Introduction to the EU REACH Legislation

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Grindon ◽  
Robert Combes

FRAME initiatives on the European Union REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) system for the safety testing and risk assessment of chemicals, first proposed as a White Paper in 2001, are summarised. These initiatives considered the scientific and animal welfare issues raised by the REACH proposals, and resulted in a number of suggestions for improvement, many of which seem to have been adopted during the current progress of the legislation through the European Council and European Parliament.

Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Combes ◽  
Jennifer Dandrea ◽  
Michael Balls

In May, 2003, the European Commission published detailed proposals relating to its 2001 White Paper – Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy. The White Paper described a new registration system called the REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) system, for both new and existing chemicals. Subsequently, these detailed proposals were available for an eight-week consultation period for stakeholders to voice their views and concerns. In this paper, we describe our reactions to the Commission's more-detailed proposals. These include the creation of a European Chemicals Agency to implement the REACH system in conjunction with Competent Authorities (CAs) in Member States and the Commission itself. Unfortunately, many of our concerns and suggestions, previously voiced and shared with several other key stakeholders, remain unanswered, but are as relevant as when the White Paper was published. In particular, we are concerned about the lack of a clear and coherent strategy. There is no guidance for registrants on intelligent testing to maximise the use of non-animal approaches to safety testing, based on a combination of factors for estimating exposure levels, rather than mainly on production volumes. We are also concerned about the absence of a clear programme for the development, improvement and validation of new alternative methods, in conjunction with the Commission's own unit, the European Centre for the Validation of Alternative Methods, as well as other organisations with relevant expertise and experience, including FRAME. Finally, we explain why such measures should be introduced, together with clearer guidelines for the respective roles of the Agency, the CAs and the Commission in implementing and harmonising the REACH system at the European Union and Member State levels. A series of recommendations are made, to improve the situation and to improve the risk assessment process.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


IG ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Nicolai von Ondarza

The Brexit negotiations constituted unchartered political and institutional territory for the European Union (EU). This analysis shows how a new institutional approach enabled the EU-27 to present an unusually united front. The “Barnier method” is characterised by five elements: a strong political mandate from the European Council, a single EU negotiator based in the European Commission in the person of Michel Barnier, very close coordination with the Member States and the European Parliament, and a high degree of transparency. Lessons can also be drawn from this for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations and the EU’s relations with other third countries.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Friel Raymond

After almost 50 years in existence in a variety of different forms, the EU finally has an express proposal on the table dealing with the potential withdrawal of a Member State. Article 59 of the draft Constitution states that any Member State may now ‘decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’.1 The Member State would have to formally notify the European Council of this decision. The Council and the Member State would then enter into negotiations on a mutually agreeable basis for withdrawal, including a framework for the future relationship between the EU and the Member State. The results of this negotiation would require approval by a qualified majority of the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.2 In any event, withdrawal would occur not later than two years following the notification unless extended by agreement between the Member State and the European Council.3


Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter focuses on the European Parliament (EP), the one directly elected institution of the European Union. It first provides an overview of the EP’s composition and functions before discussing the struggle for increased powers within the EP. It then considers debates and research on the EP. The focus of contemporary research on the EP include political behaviour and EP elections, the internal politics and organization of the EP, and inter-institutional bargaining between the EP, the European Council, and the European Commission. One theme of the academic debate is the extent to which the EP has become an effective independent actor in the affairs of the EU, and how far it will continue to move in that direction in the future.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter focuses on the European Parliament (EP), the one directly elected institution of the European Union. It first provides an overview of the EP’s composition and functions, before discussing the struggle for increased powers within the EP. It then considers debates and research on the EP. The focus of contemporary research on the EP includes political behaviour and EP elections, the internal politics and organization of the EP, and inter-institutional bargaining between the EP, the European Council, and the European Commission. One theme of the academic debate is the extent to which the EP has become an effective independent actor in the affairs of the EU.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


Author(s):  
Panagiotis Delimatsis

Secrecy and informality rather than transparency traditionally reign trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Yet, transparency ranks among the most basic desiderata in the grammar of global governance and has been regarded as positively related to legitimacy. In the EU’s case, transparent trade diplomacy is quintessential for constitutional—but also for broader political—reasons. First, even if trade matters fall within the EU’s exclusive competence, the EU executive is bound by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to inform the European Parliament, the EU co-legislator, in regular intervals. Second, transparency at an early stage is important to address public reluctance, suspicion, or even opposition regarding a particular trade deal. This chapter chronicles the quest for and turning moments relating to transparency during the EU trade negotiations with Canada (CETA); the US (TTIP), and various WTO members on services (TiSA).


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