scholarly journals Goods in Transit and Intellectual Property Under the EU Law and Caselaw of the Court of Justice

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Radim Charvát

Abstract The paper addresses the issue whether customs authorities of Member States are entitled to suspend or detain goods in transit (i.e., products directing from one non- Member State to another non-Member State through the EU) and the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice related to this matter. Prior to the judgment in Philips and Nokia cases, a so-called manufacturing fiction theory was applied by some Member State courts (especially Dutch courts). According to this theory, goods suspended or detained by customs authorities within the EU were considered to be manufactured in the Member State where the custom action took place. In the Philips and Nokia judgments, the Court of Justice rejected this manufacturing fiction theory. But the proposal for amendment to the Regulation on Community trade mark and the proposal of the new Trademark directive, as a part of the trademark reform within the EU, go directly against the ruling in the Philips and Nokia cases and against the Understanding between the EU and India.

Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne

Abstract This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


Author(s):  
Lorin-Johannes Wagner

The question of who ought to be regarded as Union citizen is a central but not an easily answered question. Drawing on an analysis of the ECJ’s case-law and the underlying constitutional set up of Union citizenship, this article argues that the notion of nationality in EU law is based on a jurisdictional conception that builds on the idea of a genuine link and a territorial link with the EU. Relying on this understanding the article assesses the peculiar cases of Germany, the UK and Denmark, establishing not only if and how Member States can reconfigure the meaning of their nationality under EU law but also highlighting that the notion of nationality as a peremptory marker for Union citizenship is defined within the constitutional realm of EU law. The understanding that Member States are free to define their nationality within EU law, hence, is a misplaced overstatement of sovereignty. Against this backdrop the last part of the article turns to the case of Latvian non-citizens, arguing that Latvian non-citizens, who are generally not regarded as Union citizens, have been Union citizens all along.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Marek Rzotkiewicz

According to the Article 16.1 of Regulation 2015/1589 the Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of EU law. The potential existence of such a contradiction can be then of un utmost significance to a Member State and aid beneficiaries. However, notwithstanding its significance, the notion of a general principle of EU law has not been defined in the EU legislation, has been derived from the case law of the Court of Justice. The current paper strives to analyze different sorts of general principles of the EU law and their impact on the recovery obligation, especially as such an obligation differs between particular principles. Some of those principles have no significance at all on the existence of the recovery order, while others can, and sometimes even should, bar the Commission from ordering a Member State to recover an aid.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Ogwezzy

Abstract The article deals with the rules for a grant of interim measures in the context of EU law and its application in national judicial proceedings. It covers the key case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU related to the regime, conditions and limits of the interim measures and adds a reflection of practice of Czech courts. Article pays particular attention to the conditions for suspension ofn the application of national law measures.


Author(s):  
Monika Domańska ◽  
Dawid Miąsik ◽  
Monika Szwarc

The Court of Justice of the European Union operates on a case-by-case basis. This means that its decisions normally relate to specific problems occurring in a specific Member State. Consequently it is often hard to ‘translate’ this case law into the national legal system of a different Member State. Nevertheless the case law of the Court of Justice has consequences not only for the individual Member States. It also has harmonising effects. In this sense, the principles of primacy and of direct effect of EU provisions, as well as the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law, operate as the minimum requirements which the legal systems of Member States must fulfil. Poland joined the European Union in May 2004. At that time the number of Member States increased to 25. The existence of avenues of judicial protection in the EU raised a number of questions from the very beginning. Now, after 15 years of experience it is time to consider the standard of application of EU law by Polish courts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 849-858
Author(s):  
Augustin Chapuis-Doppler ◽  
Vincent Delhomme

In its judgement in the case of Austria v. Germany, the Court of Justice of the EU found the new German motorway financing scheme to be in breach of EU law, namely Articles 18, 34, 56 and 92 TFEU. This decision is noteworthy in several regards. It is a snub for the Commission, which had previously decided to terminate its infringement procedure against Germany. It provides guidance for Member States wishing to reform some of their tax arrangements according to the ‘user pays’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles. Finally, it raises interesting questions regarding the application of Article 34 TFEU to fiscal measures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-62
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli

Effective judicial protection emerged as a EU law principle in the 1980s, operating alongside the Rewe principles of equivalence and effectiveness as a standard to assess national procedures for the enforcement of EU law. This article argues that the codification of effective judicial protection in Article 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter, operated by the Lisbon Treaty, has stimulated an evolution of the principle, which is evident in the recent case law of the Court of Justice. Today, effective judicial protection operates not only as a procedural principle, but also as a more substantive and structural one, and has generally acquired broader constitutional relevance. This evolution has crucial effects on the EU legal order: most importantly, it affects the division of competences between Member States and the EU, and between the Court of Justice and national courts.


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