Non-discrimination and free movement in a Member State to Member State fiscal dispute: Case C-591/17 Austria v. Germany: Case C-591/17 Austria v. Germany, EU:C:2019:504

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 849-858
Author(s):  
Augustin Chapuis-Doppler ◽  
Vincent Delhomme

In its judgement in the case of Austria v. Germany, the Court of Justice of the EU found the new German motorway financing scheme to be in breach of EU law, namely Articles 18, 34, 56 and 92 TFEU. This decision is noteworthy in several regards. It is a snub for the Commission, which had previously decided to terminate its infringement procedure against Germany. It provides guidance for Member States wishing to reform some of their tax arrangements according to the ‘user pays’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles. Finally, it raises interesting questions regarding the application of Article 34 TFEU to fiscal measures.

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Radim Charvát

Abstract The paper addresses the issue whether customs authorities of Member States are entitled to suspend or detain goods in transit (i.e., products directing from one non- Member State to another non-Member State through the EU) and the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice related to this matter. Prior to the judgment in Philips and Nokia cases, a so-called manufacturing fiction theory was applied by some Member State courts (especially Dutch courts). According to this theory, goods suspended or detained by customs authorities within the EU were considered to be manufactured in the Member State where the custom action took place. In the Philips and Nokia judgments, the Court of Justice rejected this manufacturing fiction theory. But the proposal for amendment to the Regulation on Community trade mark and the proposal of the new Trademark directive, as a part of the trademark reform within the EU, go directly against the ruling in the Philips and Nokia cases and against the Understanding between the EU and India.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 165-186
Author(s):  
Christian NK FRANKLIN

AbstractWhilst the European Union’s aim of achieving an ‘ever closer Union’ is not an objective of EEA cooperation, homogeneity demands that we follow the same path: as the Union gets ever closer, so too does EEA cooperation, in light of the demands of the fundamental principle of homogeneity. This is particularly well demonstrated by looking at developments in the field of the free movement of persons. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA Court) in this field shows that in situations where homogeneity is put to the test, there seems little to suggest that a more national sovereignty-friendly approach has been adopted than under EU law. Notwithstanding the integral differences between the EU and EEA legal constructs, the EFTA Court has proven highly adept at keeping pace with EU developments in the field through a number of bold and creative interpretations of EEA law, and by using different tools to arrive at uniform conclusions.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2020 ◽  
pp. 294-322
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter explores the free movement of goods, which lies at the very heart of the internal market. The idea of the free movement of goods was the starting point that the EEC Treaty aimed for, and remains one of the greatest achievements of the EU to date. However, as with everything in EU law, there are a lot of legal rules underpinning a fairly straightforward concept. The Treaty contains two separate sets of provisions that address matters of taxation when it comes to trade in products. The first relates to border taxation, while the second relates to internal taxation. With regard to non-taxation issues, the primary issue is quantitative restrictions: situations where a Member State either blocks a specific volume of products from entering its market, or outlaws/bans a product altogether. The chapter then considers the exceptions to free movement of goods, and assesses how Brexit may impact on the free movement of goods between the UK and the EU.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne

Abstract This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-486
Author(s):  
Joelle Grogan

Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 concerning the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Polish Supreme Court) is the latest in a series of European Union (EU) Member States requesting the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to rule on the independence of their judicial systems. While the organization of justice systems within Member States is a competence of Member States (and thus not for the EU to determine or decide), the CJEU has held that Member States are nevertheless required to comply with obligations under EU law to ensure effective judicial protection and, as a necessary corollary, judicial independence. The significance of the current case lies in the formulation by the CJEU of a “European” standard of judicial independence, and its finding that national judges may set aside the jurisdiction of courts found not to be independent against that standard and to disapply any national measure (in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law over national law) that gives jurisdiction to a non-independent court.


ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth

AbstractThe construction of names and the use of nobility titles is not regulated by European Union law. Yet the Court of Justice of the EU has had to deal with such issues on various occasions where national rules on names or titles had to be contrasted with the EU law on equal treatment, Union citizenship and free movement and residence. Rules on names fall essentially within the competence of the member states, but the states have to regard EU law when exercising this competence. Our paper undertakes to analyse this issue in light of a recent relevant judgment, the Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff case, having regard also to the Court’s reasoning regarding the national constitutional identity clause [Art 4 (2)TEU]. We argue – inter alia – that the Court of Justice decided in this judgment not to favour the rights of a free-moving EU citizen (even if the judgment admittedly affects only a limited circle of individuals) and put national constitutional identity first, yet the way in which the identity clause was used by the Court is also debatable in our view.


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