Making the Invisible Visible: Investment Promotion and Multinational Production in Latin America and the Caribbean

Firms seeking to invest abroad must still confront important information barriers. As a consequence, a given country may provide suitable conditions for investment but remain invisible to multinational firms. Nearly all countries in the world have established investment promotion agencies (IPAs) to address these information barriers and put themselves on investors maps. Although IPAs are ubiquitous, the existing literature on the impacts of their activities is limited and only provides a view from the top, thus leaving governments without crucial inputs for designing and guiding their policy actions. Making the Invisible Visible fills in these knowledge gaps by zooming in on the effects of investment promotion policies and the mechanisms and channels thereof. To do so, it draws on the results of a highly detailed institutional survey of more than 50 IPAs and unique firm-level data on both the worldwide location of multinational firms foreign affiliates and IPA assistance for several LAC countries. Based on the results of impact evaluations using this novel micro data, the report presents robust new evidence on whether and how investment promotion works, what works in investment promotion, and when investment promotion works. In particular, it concludes that: (i) investment promotion has been (cost-)effective in attracting multinational firms and increasing LAC countries participation in multinational production; (ii) how IPAs are organized, what they do, and how they do it all influence these effects; (iii) the impact of IPA assistance has been greater when it consisted of specialized information services and was given to firms headquartered in countries and operating in sectors in which information barriers are more prominent. These findings can help countries in the region make better, more informed policy and operational decisions to take advantage of the opportunities that the current global context could create. They may thereby create a solid basis for long-term growth and sustainable development.

The Effects of Foreign Multinationals on Workers and Firms in the United States*

Governments go to great lengths to attract foreign multinationals because they are thought to raise the wages paid to their employees (direct effects) and to improve outcomes at local domestic firms (indirect effects). We construct the first U.S. employer-employee dataset with foreign ownership information from tax records to measure these direct and indirect effects. We find the average direct effect of a foreign multinational firm on its U.S. workers is a 7 percent increase in wages. This premium is larger for higher-skilled workers and for the employees of firms from high GDP per capita countries. We find evidence that it is membership in a multinational production network—instead of foreignness—that generates the foreign-firm premium. We leverage the past spatial clustering of foreign-owned firms by country of ownership to identify the indirect effects. An expansion in the foreign-multinational share of commuting-zone employment substantially increases the employment, value added, and—for higher-earning workers—wages at local domestic-owned firms. Per job created by a foreign multinational, our estimates suggest annual gains of 13,400 USD to the aggregate wages of local incumbents, two-thirds of which are from indirect effects. Our estimates suggest that—via mega-deals for subsidies from local governments—foreign multinationals are able to extract a sizable fraction of the local surplus they generate.

“Exit” vs. “Voice”: Global Sourcing, Multinational Production, and the China Trade Lobby

This paper examines the influence of three different forms of global economic engagement on the lobbying behavior of US businesses with regard to trade relations with China: (a) input sourcing; (b) downstream export; and (c) vertical foreign direct investment. It will be hypothesized that firms involved in all three forms of global economic activities should have incentives to lobby over China-related trade issues in order to maintain unimpeded access to sources of supply or markets and to ensure the smooth operation of the entire supply chain. Going further, drawing on the exit-voice framework developed by Albert Hirschman (1972), it will be argued that compared to firms in those industries mainly involved in input sourcing from China, American multinational corporations that have verticalized their production should have even stronger incentives to engage in lobbying activities and “voice” their policy preferences due to their greater “sunk costs” and hence the higher cost of “exit.” Statistical analysis of the China trade-related lobbying activities of US firms between 2006 and 2016 lends substantial support to these conjectures.