Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

Economic games can be used to promote cooperation in the field

We present experimental evidence of the impact of playing a game on real-life cooperation. The game was framed as a pest-management activity, the effectiveness of which depends on the decisions of others. Playing the game changes behavior in the field, increasing the participation in all collective activities directed at reducing pest pressure. The economic impact of those activities is important, leading to losses that are ∼20% lower than in the control group. Increased cooperation reflects changes in the understanding of others’ willingness to cooperate, not changes in the understanding of underlying technological interdependencies.

The benefits of beauty – Individual differences in the pro-attractiveness bias in social decision making

While there already is a huge body of research examining the advantages and disadvantages of physical attractiveness in social and economic decisions, little research has been made to explore the role of individual differences in social decision-making with regard to beauty. To close this scientific gap, we conducted a multiparadigm online study (N = 210; 52% females) in which participants were asked to make decisions in four different economic games facing differently attractive counterparts. Additionally, the personality trait agreeableness was assessed to test for individual differences in decision-making. In exploratory analyses, we also assessed which facet of agreeableness is the most appropriate to predict individual differences in the various economic games. In the study, we were able to replicate the finding of a beauty premium and a plainness penalty but did not find any support for the idea of a beauty penalty. Furthermore, evidence for an opposite-sex advantage was found, which was greater when men were facing women than the other way around. While agreeableness as an overall trait influenced decision making across various paradigms, interactions of distinct facets of agreeableness with the partners’ attractiveness remain heterogeneous and ambiguous. This underlines the importance of integrating the specificity of certain traits in experimental research and the necessity of combining them with different social situations.

Prosocial Gains and Losses: Modulations of Human Social Decision-Making by Loss-Gain Context

The role of the loss-gain context in human social decision-making remains heavily debated, with mixed evidence showing that losses (vs. gains) boost both selfish and prosocial motivations. Herein, we propose that the loss context, compared to the gain context, exacerbates intuitive reactions in response to the conflict between self-interest and prosocial preferences, regardless of whether those dominant responses are selfish or altruistic. We then synthesize evidence from three lines of research to support the account, which indicates that losses may either enhance or inhibit altruistic behaviors depending on the dominant responses in the employed interactive economic games, prosocial/proself traits, and the explicit engagement of deliberative processes. The current perspective contributes to the ongoing debate on the association between loss-gain context and human prosociality by putting forward a theoretical framework to integrate previous conflicting perspectives.

Don’t get it or don’t spread it: comparing self-interested versus prosocial motivations for COVID-19 prevention behaviors

COVID-19 prevention behaviors may be seen as self-interested or prosocial. Using American samples from MTurk and Prolific (total n = 6850), we investigated which framing is more effective—and motivation is stronger—for fostering prevention behavior intentions. We evaluated messaging that emphasized personal, public, or personal and public benefits of prevention. In initial studies (conducted March 14–16, 2020), the Public treatment was more effective than the Personal treatment, and no less effective than the Personal + Public treatment. In additional studies (conducted April 17–30, 2020), all three treatments were similarly effective. Across all these studies, the perceived public threat of coronavirus was also more strongly associated with prevention intentions than the perceived personal threat. Furthermore, people who behaved prosocially in incentivized economic games years before the pandemic had greater prevention intentions. Finally, in a field experiment (conducted December 21–23, 2020), we used our three messaging strategies to motivate contact-tracing app signups (n = 152,556 newsletter subscribers). The design of this experiment prevents strong causal inference; however, the results provide suggestive evidence that the Personal + Public treatment may have been more effective than the Personal or Public treatment. Together, our results highlight the importance of prosocial motives for COVID-19 prevention.

Sharing money with humans versus computers: On Honesty-Humility and (non-)social preferences

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (1) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (2) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (3) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

Conjecturing Harmful Intent and Preemptive Strike in Paranoia

Paranoia depicts a belief of others having harmful intent. Research using economic games has exhibited the correlation between paranoia and the propensity to characterize ambiguous intentions as harmful. Using a non-clinical sample recruited online from the United States (N=290), we examined whether paranoid thoughts influence aggressive behavior against the subjective perception of harmful intent. We conducted a preemptive strike game wherein aggressive behavior was assumed to be guided by the fear of an opponent. The outcomes indicate that (1) individuals with high paranoia assume harmful intent of an opponent more than those with low paranoia (2) conjecturing an opponent’s harmful intent predicted an increase in the probability of a preemptive strike, and (3) paranoia did not have a statistically significant effect on encouraging a preemptive strike. Additionally, the exploratory analysis revealed that paranoia was related to participant’s aggressiveness and with suppositions of other’s self-interests and competitiveness. This study presents empirical evidence that paranoia is related to the perception of social threats in an uncertain situation. We discuss the possibility that paranoid ideation can promote or inhibit a preemptive strike.

DieTryin: An R package for data collection, automated data entry, and post-processing of network-structured economic games, social networks, and other roster-based dyadic data

Researchers studying social networks and inter-personal sentiments in bounded or small-scale communities face a trade-off between the use of roster-based and free-recall/name-generator-based survey tools. Roster-based methods scale poorly with sample size, and can more easily lead to respondent fatigue; however, they generally yield higher quality data that are less susceptible to recall bias and that require less post-processing. Name-generator-based methods, in contrast, scale well with sample size and are less likely to lead to respondent fatigue. However, they may be more sensitive to recall bias, and they entail a large amount of highly error-prone post-processing after data collection in order to link elicited names to unique identifiers. Here, we introduce an R package, DieTryin, that allows for roster-based dyadic data to be collected and entered as rapidly as name-generator-based data; DieTryin can be used to run network-structured economic games, as well as collect and process standard social network data and round-robin Likert-scale peer ratings. DieTryin automates photograph standardization, survey tool compilation, and data entry. We present a complete methodological workflow using DieTryin to teach end-users its full functionality.

Equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games: very practical conditions

Various Nash equilibrium results for a broad class of aggregative games are presented. The main ones concern equilibrium uniqueness. The setting presupposes that each player has $$\mathbb {R}_+$$ R + as strategy set, makes smoothness assumptions but allows for a discontinuity of stand-alone payoff functions at 0; this possibility is especially important for various contest and oligopolistic games. Conditions are completely in terms of marginal reductions which may be considered as primitives of the game. For many games in the literature they can easily be checked. They automatically imply that conditional payoff functions are strictly quasi-concave. The results are proved by means of the Szidarovszky variant of the Selten–Szidarovszky technique. Their power is illustrated by reproducing quickly and improving upon various results for economic games.