Religious Freedom and the Churches: Contemporary Challenges in the United States Today1

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-204
Author(s):  
Richard W. Garnett
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sexual Abuse ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Institutions ◽  
General Decline ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Right

A crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the human and constitutional right to religious freedom is the autonomy of religious institutions, associations and societies with respect to matters of governance, doctrine, formation and membership. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this autonomy in the context of American constitutional law, it is vulnerable, and even under threat, for a variety of reasons, including a general decline in the health of civil society and mediating associations and a crisis of confidence and authority caused by clerical sexual abuse and churches’ failure to respond to it.

scholarly journals State Legislatures Have the Courage to Pass Antiabortion Laws and Test the Ideology of the “New” United States Supreme Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Undue Burden ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Reported Data ◽  
The Right

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.

Constitutional Law in 1949–1950

1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-109
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
The United States ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court

There were two changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1949 term. Attorney General Tom C. Clark was sworn in as an Associate Justice to succeed the late Justice Frank Murphy on August 24, 1949, after his nomination by President Truman had been approved on August 19 by a vote of 73 to 8. Judge Sherman Minton of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was nominated to be an Associate Justice on September 15, 1949, to succeed Justice Wiley Rutledge. His nomination was approved by the Senate on October 4 by a vote of 48 to 16, and he was sworn in on October 12. During much of the term Justice Douglas was absent as the result of an accident incurred during the preceding summer recess. The loss of Justices Murphy and Rutledge greatly weakened the liberal alignment of the Court and very positively influenced the decision of a number of doubtful cases contrary to precedents of a recent date.

Constitutional Law in 1936–37: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1936

1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political History ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The 1936 term of the Supreme Court will probably be rated a notable one. This is due both to the Court's own work, and to certain extraneous occurrences which could hardly fail to have some impact upon it. In any attempt to evaluate the work of this term, one should bear in mind the following facts: First, a month after the Court convened President Roosevelt was reëlected by one of the most impressive popular and electoral majorities in our political history. Second, in February the President submitted to Congress his proposal for the reorganization of the Supreme Court, including the enlargement of its membership by the addition, up to fifteen, of a new justice for every one remaining on the Court beyond the age of seventy. This proposal aroused violent opposition, the debates on it continued for many months, and ultimately the plan was defeated largely through the efforts of the President's own party. The discussions on this proposal were going on during much of the time in which the Court was sitting. Third, in every case in which New Deal laws were attacked, they were held valid. These results were accomplished in many instances by five-to-four margins, and in the Minimum Wage Case by a five-to-four reversal of a previous five-to-three decision.

Constitutional Law in 1947–48: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1947

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308
Author(s):  
David Fellman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court during the 1947 term. The former Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, Avho had retired from the Court on July 1, 1941, died on August 27, 1948. Justice Hughes had served on the Court from May 2, 1910, to June 10, 1916, and was appointed Chief Justice on February 13,1930, succeeding William Howard Taft. In characteristic fashion, the justices filed during the 1947 term a very large number of dissenting and concurring opinions liberally salted with spirited and often bitter judicial invective.

Migration and Modern Religious Pluralism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa Borja
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Institutions ◽  
The Public ◽  
Religious Difference ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
American Churches

In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States enacted major changes in immigration policy that, in turn, produced dramatic changes in the ethno-racial and religious makeup of the American population. Especially after 1965, unprecedented numbers of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, animists, and ancestor-worshippers migrated to the United States, as did Asian, African, and Latino Christians who introduced new cultural diversity to American churches. During the same period, ideology of pluralism gained currency, and Americans revised their understanding of what it means to pursue harmonious relations across lines of religious difference. Ideas and practices of pluralism not only adjusted to these new conditions but also powerfully reshaped both secular and religious institutions in the United States in the process. However, despite the public embrace of pluralism, recent developments have made clear that aspirations of religious freedom and interfaith harmony have been more difficult to put into practice than many people have expected.

Constitutional Law in 1937–1938: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1937

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-266
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Prior Service ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

During the 1937 term, the Supreme Court underwent the first changes in its personnel since Mr. Justice Cardozo succeeded Mr. Justice Holmes in March, 1932. On June 1, 1937, Mr. Justice Van Devanter retired and was succeeded at the opening of the new term in October by Mr. Justice Black. On January 18, 1938, Mr. Justice Sutherland retired and was succeeded on January 31 by Mr. Justice Reed. During a substantial part of the term, Mr. Justice Cardozo was absent on account of illness, and his death occurred July 9, 1938. Mr. Justice Black, whose appointment had attracted much public comment, threw himself into the work of the Court with unusual vigor. During the term, he wrote the opinion of the Court in fifteen cases. He dissented in fourteen cases, in nine of which he wrote dissenting opinions. He concurred without substantial opinion in eleven cases, and wrote a concurring opinion in one other case. Mr. Justice Reed participated less actively, first because of the lateness of his appointment, and second because his prior service as Solicitor-General of the United States disqualified him from sitting in a considerable number of cases. These changes in the membership of the Court have altered the almost even division on the bench between the so-called conservatives and the so-called liberals. Without attempting to speculate as to the course of future decisions, it is significant that the irreconcilably conservative block of justices, consisting of Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, McReynolds, and Butler, has been broken up.

Is Religious Freedom Impossible in Canada?

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Roman Catholicism ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Nuanced Understanding ◽  
Point Of Departure

The idea of religious freedom is not new in Canadian law or wider public discourse, although it has taken on a life of its own in the post- Charter era (1982 onward) and certainly in the last several years. As the courts wade more fully into the swirling abyss that is religion they find themselves struggling with the issues that preoccupy scholars of religion (and for which they have found no conclusive answer): what is “religion” and how can it be defined in a manner that is inclusive and meaningful? This article takes as its point of departure the provocative and compelling argument made by Winnifred Sullivan in her book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (2005), that religious freedom as a legal promise is untenable. In this article I argue that while plausible and convincing in the context of the United States, Sullivan’s thesis may be less applicable in Canada for three key reasons. First, the embeddedness of Roman Catholicism in Canadian social structure has resulted in a textured and nuanced understanding of religion, or, at the very least, a recognition that religion is in some measure a multifaceted notion. Secondly, the recognition of group rights, however defined, means that there is a space created for alternative religious discourses, in part because of the constitutional recognition of multiculturalism. Thirdly, the recent turn by the Supreme Court of Canada to an understanding of the subjectivity of religious freedom strengthens the idea that religion must be conceptualized in relation to the ways in which individuals understand and practice it in their day to day lives.

Constitutional Law in 1944–45: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1944

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The membership of the Supreme Court did not change during the 1944 term, but Mr. Justice Roberts resigned in July after the term had ended. Divisions in the Court were as numerous and as difficult to classify as before. Four justices dissented in twenty-seven cases, while three justices dissented in sixteen cases. The Court seems to be moving toward the old practice of the pre-Marshall period by which the justices wrote seriatim opinions. There is a depressing increase in the number of cases in which three, four, and even five justices feel impelled to write separate opinions.

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