Cognitive adaptations to criminal justice lead to “paranoid” norm obedience

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr M. Patrzyk ◽  
Martin Takáč
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

People often cooperate and obey norms in situations where it is clear they cannot be caught and punished. Such behavior does not serve their self-interest, as they are foregoing opportunities to exploit others without any negative consequences. Hence, it is not clear how this behavior could have evolved. Some previous explanations invoked the existence of other-regarding preferences, moral motivation, or intrinsic concern for social norms. In this study, we develop an agent-based model illustrating that none of these is necessary for the emergence of norm-abiding behavior. Our model suggests evolutionary pressure against norm violators may lead to the emergence of a bias, causing agents to be extremely sensitive to the probability of being caught. Because of this, they often incorrectly classify anonymous situations as non-anonymous ones and obey social norms due to the fear of being punished. In our simulations, we show that cooperation is promoted by (1) the number of interactions actually observed, (2) the strength of punishments against norm violators, and most importantly, (3) the uncertainty in agent classifications.

Evolution and Moral Motivation in Economics

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-137
Author(s):  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Economic Man ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Preference Functions ◽  
Recent Addition ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Descent Of Man

Adam Smith argued that humans were motivated by both self-interest and moral concerns. Economics has since moved towards a contrasting utilitarian view where behavior is understood in terms of unifying preference functions. Also most economists have presumed that these preferences are “self-regarding.” Two major treatises in economics were published in 1871, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and argued that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. This stance is supported by modern research. This article reconciles Darwin’s view that developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other claim that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically inherited basis. It also questions whether the recent addition of “other-regarding” preferences is adequate, and whether morality and altruism are reducible to preferences or utility maximization.

Self-Centered Inequity Aversion and the Mass Politics of Taxation

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (14) ◽  
pp. 1965-1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobo Lü ◽  
Kenneth Scheve
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Inequity Aversion ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Policy Alternatives ◽  
Mass Politics ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Economic Conflict ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about economic policy. This article investigates whether self-centered inequity aversion along with self-interest influences individual tax policy opinions. We conduct original survey experiments in France and the United States, and provide evidence that individuals care about both how policy alternatives affect their own interests and how they influence the welfare of others relative to themselves.

A cross-species perspective on the selfishness axiom

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 818-818
Author(s):  
Sarah F. Brosnan ◽  
Frans B. M. de Waal
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Other ◽  
Capuchin Monkeys ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Henrich et al. describe an innovative research program investigating cross-cultural differences in the selfishness axiom (in economic games) in humans, yet humans are not the only species to show such variation. Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys show signs of deviating from the standard self-interest paradigm in experimental settings by refusing to take foods that are less valuable than those earned by conspecifics, indicating that they, too, may pay attention to relative gains. However, it is less clear whether these species also show the other-regarding preferences seen in humans.

scholarly journals The marketisation of rehabilitation: Some economic considerations

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Albertson ◽  
Chris Fox
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Current System ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Criminal Justice Policy ◽  
Public Welfare ◽  
State Sector ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Economic Considerations

This paper considers criminal justice policy in England and Wales since the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) agenda implemented in 2013. TR rested on the proposition that probation services are best provided in a market context. Motivated by profit and extrinsic rewards, private sector consortia, and their employees, theoretically act efficiently to deter and rehabilitate offenders from crime. However, there is evidence that marketisation itself undermines the prospects of efficient social policy. Over-reliance on markets may undermine pro-social norms through emphasising individualism and extrinsic returns. Outsourcing is also associated with increasing inequality, which may also undermine pro-social norms. Further, the emphasis placed on self-interest in framing market-based incentive structures is associated with declining public welfare support for the economically marginalised and increased use of relatively expensive incarceration. In application, TR proved unsustainable. The innovation involves increasing reliance on the para-state sector, in which private profits rely on public payment. However, the profits expected under TR fell short of expectations, in part due to changes in wider society. The early cancellation of TR contracts highlights the inflexible nature of such public sector procurement. On the basis of theory and practice, we suggest a reconsideration of the government’s position on probation and set out reasonable steps to address shortcomings in the current system.

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