The enforcement of diverse labour standards through private governance

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Christina Stroehle

The effectiveness of private governance on global labour standards remains extremely difficult to assess, let alone measure. Debates surrounding relevant factors focus on two areas: contextual variables regarding social and economic upgrading, and firm-specific characteristics. This article contributes to both debates, looking at characteristics of buyer companies, while also taking institutional variables into account. It examines structural and environmental features of cases encoded in a data set derived from over 1000 audit reports compiled by the Fair Labor Association. Focusing on the apparel, sports- and footwear industry, the article highlights the importance of regulatory quality, economic performance and social freedom in sourcing countries for the success of private governance. The analysis statistically underlines the importance of public governance specifically for process rights, such as anti-discrimination and freedom of association. Complementarity between private and public governance programmes may therefore be particularly important for these standards.

Author(s):  
Giovanni Pasquali ◽  
Shane Godfrey ◽  
Khalid Nadvi

Abstract Regional value chains (RVCs) and South–South trade are increasingly considered key features of 21st-century globalisation. This article investigates how RVCs are shaped by the interaction of private and public governance. It evaluates how this interaction unfolded in Southern Africa’s apparel RVCs, exploring trade, investment and labour regimes across three levels of analysis: national, regional, and global. The paper draws on trade data, secondary literature, and interviews with suppliers and institutions in Eswatini and Lesotho (the largest exporters to the region), and lead firms in South Africa (the largest regional importer). The findings underline the critical role of public governance in shaping retailers’ and suppliers’ participation in RVCs through: (i) regional ‘trade regimes’ protecting regional exporters from global competitors, and recent shifts in global trade regimes; (ii) national and regional ‘investment regimes’ facilitating investment flows from South Africa to Lesotho and Eswatini, and the more recent shift of US-oriented suppliers towards regional markets; and (iii) ‘labour regimes’, including lower wages, less comprehensive labour legislation and weaker trade unions in Lesotho and Eswatini compared to South Africa. The article concludes by considering the policy implications of the interaction of private and public governance for existing and future RVCs in Sub-Saharan Africa.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Pasquali ◽  
Shane Godfrey

AbstractThere is a growing literature on the impact of Covid-19 on commercial and labour conditions at suppliers in apparel global value chains (GVCs). Yet much less is known about the implications for suppliers operating in regional value chains (RVCs) in the global South. In this article, we focus on Eswatini, which has grown to become the largest African manufacturer and exporter of apparel to the region. We draw on a combination of firm-level export data and interviews with stakeholders before and after the Covid-19 lockdown to shed light on the influence of private and public governance on suppliers’ economic and social upgrading and downgrading. We point to the coexistence of two separate private governance structures: the first characterised by direct contracts between South African retailers and large manufacturers (direct suppliers); the second operating through indirect purchasing via intermediaries from relatively smaller producers (indirect suppliers). While direct suppliers enjoyed higher levels of economic and social upgrading than indirect suppliers before Covid-19, the pandemic reinforced this division, with severe price cuts for indirect suppliers. Furthermore, while retailers provided some direct suppliers with support throughout the crisis, this was not the case for indirect suppliers, who remain comparatively more vulnerable. In terms of public governance, the negative consequences of the lockdown on firms’ income and workers’ livelihoods have been compounded by the state’s ineffective response. Our paper contributes to the research on RVCs in the global South, enhancing our understanding of how different governance structures and external shocks affect firms’ and workers’ upgrading and downgrading prospects.


Author(s):  
Peter Knaack

G20 leaders vowed to collect and share OTC derivatives trade data so that regulators can obtain a global picture of market and risk evolution. This chapter employs a network perspective to explain why they have failed to meet this commitment to date. It examines three networks: the OTC derivatives market itself, and those of its private and public governance. The analysis shows that the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the public supervisory entity, struggles to establish itself at the center of the global regulatory network. It failed to act as a first mover in setting global trade identification standards (legal entity identifiers), and it has not been able to establish a core of global data warehouses. This is largely the result of unilateral action by FSB members. In particular, legislators in member countries have undermined FSB-led efforts by refusing to remove legal barriers to transnational regulatory cooperation and, in some instances, by erecting new ones.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Strickland

Across the United States over time, numbers of registered interest groups have continued to increase, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America’s statehouses. Among registered interests, average numbers of hired lobbyists have increased markedly since the late 1980s. This study both quantifies this increase and identifies a set of causal variables. Previous studies have proposed a variety of short-term, political and long-term, institutional factors that govern rates of lobbying. Using a new data set spanning multiple decades, I find that changes in lobbying can largely be ascribed to institutional variables, including the implementation of term limits and regulations on lobbying. Lobby regulations, one-party dominance, and legislative expenditures also appear to play a role in determining rates of multiclient lobbying. Direct democracy and state spending do not affect the hiring of lobbyists by registered interest groups.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Mayer ◽  
Gary Gereffi

Corporate codes of conduct, product certifications, process standards, and other voluntary, non-governmental forms of private governance have proliferated in the last two decades. These innovations are a response to social pressures unleashed by globalization and the inadequacy of governmental institutions for addressing its social and environmental impacts. Private governance has had some notable successes, but there are clear limits to what it alone can be expected to accomplish. We hypothesize that the effectiveness of private governance depends on four main factors: 1) the structure of the particular global value chain in which production takes place; 2) the extent to which demand for a firm's products relies on its brand identity; 3) the possibilities for collective action by consumers, workers, or other activists to exert pressure on producers; and 4) the extent to which commercial interests of lead firms align with social and environmental concerns. Taken together, these hypotheses suggest that private governance will flourish in only a limited set of circumstances. With the trend towards consolidation of production in the largest developing countries, however, we also see a strengthening of some forms of public governance. Private governance will not disappear, but it will be linked to emerging forms of multi-stakeholder institutions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (11) ◽  
pp. 1455-1488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Nikolova ◽  
Nikolay Marinov

We show that unexpected financial windfalls increase corruption in local government. Our analysis uses a new data set on flood-related transfers, and the associated spending infringements, which the Bulgarian central government distributed to municipalities following torrential rains in 2004 and 2005. Using information from the publicly available audit reports, we are able to build a unique objective index of corruption. We also exploit the quasi-random nature of the rainfall shock (conditional on controls for ground flood risk) to isolate exogenous variation in the amount of funds received by each municipality. Our results imply that a 10% increase in the per capita amount of disbursed funds leads to a 9.8% increase in corruption. We also present suggestive evidence that more corrupt mayors anticipated punishment by voters and dropped out of the next election race. Our results highlight the governance pitfalls of nontax transfers, such as disaster relief or assistance from international organizations, even in moderately strong democracies.


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