scholarly journals Conceptualizing intellectual attention

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 775-788
Author(s):  
Mark Fortney

Remembering that there’s a difference between intellectual and perceptual attention can help us avoid miscommunication due to meaning different things by the same terms, which has been a particular problem during the last hundred years or so of the study of attention. I demonstrate this through analyzing in depth one such miscommunication that occurred in a philosophical criticism of the influential psychological text, Inattentional Blindness. But after making the distinction between perceptual attention and intellectual attention, and after making an effort to keep this distinction in mind, we are still faced with the problem of specifying what makes intellectual attention distinct from perceptual attention. In the second half of this article, I discuss the range of proposals about how to understand intellectual attention that are present in the literature, and the problems with them. I do this with the aim of stimulating further discussion about how best to conceptualize intellectual attention, although I do not settle that further question within this paper.

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 120-127
Author(s):  
Carina Kreitz

Zusammenfassung. Wenn wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit einer Aufgabe zuwenden, nehmen wir Dinge, die währenddessen unerwartet auftauchen, häufig nicht bewusst wahr – obwohl sie unmittelbar in unserem Blickfeld erscheinen. Dieses Phänomen, das als Inattentional Blindness bezeichnet wird, kann fatale Konsequenzen in alltäglichen Situationen und auch einen ernstzunehmenden Einfluss auf sportliche Leistungen haben. In Ergänzung zu vorheriger Forschung zeigen meine eigenen Ergebnisse, dass eine Vielzahl situativer Faktoren die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der Inattentional Blindness auftritt, beeinflussen können. Dazu zählen unter anderem bestimmte Eigenschaften des unerwarteten Objekts sowie Kontextfaktoren. Im Gegensatz dazu scheinen interindividuelle Unterschiede über die situativen Einflüsse hinaus kaum (oder zumindest nicht reliabel) vorherzusagen, ob Inattentional Blindness auftritt oder nicht. Während es also eine feste Wahrscheinlichkeit über alle Personen hinweg gibt, dass ein unerwartetes Objekt bemerkt wird (deterministischer Aspekt), kann anhand der Persönlichkeitsstruktur und der kognitiven Fähigkeiten dieser Personen nicht vorhergesagt werden, wer von ihnen das unerwartete Objekt entdecken wird und wer nicht (stochastischer Aspekt).


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Dattel ◽  
Jason E. Vogt ◽  
Chelsea C. Sheehan ◽  
Kristen Madjic ◽  
Matthew C. Stefonetti ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (12) ◽  
pp. 1143-1151
Author(s):  
Cheng-Zhi FENG ◽  
Xia FENG

Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Conscious attention performs two distinct roles in experience, a role of placing and a role of focusing, roles which match a distinction between selection and access endorsed in recent theories of attention. The intentionality of conscious experience consists in two sorts of attentional action, a focusing at and a placing on, the first lending to experience a perspectival categorical content and the second structuring its phenomenal character. Placing should be thought of more like opening a window for consciousness than as shining a spotlight, and focusing has to do with accessing the properties of whatever the window opens onto. A window is an aperture whose boundaries are defined by what is excluded—in this case, distractors.


Author(s):  
Linda Hirsch ◽  
Christina Schneegass ◽  
Robin Welsch ◽  
Andreas Butz

People visit public places with different intentions and motivations. While some explore it carefully, others may just want to pass or are otherwise engaged. We investigate how to exploit the inattentional blindness (IB) of indirect users in the design of public interfaces to apply to such diverse needs. Beginning with a structured literature study in the ACM Digital Library on IB, we analyzed 135 publications to derive design strategies that benefit from IB or avoid IB. Using these findings, we selected three existing interfaces for information presentation on a large public square and created two additional interfaces ourselves. We then compared users' perceptions through a self-reported photography study (N = 40). Participants followed one of four scripted profiles to imitate different user intentions, two for direct and two for indirect users. We hypothesized that direct users would recognize the interfaces, while indirect users would experience IB and ignore them. Our results show that direct users reported up to 68% of our interfaces, whereas indirect users noticed only 16%. Thus, IB can be exploited to hide interfaces from indirect users while keeping them noticeable to direct users.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi

Abstract I argue that a study of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Parva Naturalia shows that Aristotle had a notion of attention. This notion captures the common aspects of apparently different phenomena like perceiving something vividly, being distracted by a loud sound or by a musical piece, focusing on a geometrical problem. For Aristotle, these phenomena involve a specific selectivity that is the outcome of the competition between different cognitive stimuli. This selectivity is attention. I argue that Aristotle studied the common aspects of the physiological processes at the basis of attention and its connection with pleasure. His notion can explain perceptual attention and intellectual attention as voluntary or involuntary phenomena. In addition, it sheds light on how attention and enjoyment can enhance our cognitive activities.


1985 ◽  
Vol 78 (S1) ◽  
pp. S83-S83
Author(s):  
Howard C. Nusbaum ◽  
Steven L. Greenspan ◽  
David B. Pisoni

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