Is Eastern Europe to Blame for Falling Corporate Taxes in Europe?

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carissa L. Tudor ◽  
Hilary Appel

When a dozen new countries joined the European Union in the mid-2000s, political tensions spiked over disparities in corporate income tax rates. Since the time of enlargement, leaders have tried repeatedly to enhance corporate tax coordination within the EU, as a result of fears of downward pressure on corporate tax rates and states’ weakening ability to collect revenues. At the same time, leaders from new member states in Eastern Europe with low corporate tax rates have contended that regional efforts to coordinate tax policies are not worthwhile, given that corporate tax competition is a global phenomenon. This article argues that corporate tax competition is more acute at the regional than the global level. While corporate tax rates are falling inside and outside the EU, we demonstrate using a large multiyear, multiregional data set that Eastern European countries have extremely low corporate tax rates relative to other EU and non-EU countries, even when controlling for multiple domestic economic and political factors. These findings support the potential efficacy of pursuing regional corporate tax reform to address the downward spiraling of rates in the EU.

1996 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Hallerberg

The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I. This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator state, but pressure from the national government, especially to increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates. These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Elschner ◽  
Jost H. Heckemeyer ◽  
Christoph Spengel

AbstractEU law demands that the allocation of factors and goods within the European Union shall not be distorted by taxes. Efforts to formally harmonize corporate tax regimes in Europe have, however, stalled in recent years. What is more, the source principle has prevailed over residence based taxation which is seen to be more in line with EU law. Tax induced distortions of cross-border investment decisions are supposed to be the consequence. Based on country-specific effective average tax rates from 1998 to 2009, this article shows that there is, however, non-coordinated convergence of tax burdens within the EU. Thus, distortions of cross-border investment decisions are limited and decreasing even without formal harmonization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 119-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorota Wawrzyniak

This paper investigates different measures of corporate tax burden ranging from the most basic ones such as the statutory tax rate to the effective tax rates. Each of these measures has advantages and disadvantages and they may lead to different rankings of countries. One of the reasons lies the fact that they measure different things. The comparison of the statutory tax rates to the effective ones for the EU-27 during the period of 1998-2009 sometimes reveals very significant differences between these indicators. Taking this into consideration, the paper suggests that corporate tax burden analysis should not be limited to the most basic and readily available measure in the form of the statutory tax rate. Different measures are tailored to answer different research questions. Moreover, the article presents changes of company taxation for the EU-27 within 1998-2009.


Author(s):  
Veronika Dvořáková

The increasing globalization and integration of markets are one of the causes of tax competition. Even though tax competition may be beneficial for some countries, on the other hand for others states it may mean an erosion of their public budgets. The Member States are therefore forced to compete for a capital by a reducing of the tax burden (especially a cutting of the corporate effective tax rates) to don’t lose their tax bases. At present time of the debt crisis, when most of the Member States look for a solution to a balance of their deficit budgets, there a question arises whether a tendency towards a cutting of corporate effective tax rates does not lead to a race to the bottom and the erosion of their public budgets. In this context, the aim of this paper is to answer whether the race to the bottom is real in the European Union. This paper empirically evaluates the level of the race to the bottom in the European Union and using panel analysis it verifies on a sample of 27 Member States over the period 1998 to 2010 whether the tendencies of the race to the bottom are real. According to the panel analysis this paper concludes that the tendencies of the race to the bottom are particularly evident in the new Member States, i.e. in the EU-12 countries, while for the old Member States, i.e. for the EU-15 countries, the race to the bottom cannot be statistically confirmed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-535
Author(s):  
Ryan Woodgate

Corporate tax rates have been consistently falling around the world for decades now. This paper aims to explain the causes and consequences of this ‘global race to the bottom’. In particular, the author wishes to test the hypothesis that this race to the bottom is driven by demand-boosting corporate tax competition, where, contrary to traditional Kaleckian theory, lower corporate taxes may positively affect demand through increased investment due to multinational enterprises (MNEs) that seek higher net profits through (re)locating in low-tax jurisdictions. In order to do so, the author builds a general theory of the effect of average effective corporate tax rates (AECTRs) on MNE location. This theory is used to justify the addition of a tax-sensitive foreign direct investment channel in the investment function of a canonical Kaleckian model. As a result, this paper determines the conditions under which a country may be ‘tax-competition-led’, where lowering AECTRs increases demand through increased MNE investment and in spite of the negative effect on government expenditure given a balanced budget. The findings of this paper are that it is possible for an economy to be tax-competition-led, though it is unlikely in many cases given the existence of a coordination problem that lessens or nullifies the effect of lowering AECTRs when many countries do so simultaneously. The author refers to this problem as the ‘paradox of tax competition’, since, like other fallacies of composition commonly identified in Post-Keynesian thought, this is a phenomenon where the benefits of one country acting alone are reduced or eliminated if other countries act the same way at the same time. Based on this model, crude but nonetheless informative estimates are given that indicate that the race to the bottom has had a negative effect on demand in the vast majority of OECD countries. In this sense, the author finds that the persistence of policymakers to continue to compete on corporate taxes ‘imprudent’. Model-consistent policy recommendations are offered, chief among which are tax coordination or, failing that, technical changes in how individual countries collect corporation tax.


World Economy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 818-845
Author(s):  
María Teresa Álvarez-Martínez ◽  
Salvador Barrios ◽  
Diego d'Andria ◽  
Maria Gesualdo ◽  
Dimitrios Pontikakis ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
pp. 101-106
Author(s):  
Leonid GUSEV

It is necessary to specify that as a result of the (unification?) of Germany in 1990, its eastern frontier directly bordered with a number of former communist states. Since the beginning of the 90 years of cooperation with these states one of Germany’s main tasks became rendering aid to them in carrying out reforms. Germany, being one of leaders of the EU was interested in involvement of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the European market and in receiving benefits from this cooperation, besides; in the political sphere it was important to create a common and stable Europe. One can add that stability and safety in Europe was connected with EU expansion to the East. This article also analyzes how in recent years Germany has been influencing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; demonstrating that Germany cooperated with countries of Eastern Europe not only within the European Union, but also in a bilateral format since for Germany, entry of the countries of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU into EU was communicated with the realization of a complex of social, economic and political interests with the Visegrád group.


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