edwin Buitelaar
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Fan Tu ◽  
Shuangling Zou ◽  
Ran Ding

Due to low industrial land prices and inefficiently used industrial land, China’s central government has reformed land regulations in order to promote more market-oriented industrial land. Considering the differences in land management between developed and developing countries, this study aims to investigate the impact of land use regulations on industrial land prices in China and the effect of market-oriented reforms of industrial land policy. Measures that capture multiple dimensions of land use regulation tools are incorporated into OLS models based on a micro dataset from 1999 to 2016 that covers Jiaxing City in Eastern China. The results show that (1) The land policy implemented in 2006 to promote industrial land marketization has had a very limited effect; (2) The impact of land supply on industrial land prices was decreased for land transferred through listings after 2006, which implies an immature marketization; (3) Zoning instruments has obvious effects on industrial land prices; (4) The results imply that the effect of land use regulations varies with firm ownership and development zones. The findings in this paper clearly show that the industrial land market should be more open and competitive and combined with a rational land supply to promote the market-oriented price mechanism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 104434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Wang ◽  
Qun Wu ◽  
Siqi Yan ◽  
Guancheng Guo ◽  
Shangui Peng

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Tai Hsu ◽  
Xiaolu Li ◽  
Yang Tang ◽  
Jing Wu

This paper explores whether and how corruption and competition-for-promotion motives affect urban land supply in the People's Republic of China. Conditional on demand-side factors, we find that corruption is highly correlated with an increase in land supply. The corruption effects are strongest for commercial land, followed by residential land, and then industrial land. To shed light on the competition motives among prefectural leaders, we examine how the number of years in office affects land supply and distinguish among different hypotheses. Our empirical results show robust rising trends in land sales. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that among prefectural leaders the impatience and anxiety in later years from not being promoted may contribute to an increase in land sales revenue in later years. We also find that prefectural leaders may aim for more land sales revenue over their first few years in office instead of seeking higher revenue in their first 1–2 years.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 225-254
Author(s):  
Kai Liu

PurposeWhat is the relation between the land system with Chinese characteristics and the country's high-speed economic growth in the past decades? There is a lack of rigorous academic research based on the general equilibrium theory of macroeconomics on this issue.Design/methodology/approachBy building a multisector dynamic general equilibrium framework with land system, this paper explores how the land supply mode with Chinese characteristics affects China's economic growth as well as its transmission mechanism.FindingsThis paper confirms the importance of land system with Chinese characteristics in explaining the mystery of China's high-speed economic growth. Counterfactual analysis shows that if China adopts a land system similar to that of other developing countries, GDP will drop 36% from the current level under the baseline model.Originality/valueAs the industrial sector shrinks relatively and the output elasticity of infrastructure decreases, this inhibitory effect will become more apparent. China should improve its land supply mode, especially expand the supply of commercial and residential land and reduce the cost of land in the service sector. This can promote better economic development in the future and thus improve household welfare and the structure of aggregate demand, replace “land-based public finance” and thus inhibit the “high leverage” risks of local governments.


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