scholarly journals Arbitrage spaces in the offshore world: Layering, ‘fuses’ and partitioning of the legal structure of modern firms

2021 ◽  
pp. 0308518X2110536
Author(s):  
Ronen Palan ◽  
Hannah Petersen ◽  
Richard Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Group Structure ◽  
Multinational Enterprise ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Social Technologies ◽  
Ownership Arrangement ◽  
Social Geographies

In this article, we discuss the way offshore financial centres are used by the multi-subsidiary, multi-jurisdictional group structure known as the ‘multinational enterprise’ to arbitrage between social geographies of political jurisdictions. We define arbitrage as the use of corporate legal entities located in diverse jurisdictions to arbitrate a third country's rules and regulations. Using a new method to categorize firm-level data from Van Dijk’s Orbis, we operationalize the notion of arbitrage to systematically detail and compare the structural sequencing choices firms are making, likely in part for reasons of arbitrage. We base our techniques on legal theory of the firm, acknowledging the underpinning of social technologies of law and accounting by which business enterprises are constructed and maintained. We conclude that two specific types of entities, ‘standalones’ versus ‘in-betweeners’, are qualitatively different from others in the activities they perform. We also highlight the existence of liability structures, or ‘fuses’, which typically take the form of a split ownership arrangement. Ultimately, we demonstrate that the position of a firm’s subsidiary within the overall network ecology of that firm is as important as its jurisdictional registration location.

From the Fringe to the Fore: Labor Unions and Employee Compensation

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Knepper
Keyword(s):  
Labor Unions ◽  
Multinational Enterprise ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Employee Compensation ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Labor Share ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Union Election ◽  
Enterprise Survey

Conventional wisdom suggests that labor unions raise worker wages, while the newer empirical literature finds only negligible earnings effects. I reconcile this apparent contradiction by arguing that collective bargaining targets fringe benefits. Using U.S. firm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Multinational Enterprise Survey and Compustat, I exploit a regression discontinuity in majority rule union elections to compare changes in employee compensation at firms whose establishment barely won a union election against those that barely lost an election. Following unionization, average employee compensation and employer pension contributions increase, which raises the labor share of compensation.

scholarly journals Global Production with Export Platforms*

2016 ◽  
Vol 132 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Tintelnot
Keyword(s):  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Multinational Enterprise ◽  
Fixed Costs ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Multinational Production ◽  
Foreign Affiliates

Abstract Most international commerce is carried out by multinational firms, which use their foreign affiliates both to serve the market of the host country and to export to other markets outside the host country. In this article, I examine the determinants of multinational firms’ location and production decisions and the welfare implications of multinational production. The few existing quantitative general equilibrium models that incorporate multinational firms achieve tractability by assuming away export platforms—that is, they do not allow foreign affiliates of multinationals to export—or by ignoring fixed costs associated with foreign investment. I develop a quantifiable multicountry general equilibrium model, which tractably handles multinational firms that engage in export platform sales and that face fixed costs of foreign investment. I first estimate the model using German firm-level data to uncover the size and nature of costs of multinational enterprise and show that the fixed costs of foreign investment are large. Second, I calibrate the model to data on trade and multinational production for twelve European and North American countries. Counterfactual analysis reveals that multinationals play an important role in transmitting technological improvements to foreign countries and that the pending Canada-EU trade and investment agreement could divert a sizable fraction of the production of EU multinationals from the U.S. to Canada.

Implicit Taxes Amid Race to the Bottom in a Global Tax Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn
Keyword(s):  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Tax Returns ◽  
Tax Hypothesis

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation

Ageing and Employability. Evidence from Belgian Firm-Level Data

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariann Rigo ◽  
Vincent Vandenberghe ◽  
Fábio Waltenberg
Keyword(s):  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Firm Level Data

scholarly journals Who Really Benefits from Consumption Tax Cuts? Evidence from a Large VAT Reform in France

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youssef Benzarti ◽  
Dorian Carloni
Keyword(s):  
Value Added ◽  
Consumption Tax ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Employment Effects ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Firm Level Data ◽  
Material Goods ◽  
Firm Owners

This paper evaluates the incidence of a large cut in value-added taxes (VATs) for French sit-down restaurants in 2009. In contrast to previous studies, which only focus on the price effects of VAT reforms, we estimate the effects of the VAT cut on four groups: workers, firm owners, consumers, and suppliers of material goods. Using a difference-in-differences strategy on firm-level data, we find that: firm owners pocketed more than 55 percent of the VAT cut; consumers, sellers of material goods, and employees shared the remaining windfall with consumers benefiting the least; and the employment effects were limited. (JEL H22, H25, L83)

scholarly journals Information related service trade within firms: evidence from firm-level data in Germany

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt A. Hafner ◽  
Jörn Kleinert
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Economies Of Scope ◽  
It Services ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
It Service ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Related Service ◽  
Foreign Affiliates ◽  
Knowledge Intensive ◽  
Parent Companies

AbstractMulti-unit firms have productivity advantages over competitors because of their use of a non-rival asset—firm-specific knowledge—in several units. Using knowledge-intensive services leads to economies of scope in production by multi-unit firms. Such headquarter are usually supplied by parent companies and serve to link different firm units. Headquarter services are difficult to quantify in statistics or surveys, except when they cross-borders and the exchange of services between MNEs and their offshore subsidiaries becomes apparent. This study therefore focuses on IT service imports to explain productivity differences among foreign affiliates of multinational firms in Germany. The authors base the analysis on the population of foreign multinational firms active in Germany and analyze what effect the import of IT services has on their productivity. They find that IT headquarter service flows have significant impacts on foreign affiliates’ productivity in general and US affiliates in particular. As the average IT-service flows (per firm and partner) from parent countries are significantly higher for US affiliates than non-US affiliates, they conclude that the import of IT services from the parent-company is a source of the productivity advantages of US affiliates in Germany.

Multinational Banks and IMF Conditionality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trung A Dang ◽  
Randall W Stone
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Location Decisions ◽  
Preferential Treatment ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Firm Level Data ◽  
Imf Programs ◽  
Investment Location

Abstract We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location decisions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in countries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial conditionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial conditionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local affiliates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for preferential treatment.

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